



International Journal of World Civilizations and Philosophical Studies  
(IJWCPS)  
Universiti Sains Malaysia  
<https://ejournal.usm.my/ijwcps/>  
e-ISSN: 3030-5071  
Volume 3 September 2025: 72-103

Submission date: 01.03.2025 Accepted date: 07/03/2025 Published date: 01/09/2025

## **Moral Judgment and Bias in Historiography: Issue and Clarification**

**Mohammad Umair Abd Rahim\* & Mohd Syahmir Alias**  
**Universiti Sains Malaysia**

**\*Corresponding Author: [umairabdrahim@gmail.com](mailto:umairabdrahim@gmail.com)**

### **Abstract**

Bias is often perceived as a challenge to objectivity in every field of knowledge, including history. The problem of bias in history has received special attention from historians since the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The topic also involves discussions on moral judgments in historiography, as if the two are strongly related. Some historians have argued that moral judgment in historiography leads to biased history and should be avoided. On the other hand, others contend that moral judgment in historiography should not be prohibited merely because it introduces bias, as there can be both justified and unjustified bias. Hence, this paper aims to present the issue of moral judgment in historiography as a cause of biased history and to explain why this issue does not necessarily undermine the legitimacy of moral judgment in historiography. As a philosophical study, the research will employ content analysis and logical inference using library-based sources to shed light on the issue. The study indicates that fundamentally, abandoning moral judgment to avoid biased history reflects a flawed understanding of the philosophy of historiography and is practically untenable.

**Keywords** Moral judgment, bias, philosophical argument, philosophy of historiography, objective history.

## Introduction

The discussion about bias in historiography is not a recent one. Thucydides (1954: 48) once noted that history must not be recorded with partiality:

“...my factual reporting of the events of the war, I have made it a principle... not even to be guided by my own general impressions... I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible... different eye-witnesses give different accounts of the same events, speaking out of partially for one side or the other else from imperfect memories.”

He argued that bias or personal preference is an adversary to objective history. However, historians before the nineteenth century never discussed the problem of biased history (e.g., its causes and nature) in depth, unlike those in the nineteenth century and beyond. It is often argued that moral judgment in historiography, which contributes to biased history, is evident in many historical writings before the "scientific historiography era." Because moral judgment in historiography was not perceived as a significant threat to the objectivity of history during those times, historiography of those periods was often biased in order to convey lessons (Howell & Prevenier, 2001).

Although the intensity of discourse on biased history has varied across centuries, one message has remained apparent since the time of Thucydides: historians should not write biased history. This advocacy became more pronounced with the advent of the modern age when mainstream historians, mostly Rankean, insisted that history must be "scientific." Since the Acton-Creighton debate on moral judgment in historiography, discussions on bias have become a central theme (Sewell, 2005). Even the moral nature of biased history—good or bad—has been debated. As a result of this development, most historians today, whether Rankean or not, have adopted a "scientific-history approach." This approach advocates that "for history to be objective, historians must not make moral judgments in historiography."

Take, for instance, Ahmat Adam, a renowned Malaysian historian famous for his strict attitude in representing facts of history. He urged historians to avoid moral judgment in writing history to follow the 'scientific standards'. He sees that moral judgment in historiography causes historical bias because moral truths are relative. Therefore, it is safer to refrain from moral judgment in historiography to avoid writing biased history (Ahmat Adam, 2016). Simply put, the common notion is that moral judgment in historiography is equivalent to bias in historiography.

That being said, this article will explore the link between moral judgment and bias in historiography. It will address some philosophical and methodological issues that arise concerning moral judgment in the context of the above discussion. The article aims to answer two main questions: Does moral judgment *cause* biased history? Second, if moral judgment does lead to biased history, *should* its practice be entirely prohibited? Subsequently, the article will explore related issues, such as whether history needs to be as objective as natural science. Finally, important clarifications on these issues will be provided.

Related to the questions above, many historians have provided insights and answers. To mention but a few, George M. Trevelyan and Herbert Butterfield had discussed this issue quite extensively. Trevelyan (1947) admits that bias hinders the search for truth in history because it allows for one-sidedness where one can condemn and praise historical agents unfairly. Butterfield (1951) explains that moral judgment in historiography will convert history into a tool for propaganda. History will be used to downgrade others for political interest, especially during war. Hence, he maintains, that is a problem for objectivity.

However, the previous literature is believed inadequate in *clarifying* the issue. Therefore, this article is believed to equip an important philosophical assessment to clarify that "moral judgement in historiography causes biased history and therefore historians should not adopt it". In attaining the objectives of this article as a philosophical study, it will utilize content analysis, deductive and abductive inferences, which is based on philosophical principles such as the principle of non-

contradiction over the qualitative data gathered from the writing of philosophers and historians.

### **Conceptual Definition of Moral Judgment in Historiography and Biased History**

Moral judgement in historiography is any historical description that gives the impression that historical agents have certain moral attributes and qualities or to be perceived as praiseworthy or blameworthy. It exposes the moral quality or value of any person, group, or institution. Therefore, when an author describes men in the past as being better or worse, right or wrong, it is moral judgment in historiography because it involves valuation on the subject (Vann, 2004; Oldfield, 1981; Broad, 1970; Atkinson, 1978). This includes, for example, descriptions to assert bravery, cowardice, stupidity, treachery, rightness and wrongness. These descriptions do not necessarily have to be made explicitly, they can also be made implicitly. As long as the authors use words that inform us about the agents' moral status and responsibility, value and devalue, the authors already did moral judgement (Berkhofer, 1995; Topolski, 1976; Waldmann, Nagel & Wiegmann, 2012).

As a sidenote, the term moral judgement in 'historiography' -instead of 'history' - has a more concise and limited definition because historiography can only mean two things, either "the study of historical writing" or "the writing of history". Also, historiography means explicitly the writing of history of "actions of human beings" (D'oro, 2009, p. 142). If history was used, it may also refer to multiple past objects. Thus, natural history and archaeology study the history of non-humans and physical remnants (Tucker, 2009). There is no moral judgement towards non-humans. Also, "moral judgement in history" can mean the history of moral judgement. Therefore, it is safer to use the term historiography instead of history when referring to the study of historical methods, although both may be used interchangeably.

Moving into the definition of biased history. Bias is prejudice; or an inclination of outlook, especially inclination marked by a substantial prejudice (Merriam-Webster, 2004; Webster's New Explorer, 2003). What

is prejudice? According to *Webster's New Explorer* (2003, p. 701), prejudice means "a judgement or opinion formed before considering or without knowing the facts" and "a favoring or dislike of something without grounds or before sufficient knowledge". *Merriam-Webster* (2004, p. 567) defines prejudice as "an opinion made without adequate basis" or "to damage by a judgement or action".

It is also synonymous with bias because bias implies partiality of individuals' judgement due to a consistent mental leaning in favor of something. Partiality is also one definition of bias, even though partiality carries another meaning (Scheffler, 2010). This is because partial also refers to an inclination to favor one side over the other and therefore, synonymous with bias (Hobson, 2001; *Webster's New Explorer*, 2003; *Merriam-Webster*, 2004). In other words, *not every partial representation is biased, but every biased representation is partial*. Having said that, biased history can be understood as a historical writing based on *intentional* partial attitude. It is the opposite of being objective. In a *general* sense, however, biased history is a history based on personal interpretation, which is not acceptable to everyone (Trevelyan, 1947).

### **The Common Understanding of the Link between Moral Judgment in Historiography and Bias History: Its Philosophical Basis**

The common understanding concerning moral judgement in historiography and bias history is that "moral judgement in historiography causes bias history, and therefore should not be practiced by historians". This understanding does not exist out of nothing: certain assumptions or premises are behind it. The following deductive argument is a summary of the assumptions behind this common understanding:

Premise (1): Objective historical truth is the aim all historians should have.

Premise (2): Bias in historiography obstructs objective historical truth.

Premise (3): Moral judgement in historiography causes bias in historiography.

Conclusion: Therefore, moral judgement in historiography should not be adopted by historians.

This deductive argument establishes why historians should not make moral judgements in historiography: the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. In order to refute the conclusion, the premises or the link need to be proven false, inadequate, or misplaced. This argument is the main issue of moral judgement in historiography. Now, in discussing the assumptions of this argument, several issues concerning the practice of moral judgement in historiography will be addressed as well. These issues will be explained along with the explanation of this deductive argument.

For the sake of argument, premise (1) is taken for granted, unless someone adopted historical relativism or extreme scepticism. This is because moral judgment in history must not be made under the relative truth of historical relativism. The absence of objective historical truth proposed by the historical relativist implies that moral judgement in history is unnecessary because it violates the idea of relative historical truth. Moral judgement in history implies *objective judgement* towards the actors in history which is against the grain of historical relativism (Sawaoka, Newheiser & Dovidio, 2014; Butterfield, 1965). Furthermore, historical relativism is self-defeating. Instead of falling into self-contradiction like the relativists, it is more plausible to believe that historical truth is and can be objective (Wood, 2002; Loewenberg, 1949).

Some may argue that history can never depict the past as it is because of the historian's limitation and insufficiency of sources. However, this argument does not negate that "objective historical truth is the aim that all historians should have". This is because, being objective in historical research does not mean the research finding is infallible. Instead, it means objectively representing an event's approximate reality (Lowenthal, 2015). In other words, the represented past should be external from the historian's subjectivity. Its truth is not dependent on the historian's subjectivity such

as likes, desire, and interest. This is what is meant by objective historical writing. In light of this, Butterfield (1965) maintains that although impartiality is impossible, historical research must still be done without bias, not partial to anyone.

That being said, premise (2) had to be established: "bias is an obstacle towards objective historical truth". Why do historians need to be biased in historical writing? This is because being partial in historical research is the opposite of being objective. Bias is a challenge for objectivity in history because being objective by definition is prejudice. Impartiality means accepting the evidence presented *as it is*, regardless of our personal predilections or private circumstances (Walsh, 1960). Contrary to this, bias refers to being prejudiced when evidence is put before us. This type of bias is deliberate bias, which is wrong. If being objective in historical research is good, then being partial or biased is terrible. Hence, historians should not be biased in their inquiry.

The very reason there is any debate among historians about specific historical events is grounded on the assumption that "history should be fair, impartial, and not misleading" (McCullagh, 2002). Thus, Trevelyan (1947, p. 14) says: "...the object of history is to know and understand the past on all its sides." Bias by definition is contrast to this; it is one-sidedness. As Walsh (1960) notes, impartiality must be the aim of historians because it requires objective historical truth. In other words, if you intend to be biased in your writing, you have already abandoned objectivity (Trevelyan, 1947). It has been established that bias in historical research is wrong and historians should avoid it. The following sections will proceed justifying premise (3): "moral judgement causes bias in historical writing".

### **Moral Judgment in Historiography Invites the Risk of Biased History**

The argument that moral judgement causes biased historical writing has been postulated by many historians. Benedetto Croce explains that moral judgement should not enter history because it will pave the way for biased history or in his terms, "party-historiography". Croce (1941, p. 181) says: "...party histories adulterate the truth because instead of resting content

with events as they happen, they judge events”. Then, Croce posits that if impartial, objective and unbiased history were to be achieved, historians must abstain from moral judgment or “manifestations of sentiment” because it will cause “partisan historiography” (Croce, 1941, pp. 181-182).

Significantly, Butterfield explains that the practice of moral judgement in history will cause history to be biased because history has become an “instrument of the partisan”. In other words, moral judgement in historiography allows historians to pick a side or be biased in their writing (Butterfield, 1951). This is the danger of moral judgement in history if it were allowed; we do not know if the historian’s moral judgement is based on his impartiality or his personal inclination (his love or hatred for someone). In light of this, Fischhoff (1980) says that bias happens because we are not being ‘charitable’ to the dead. Historians are not judges (still less a hanging judge); therefore, historians should be “charitable” i.e., forgiving the dead by not judging their misdeeds.

Edward H. Carr believes that moral judgment is equivalent to being partial in historical explanation. Of course, he refers to “intentional partiality” which is bias. Carr’s view is evident when he says that historians should pass moral judgment and hence be partial towards oriental despotism (Carr, 1990). Although Carr believes that bias in history is not wrong *per se*, he maintains that moral judgment is indeed a cause for biased history. Trevelyan (1947) also admits that moral judgement in historiography causes (wrong) historical bias. He says that moral judgement in history allows histories that ‘condemn the crime of one side and conceal the others’ to happen. Nevertheless, Trevelyan’s overall position is different because he believes there are actual and wrong biases.

It must be noted, however, that what has been explained so far does not imply that moral judgment is the only cause of biased or partial historiography. Notwithstanding, it is the most obvious. As Berkhofer (1997) states, the most apparent form of bias in history is partiality from partisanship and moral judgment. In order to understand this, the types of bias in history must be explained. Bias in history, as defined previously, is any historical interpretation that is *not objectively true*. Now, how can an



interpretation not be acceptable universally or objectively? This can be caused by (a) unintentional and (b) intentional bias. Moral judgement is an intentional bias (it is a deliberate act). On the other hand, bias or partial historiography can also be caused by the historian's limitation and inaccuracy, which is most of the time unintentional. As Lowenthal (2015) and Romanowski (1996) explain, bias can also be caused by historians' limitation or carelessness (mistakes), not necessarily caused by our moral inclination. According to Berkhofer (1997), bias can be caused by (i) authorial subjectivity; (ii) social context; and (iii) limits of historical method/ evidence/ inquiry. Actually, (i) and (ii) are moral judgments because moral standards are based on authorial subjectivity and social context. Thus, bias in history can be caused by inaccurate facts or err; and (or) selective value and moral judgement (which implies intention).

Having explained that, unintentional bias in historiography is inevitable and justifiable. This means that "bias" itself is not wrong *per se*. This is why there has been a discussion about "wrong bias" and "true bias" throughout history. Wrong bias is the problem, not bias itself (Trevelyan, 1947, p. 7). Wrong bias is due to personal inclination and our moral outlook (what we see as good or bad). It is a wrong bias because moral outlook and personal preference are relative. History on the other hand is an objective representation of the past; it must not be presented according to what we like or dislike. This is what Bloch (1954) means when he says there are two ways of being biased: a scholar's and a judge's bias. Bias of a scholar is pardonable as it is not personal, but rather a result of limitations or mistakes. Bias of a judge always concerns moral judgement and intentionality. Hence, instead of acting like a judge, a historian should maintain the role of a scholar.

It is clear now that 'wanting' to be partial or biased in historical research implies intentionality. An author is blameworthy for the bias in his writing if he *intentionally* wanted to be partial. In light of this, biased history can happen due to the author's (i) self-interest and pleasure; or (ii) moral beliefs. The explanation for this section will focus on the former. Now, there is a difference between the two. Bias due to self-interest does not have the idea of 'how one should relate to others'; its only concern is for

self well-being (Hooker, 2017). For instance, someone might intentionally write biased history in support of the Republican because his interest (e.g. source of income) lies with the Republican. However, he sees the Republicans to be morally abhorrent. Therefore, he makes moral judgments by hiding the contributions of the Democrats while highlighting the Republicans as good. Hence, moral judgment because of self-interest is a wrong bias. As Berkhofer (1997) explains, improper judgment includes not only blatant moral advocacy, but also political advocacy. Having explained the causes of bias in history, it is clear that there are genuine and wrong biases as Trevelyan postulated. Wrong bias is caused by moral judgement of the historian derived from his/ her intention and (or) moral outlook. The inevitable nature of historical research causes actual bias on the other hand.

Moral judgment will ultimately cause biased history, and it is better to abstain from it so that we do not take any risk. This ultimate implication happens due to the inherent function of history itself as entertainment. According to Hume (1903), Fischhoff (1980) and Bloch (1954), there is one purpose of history that is accepted universally: people read history for pleasure. Therefore, because of this everlasting purpose, people may use history to satisfy others' moral outlooks or parties. It is natural for us not to want to read history that is not favorable to our parties. We also find it interesting to read history that aligns with our moral perspective. It is natural to feel bored reading history with no narrative of 'good versus evil' (Butterfield, 1954). This is where moral judgment can be used to influence others. Because history is read for pleasure, ill-intention individuals will use moral judgment to persuade readers. If moral judgment were allowed, falsehood would enter into historical writing.

It is important to acknowledge that the common perception on 'biased history' is always negative. When we hear that 'the history book is biased', we immediately perceive it negatively, and the author(s) of the book should not be biased. We believe those who wrote biased history must be criticized, rebuked, or condemned. Why is this the case? It is because we attribute the deliberative act of being biased towards the author. Again, the point that separates true and wrong biases here is intention. Most of the

time, we see bias as a wrong, unjustified bias. We often refer to bias due to carelessness and limitations as mere “weaknesses”. This is because it is unintentional. Moral judgment on the other hand necessitates intention. In other words, bias due to moral judgment is a wrong bias because it is a purposeful bias. As Lowenthal (2015: 344) states, it is “...wrong to slant history for partisan purpose”. Sawaoka, Newheiser & Dovidio (2014: 361) also suggested this by saying that “...moral judgements... may represent a stronger form of bias...”.

Bias in history may exist implicitly or explicitly. Implicit bias includes the historians’ selection of facts (hide facts, etc.). It can also be employed by creating a narrative that depicts a specific person's deeds or failure in exaggeration. This depiction includes presenting too many stories about a figure, ‘portraying’ a person as evil (without pronouncing censure), and hiding the person's contributions. Stereotyping is also a form of implicit bias. For instance, there is an American author who used stereotyped words such as “Kamikaze” to refer to all the Japanese; not explicitly referring to the Japanese army responsible for the attack on Pearl Harbor. These words used in historical narrative invite an implicit bias because, in the minds of his audience (the Americans), they suggested an image of aggressiveness to all Japanese (Romanowski, 1996). This is an unfair, i.e. biased representation of the Japanese in historical writing.

The claim that moral judgment as a cause of biased history also resonates with the explanation given above. One of the reasons why bias can exist implicitly and explicitly is that moral judgment can be made implicitly and explicitly. Moral judgment does not necessarily have to be made explicitly. As Berkhofer (1997: 143) says, “Moral judgements... pervade the history productions in subtle as well as obvious ways”. Romanowski (1996) also affirms that moral judgment can be made explicitly or implicitly and both types weigh the same. Studies suggest that men will always employ implicit moral judgements as Morgan (2012) noted. In other words, bias due to moral judgement can happen explicitly or implicitly (Berkhofer, 1997).

Implicit moral judgement means any narrative that gives a particular impression on the moral status of past agents. For example, in *Sejarah Melayu* (2015), there is a story about a king named Raja Suran who went underwater and married a princess there. His descendants, along with the princess, formed the lineage of the Malay rulers. This marriage myth was told to justify an implicit moral judgement. As Arbai'yah Mohd Noor (2009, p. 74) says, it was to ascertain that the Malay ruler "...has the power over the earth and what lies underneath the sea". The following example shows how implicit moral judgement causes implicit bias in history. When a historian assumes 'democracy is just and better', his research will be directed to show the fight for democracy as a noble event. This shows that implicit moral judgement has underlying assumptions, making a narrative biased (Morgan, 2012). In this case, the underlying assumption or a more straightforward term, the implicit moral judgement is "democracy is good".

As long as there is hatred and conflict, moral judgment in history is always risky. As Butterfield says, moral judgment cannot be allowed because it will lead to history becoming a 'tool' to expose the weakness of one's foe and cover the misconduct of one's friend (cited from Suntharalingam, 1985). In other words, regardless of the benefits gained by allowing moral judgement in history, its harmful effect will always supersede its benefit. Propaganda is a good example of this. Propaganda came from our desire to fulfill our hatred (Morgan, 2012). In light of this, Falola (2011, p. 599) explained: "History could be used to justify certain claims or situations, and distortions could thus become a deliberate device. Where a history had a propaganda value, it created biases and effects." As explained previously, propaganda is a biased history because it is a manifestation of practicing moral judgment in historiography. Propaganda implies the historian's bias-purpose: it is about what the historians wanted the event to be perceived, not what the event was (Berkhofer, 1997). Howell & Prevenier (2001, p. 6) gave an example of this point that during the Middle Ages, "...many such accounts were explicitly written as propaganda, tales to convince readers of the power of a bishop, the sanctity of a holy person, the justice of a cause...".

Moral judgment in history opens the door for propagandist history to prevail because allowing moral judgment in history implies that everyone can write according to their emotion and moral outlook, which means allowing partial representation of history (Trevelyan, 1947; Walsh, 1960). By implication, propagandist history, which is an intentionally partial representation of history, would have to be allowed. Moreover, one important reason moral judgment is needed for propaganda is that moral judgment was made to persuade the (present) audience. Moral judgment is the best instrument in producing propaganda writing to suit the historians' political and personal interest (Fitzmaurice, 2018; Morgenthau, 1945; Lamus, 2016). In justifying a particular ideology, the historians will need moral judgment in their historical writing such as what the Nazi historians did under the Third Reich and the supporters (historians) of Holocaust denial did, or vice versa (Tosh, 2002). As Lowenthal (2015, p. 342) remarks, "...the more salient the historian's bias, the more believable his account". Propaganda is one form of harmful effect of moral judgement in history. Also, whether moral truth is relative or objective, the risk for propaganda will always remain if moral judgment in historiography is allowed. This is because, propagandist history presupposes "the end justifies its means" (Morgenthau, 1945, pp. 8-9). Hence, it does not matter whether truth-telling is objectively reasonable; propagandists can always use moral judgment to incite bias.

As mentioned previously, biased history is a historical narrative that is not acceptable by everyone. Regarding this, moral judgment has caused bias in history because moral judgment can never be satisfactory; it fails to satisfy everyone's expectations. Moral judgment causes a one-sided attitude when giving historical explanations. This is because, to give moral judgment is to be sympathetic; we must sympathize with the person we judge. We are biased when we sympathize with somebody, group, or party (Oldfield, 1981; Trevelyan, 1947). Now, our feelings of sympathy or inclination towards someone, on the other hand, come from our moral outlook. For instance, when we believe that fighting for freedom from the British is good, we will praise the freedom-fighters who oppose the British. In other words, expressing our sympathy in history equals making moral judgment. To wrap this discussion, every history has either wrong or true

bias. The wrong bias, for example, is the propagandist narrative. Moral judgment is wrong because instead of embracing the principle of historical writing, which is ‘truth is always the uppermost’, it turned history into a tool to persuade others for self-interest (Walsh, 1960).

### **Relativistic Nature of Moral Judgment Causes Biased History**

Another important issue with moral judgment in historiography is the relativistic nature of morality. In this article, the concepts of subjective and relative moral truths will be used interchangeably because both share the same meaning: both concepts reject objective moral truth. Although there is an alternative definition that distinguished moral relativism from subjectivism, this article opted for the definition given by Allen Wood and Simon Blackburn, which states that moral relativism also implies moral subjectivism (Lacewing, 2003; Wood, 2002).

The relative truth of morality is why Trevelyan believes that moral judgement is a biased judgment. He writes, “...to say, ‘John was a bad king’ is bias” (Trevelyan, 1947, p. 2). He posited so because it is a mere ‘opinion’ that John was a lousy king; not everyone accepts that John was an evil king. Meaning, moral standard is subjective. In other words, we make moral judgments according to our moral standards. Our standards might be that what John did was not bad, therefore he was not an evil king. Our judgment is also subjective because our moral standard is subjective/relative. Meaning, moral judgment is always a biased judgment. This is why, the definition of moral judgement as Farbes and Grafman expounded, is an “evaluative judgements of the appropriateness of one’s behaviour within the context of socialized perceptions of right and wrong” (cited from Sawaoka, Newheiser & Dovidio, 2014, p. 361). This definition asserts the phrase “within the context of socialized perceptions of right and wrong” because it assumes that morality is relative. This point will be elaborated in the sections below.

## Moral Judgement is a Bias Judgement

A problem of moral judgment in historiography when the moral standard is relative is that a relative judgment refers to a biased *judgment*. The moment we judge, we have let our personality, which is based on our moral outlook, decide who is right and wrong. In other words, our personality had entered our writing. This will cause biased history because personality is not universal but subjective. Bias also refers to one-sidedness, i.e., not universally accepted opinion. This is why, Romanowski (1996) states that bias happens when historical writing is influenced by the author's belief about what is praiseworthy and blameworthy. In light of this, if what is praiseworthy and blameworthy is objective, the judgment would have universal appeal; if everyone believes that killing Jews indiscriminately is bad, Hitler's actions should always be highlighted as bad. However, this is not the case because some people believe that Hitler had done a noble cause. For example, we have the Neo-Nazi movement and the White Supremacist (Taylor, 1988). In other words, bias happens when we try to fit our judgment toward the past via some modern category (including morality) that does not exist in their time (Trevelyan, 1947). In other words, *our moral judgment is biased because moral views are subjective*.

Marc Bloch explained the relative truth of moral judgment as the cause of biased history. He elucidates this point by giving the analogy of an historian who gives moral judgement as a judge. A historian is a scholar, not a judge, because a judge, like it or not, has to pass judgement after thorough investigations (Bloch, 1954). He says: "...one man has killed another is a fact which is eminently susceptible of proof. But to punish the murderer assumes that we consider murder culpable: which is, after all, only an opinion about which not all civilizations have agreed." (Bloch, 1954, p. 139). Bloch poses that moral judgement could lead the historians to be biased in their writing because of the relative nature of morality. Bloch (1954, p. 140) says: "How absurd it is, by elevating the entirely relative criteria of one individual, one party, or one generation to the absolute". The moral system is not objective; therefore, moral judgment can only be valid for the 'system' relative to a particular place and time.

This relation between relativism (including *moral* relativism) and biased history has also been highlighted by Sandwell (2003) and Ahmat Adam (2016). Romanowski (2015) also states that by explicitly or implicitly assigning positive and negative values to historical events, history will be biased. In other words, moral judgment is a form of bias because when we judge values, we are selective: we judge using our moral standards, which are different from anyone else. In a nutshell, moral judgment is a relative judgment. Relative truth by definition is partial truth. Denoting this understanding, Trevelyan (1947, p. 10) says, “This business of... judging the past by our knowledge of the present, clearly introduces the elements of bias or personal opinion on a large scale”. Moral judgment is based on our (present) knowledge of what is moral or immoral. Therefore, it follows that it will cause bias because bias by definition is personal opinion; it is not universally accepted (Trevelyan, 1947). Thus, because morality is subjective/relative, our judgment is biased.

Moreover, purposeful bias is based on our moral outlook: we can only be biased if we can cognize what is good or bad (according to us). Different people saw moral truths differently. For you, Napoleon Bonaparte may be a bad person, but for the others, he may be revered as a revolutionary. Because morality is subjective, our moral judgement will always be one-sided; it will not satisfy everyone’s expectation. Therefore, it is a biased judgment. This is why, Trevelyan (1947) says that bias is personal feelings and opinion. This is the very definition of being subjective. In other words, if we based our historical writing on our subjective morality, we will write a biased narrative. So, because morality is subjective, moral judgment will always cause biased history. Berkhofer (1997) also suggests this point when he said that being biased means being a relativist and vice versa. Both refer to partiality and therefore can never give rise to objectivity.

Moral judgment explains why (wrong) bias exists in historiography. This is because moral judgment denotes that an age is more superior, better and ‘ought to be’ favored more by the present reader. In this light, if we follow and include the moral judgment of a particular source about a past or an age, we will be succumbed to their subjectivity and therefore, be biased. For example, the “Dark Age” is an implicit moral judgement. The “Dark



Age” was not considered a “Dark Age” by people living during the time. The term, which implies moral judgement, was given by the Renaissance historians, whose moral outlook and principles differed from those of the Dark Ages. In other words, if we were to make moral judgments based on historical sources during the Renaissance about the Dark Age, we would succumb to their biased narrative. Therefore, the judgement will be relative and relativistic, a biased judgement. This bias happened because the moral outlook and principles of the people of the Renaissance had changed, which viewed individualism, humanism, skepticism as virtuous, therefore they saw the Dark Ages as a condition they did not want to be in (Marwick, 1989; Bloch, 1954).

### **Moral Judgment in Historiography Paves the Way for Partisan Historiography**

Another issue with moral judgment in historiography derived from the relativistic nature of morality is that history will become a battle of partisanship. If moral judgment were allowed, it would pave the way for history to be written for a particular moral cause. Under moral relativism, moral judgment causes bias in history because every author’s moral causes are different. For example, one historian says that Hitler was reasonable and therefore, he highlights Hitler and blackens Hitler’s enemy. Another historian despised Hitler, thus blackening his character, etc. Because morality is relative, killing Jews indiscriminately can be good or bad according to anyone’s eye. That being said, the problem of (wrong) bias will not occur if no moral judgment was made, either implicit or explicit, even if there is no objective truth about morality. The truth is, moral truth is different from person to person. Thus, causes history based on moral judgment to be biased when it becomes a partisan’s tool and ‘entertainment’. Another way to put it, “moral judgement, which is relative, causes *conflict between moral beliefs*”.

Butterfield’s argument that moral judgment causes bias as mentioned previously is also based on the assumption that morality is subjective or relative. Butterfield (1951, pp. 127-128) writes:

“...for one historian, the Catholic or the royalist... cause may be the absolutely virtuous one, while for another historian only the Protestant or the Parliamentary... is on the side of righteousness... what some men regard as the good is for others the seat of all evil in the universe”.

If our moral outlook is objective (all humans perceive evil and good the same way), then our moral judgment will not be subjective and hence, not biased, and this conflict of historical narrative would not exist. However, this is not the case. An additional reason for this is that propagandist history exists. Propagandist history is history written to persuade readers to adopt a particular moral view towards specific individuals or parties in the past. Hence, propagandist history is a biased history (Fitzmaurice, 2018).

Propagandist history presupposes the principle of “ethical end justifies unethical means”. It does not care about historical truth as long as what is written enables the fulfilment of specific motive (Morgenthau, 1945, pp. 7-8; Walsh, 1960). Our moral outlook shapes our motives. So, when our moral view is different in the sense, what one saw as good is harmful to another, therefore moral conflict arises. As Butterfield (1951) postulates, permissibility on moral judgement in history ‘corrupts’ a historian in the sense that it can be misused as a weapon towards the historian’s enemies when one is cause of what is good and right is in conflict. Hence, Butterfield (1951, p. 126) says “...moral judgements are a loophole for every abuse in historical study”.

To further elucidate what Butterfield meant when he said moral judgment causes history to be a tool for ‘moral war’ in historical writing, consider the historiography of 20<sup>th</sup> century Malaysia’s politics. The popularized historiography concerning Malaysia’s history of independence is that the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) is the party that sought independence for Malaya and subtly discredited the Malay-leftist party’s role for independence. The narrative that UMNO is the party that deserves the glory became the “official national history”. UMNO and its figures are what matters now because they are the government. This biased depiction

by asserting positive value to UMNO and negative value to the Malay-leftist is evident in the mainstream historical narrative. Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), led by the Malay-leftist, was depicted morally negatively by mainstream historiography as a 'radical' group, even though that was not the case. If they were radical, they would not fight for independence through official means (Azmi Ariffin, 2014).

However, Azmi Ariffin (2014, p. 12) proves that "...the Malay left nationalists can be considered moderate, even though their struggle was constantly hampered by accusations that they were extremists who were radical in their approach". The unbiased narrative should be as follows: the roles played by UMNO leaders (e.g. Dato' Onn and Tunku Abdul Rahman) must not be exaggerated. Instead, their contribution can be more accurately described as amalgamating the effort for independence, not pioneering it (Azmi Ariffin, 2014). Clearly, this explanation shows that the mainstream historical accounts contain political bias because they embrace implicit and explicit moral judgment in history. This is because the moral causes of UMNO and MNP were different: the Malay-leftists did not share the same ideology and specific moral views as the Malay-rightists or the elitists. The narrative guided by the (relative) moral view that wants to give credit to UMNO is the mainstream narrative because UMNO became the government. This is also why, nationalist histories are filled with moral judgments.

The relativistic nature of moral judgment is why Lord Acton did not condemn the French Revolution. Acton saw the revolution as a historical progress towards 'freedom'. Because Acton viewed freedom as good, therefore he depicted the French Revolution as good. Edmund Burke on the other hand had another moral perspective. In other words, Acton was inclined towards the French Revolution. Hence, Acton's historical interpretation portrayed the French Revolution as only goodness while Burke negatively portrayed the French Revolution. Hence, the historical narrative is a biased narrative (it is not acceptable universally). Now, the reason for this is, both historians had implemented moral judgement in historiography (Gorman, 2009). This is why, Butterfield (1965, pp. 1-2) maintains that historians who practice moral judgement in historiography

“...is stepping into a world of partial judgements”. Allowing moral judgment in history is dangerous because people use different standards of moral judgment to conform to their political orientation (Sawaoka, Newheiser & Dovidio, 2014). This attitude in writing is the very definition of being biased. This is why moral judgment causes biased history.

### **Blocking the Means to Greater Evil: Historians Should Avoid Moral Judgment in Historiography**

Moral judgment as a cause for bias in history is not primarily because morality is subjective/relative. Instead, it is because of moral judgment as a necessary tool itself for bias in history. Moral judgment in history is a parable of a gun. A gun can be used according to the user's will. If the user wishes to kill someone in order to be in a better position in life, although he recognizes that killing an innocent person is objectively wrong, it is still possible for him to do it. Therefore, the right approach would be to forbid the possession of firearms altogether. Taking this example, moral judgment in history will always remain a tool for ill-intentioned individuals; it is risky. Butterfield also equates moral judgment as a *tool* or *instrument*. He says that moral judgment will degrade history “...into an instrument of the partisan... In times of war and revolution, these arguments possess redoubled force...” (Butterfield, 1951, p. 128).

Moral judgment is indeed a means to establish justice for past agents. However, it would be naïve to assume everyone had that pure intention because it is also true that moral judgment is a means for history to be biased and misused. By considering the danger and benefit it may pose, allowing moral judgment in historiography does more harm than goodness. As long as moral judgment has the potential to be misused and causes more harm than benefits, we should forbid it altogether. Hence, Trevelyan (1947, pp. 12-13) suggested that history that passes no moral judgment is preferable because it is “far less harmful”. Permitting moral judgment in history is equivalent to allowing partiality in historical research. That being said, premise (3) of the earlier deductive argument is established. Hence, the argument's conclusion is justified.

## Clarifications on the Issue of Moral Judgment and Bias in Historiography

Having laid out the argument of those who prohibit moral judgement in historiography because it leads to biased history, this section will proceed to explain some flaws of the argument.

### Refuting the Assumption that ‘Moral Judgment is a Bias Judgment’

The argument from moral relativism presented does not undermine the validity of moral judgment in history because some moral truths are objective. For instance, killing a five-year-old child and insincerity are objectively wrong (Rachel, 2003). In light of objective moral truth, those who argued from relativism to prohibit moral judgment in history had justified what they want to reject: they assume objective moral truths. This is a *self-contradiction* because, for their argument to work, they must assume that telling an objective, truthful account is objectively good and telling a partial or ‘bias’ account is objectively wrong. In other words, they are actually making an *objective moral judgement*: ‘bias is wrong’ (the basis for the argument’s premise). If they say that *all* moral judgments in history are wrong, they say that even ‘objective’ moral judgment is wrong. This means that they are refuting what they want to defend in the first place, which is being ‘objective’ in judgement (Berlin, 2002). Hence, those who want to condemn the attitude of bias in historiography must first establish that objective moral truth exists, a belief which is fundamentally at odds with being ‘biased’.

Additionally, if moral truth is relative, then those who believe in moral relativism should not prohibit the practice of moral judgment in historiography. Berlin (2002, p. 136) aptly explained this problem:

“...neither may we bring charges of moralism or bias against those historians who are prone to praise and blame, for we are all in the same boat together... no one standard can be called objectively superior to any other”.

This might be the case for historians who judged; they thought making moral judgement was a just act, or even being partial was morally good to their part. For example, moral judgment may be suitable for their national purposes or greater happiness for the most people.

### **Refuting the Assumption of the Superiority of Natural Science**

Many who argue against moral judgment in historiography assume that the 'scientific method is the only way to truth', a view known as 'scientism' (Giere, 2008). They want history to be 'scientific like in natural science' because they assume scientists are unbiased; they never had a moral outlook influencing their research. However, this is false. Any type of inquiry is vulnerable to being biased. Marwick (1989, pp. 301-302) notes: "Historians are not by nature more biased or prejudiced than scientists: simply, they are forced into a greater deployment of personal interpretation by the imperfections of their evidence."

Secondly, science cannot guarantee absolute truth about its findings. Even the reliability of *empiricism*, the basis of scientific research, had been questioned by philosophers of science (Sober, 2008). Also, scientific methods, such as natural science, are not the only way to know the truth. There are many other sources of truth, an important one being *testimony*, which is what history is based upon (Coady, 1973). Regarding the deficiency in science, Elliot Sober (2008, pp. 137-138) writes: "At any moment, scientists are limited by the observations they have at hand... science is forced to restrict its attention to problems that observations can solve". In light of this, morality and past events are unobservable. That being said, there is no need to feel inferior and try to compensate history's 'limitation' by adopting anything that science does and imposing it into history, because both fields of inquiry are fundamentally different.

### **The Fallacy of Undistributed Middle (Inadequacy in Premise)**

The argument that moral judgment in historiography should be abandoned because it causes biased history rests on the assumption that the historian's judgment is not objective. However, this is a false assumption because

historians do make objective judgments in reality. Many ethical theories and schools of thought have argued that we can make objective moral judgements (Berlin, 2002; Van Den Berg, 2011). For example, one of the most popular schools in ethics, Consequentialism maintains that we can make objective and impartial moral judgments about the goodness or badness of a state of affairs (Shaw, 2006). Moral judgment in-and-of-itself is not the reason for biased historiography to exist. Instead, 'the motive and purpose of historians to write' determines historical bias. Historians must not degenerate into a propagandist or advocate, and secondly, history must not be written for utilitarian purposes devoid of truth-telling (Berkhofer, 1997, p. 140).

The argument that even if morality is objective, moral judgment still allows for biased history to happen is valid because biased history can never exist without moral attachment, unless it is unintentional bias, as discussed earlier. No matter whether the propagandist believes in objective morality or subjective morality, he/ she can always create propagandist history. However, this does not mean that moral judgement *necessarily* causes historical bias. To justify this argument, the opponents of moral judgment in history must establish an additional premise: *no one can ever make objective or impartial moral judgment*. However, this can never be established because to believe so will create more problems than it solves. For example, it will distort the judiciary system through which a society functions. This is the assumption that they do not and can not include: therefore, the argument's premises are inadequate.

A more plausible way to look at this is, moral judgment is only a tool. It does not, in and of itself, cause bias in history. It depends on who uses it. The fault lies in prioritizing self-interest and pleasure instead of truth-telling. If historians were not allowed to assert the morality of men in history, 'unqualified' individuals such as propagandists and untrained readers would do it anyway due to the moral function of history. This will lead to more significant corruption in the preservation of history. Therefore, historians should make moral judgments. Not only because historians are the most qualified to do so, but also to prevent history from being abused (Qasim Ahmad, 2004; Parker, 1913). It becomes an objective

moral obligation for the historians. In a nutshell, our bias attitude causes our moral judgement in historiography to produce biased history.

### **The Existence of Objective Moral Truth Requires Moral Judgment in Historiography**

All that being said, it seems that for the deductive argument to work, the only option is to rely on moral relativism -that there are no 'facts' in value - which is a problematic position. Berlin (2002, p. 137) explains the reason why:

“Because all standards are pronounced relative, to condemn bias or moralism in history, or to defend them, turn out themselves to express attitudes which, in the absence of super-standard, cannot be rationally defended or condemned”.

In other words, if, on the other hand, the advocates of this contention turn to moral relativism to justify their argument, moral relativism will defeat the premise of their argument, which is “bias is morally wrong and historians should not embrace it”. This, then, is self-defeating because the belief in objective moral truth justifies the moral judgement that ‘bias is wrong’ in the first place. Therefore, it is clear that believing in objective moral truth is consistent with avoiding historical bias. This is why, Berlin (2002) and Trevelyan (1947) allow moral judgment in history.

On top of that, if there are no objective moral values, moral judgment in history is biased. Novick (1988: 254) affirms this: “The very process of deciding what was a fact, apart from traditional technical procedures of verification... depended on values”. Significantly, the “traditional technical procedures of verification” refers to personality criticism to authenticate sources which also depends on value. But if there is no objective moral values, our authentication of sources will end up being partial / bias judgments. This is self-defeating because we do source criticism to get an objective historical account; we judge the morality of our sources to know their credibility. But if we say that the standard we use to criticise the sources -which is moral values- are not objective, hence



our criticism is not objective or in other words, a bias and unreliable criticism. Thus, history under this view becomes a biased discipline. Abdul Rahman Haji Abdullah (1994) also had highlighted that relativism will lead the historian to incline into being partial in his study. Objective moral truths on the other hand produce objective moral judgment, not a partial or biased moral judgment. This is why, Acton argued that morality should not be relativised/subjectivised because if that is the case, it "...enables us to make exceptions... to deal unequal justice to friends and enemies" (cited from Babbage, 1964, p. 35).

To conclude, acknowledging objective moral truths means that you can no longer write a biased narrative because you are morally obliged to tell the truth *objectively*. As a sidenote, we are not saying that "you can only make moral judgment if you believe in the objective truth of values" or "if you believe historical truth is objective, you must make moral judgment in history". This is a shallow reading. Objectivist historians such as Herodotus embraced moral judgment in history, but Thucydides did not. Croce also belongs to the objectivist school but insists that moral judgment should be avoided at all costs (Suntharalingam, 1985). This is common because people may do things that contradict their fundamental, sub-conscious moral beliefs. That being said, we should not prohibit moral judgment in history to solve the problem of bias because it will create more problems. Instead, we should advocate that historians must be *objective* in their judgments.

## Conclusion

The issue of moral judgment in historiography, according to what has been explained so far, can be summed up into two: (i) history becomes biased because moral judgment is a relative judgment; and (ii) moral judgment in historiography is a tool for partisanship-history. For the former (i), moral judgment is biased because moral truths are relative and relative implies partiality. This argument was first explained extensively by Marc Bloch, Croce and Butterfield. This argument assumes moral relativism. Notwithstanding, it has been clarified that not all moral truths are relative. Also, it is a false contention to be used as prohibition of moral judgement

in historiography. This is because it is based on a shaky ground (relativism) which leads to self-contradiction: the argument must also assume objective moral truth to forbid moral judgement in historiography. Not only that, the argument must also include an additional implausible assumption that denies the existence of ‘objective moral judgment’ altogether.

For the latter (ii), history may be misused as a partisanship tool regardless of objective or relative moral standards. If moral truths are relative, moral judgment in historiography will allow for the narrative of ‘hero and villain’ to be perceived relatively. Hence, hatred will circulate because of incitement of bias, which eventually paves the way for partisan historiography. In other words, the implication of moral judgement in historiography is that it replaces objective truth as the “end” in historiography with partial truth based on our relative morality. Even if moral truths are not relative, the danger of bias in history always remains if moral judgements were allowed. This is because ill-intentioned individuals could not care less about objective moral truths, whether being biased is wrong or good. If they insist on it, they will do it anyway. Hence, moral judgment will always remain a risky tool for historiography. This argument was advocated strongly by Butterfield.

However, it has been clarified that just because a tool can be used for evil cause does not necessarily mean it should be prohibited. Especially when moral judgment in historiography is necessary for source criticism and establishing justice towards historical agents. The blame is not on the practice of moral judgment in historiography: it is just a tool. That being said, this article had shown that the notion that “moral judgment in historiography should be avoided because it causes biased history” is a crude representation of moral judgment in historiography. It has some truth in it: *moral judgement is required to produce biased history*. However, to say that the practice *necessarily* causes bias in history is only a high mark in enthusiasm and low mark in rational justification. Hence, historians should accept moral judgement in historiography, rather than embrace it appropriately. This article’s findings provide a philosophical foundation for researchers to write history. It is also an intellectual defense from the attempts to downgrade the veracity of historical writing.

## References

### Books

- Abdul Rahman Haji Abdullah. (1994). *Pengantar ilmu sejarah*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.
- Ahmat Adam. (2016). *Antara sejarah dan mitos: Sejarah Melayu dan Hang Tuah dalam historiografi Malaysia*. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: SIRD.
- Atkinson, R. F. (1978). *Knowledge and explanation in history: An introduction to the philosophy of history*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Education Ltd.
- Audi, R. (1999). *The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy, second edition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berkhofer, Jr., R. F. (1997). *Beyond the great story: History as text and discourse*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Berlin, I. (2002). *Liberty: Incorporating four essays on liberty*, Henry Hardy (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bloch, M. (1954). *The historian's craft*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Butterfield, H. (1951). *History and human relations*. London: Collins Clear-Type Press.
- Butterfield, H. (1965). *The whig interpretation of history*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc.
- Carr, E. H. (1990). *What is history?*. London; Penguin Books.
- Croce, B. (1941). *History as the story of liberty*. London: George Allen & Unwin Limited.

- Hobson, A. (2001). *The Oxford dictionary of difficult words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hornby, A.S. (2000). *Oxford advanced learner's dictionary of current English* (6th Edition), S. Wehmeier (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Howell, M. & Prevenier, W. (2001). *From reliable sources: An introduction to historical methods*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Hume, D. (1903). *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*. London: Henry Frowde.
- Lowenthal, D. (2015). *The past is a foreign country – revisited*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marwick, A. (1989). *The nature of history* (3<sup>rd</sup> edition). Macmillan Education Ltd: Hampshire, United Kingdom.
- Novick, P. (1988). *That noble dream: The “objectivity question” and the American historical profession*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Qasim Ahmad. (2004). *Karya sejarah: pendekatan dan persoalan* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition). Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.
- Rachel, J. (2003). *The elements of moral philosophy* (4<sup>th</sup> edition). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Scheffler, S. (2010). *Equality and tradition: Questions of value in moral and political theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sewell, K. C. (2005). *Herbert Butterfield and the interpretation of history*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sulalatus Salatin, Sejarah Melayu*, A. Samad Ahmad (ed.) (2015). Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.

- Suntharalingam, R. (1985). *Pengenalan kepada sejarah*. Kuala Lumpur: Marican & Sons (M) Sdn Bhd.
- The Merriam-Webster dictionary*. (2004). Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Incorporated.
- Thucydides. (1954). *History of the Peloponnesian War*, R. Warner (tran. & ed.). Hammondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books.
- Topolski, J. (1976). *Methodology of history*, O. Wojtasiewicz (tran.). Warsaw, Poland: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- Tosh, J. (2002). *The pursuit of history: Aims, methods, and new directions in the study of modern history (revised third edition)*. Pearson Education Limited: London.
- Walsh, W. H. (1960). *Philosophy of history: An introduction*. New York: Harper Torchbook.
- Webster's new explorer college dictionary*. (2003). Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam Webster Incorporated.
- Wood, A. (2002). *Unsettling obligations: Essays on reason, reality and the ethics of belief*. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

### Book Chapters

- D'oro, G. (2009). Historiographic understanding. In. Aviezer Tucker (ed.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography* (pp. 142-151). West-Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Falola, T. (2011). History in Sub-Saharan Africa. In S. Macintyre, J. Maiguascha & A. Pok (eds.), *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, Volume 4: 1800-1945*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 597-618.
- Giere, R. N. (2008). Naturalism. In S. Psillos & M. Curd (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science* (pp. 213-223). London: Routledge.

- Gorman, J. (2009). Ethics and the writing of historiography. In. Aviezer Tucker (ed.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography* (pp. 253-261). West-Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Kosso, P. (2009). Philosophy of historiography. In. Aviezer Tucker (ed.), *a Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*. West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Lorenz, C. (2011). History and theory. In A. Schneider & D. Woolf (eds.), *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, Volume 5: Historical Writing Since 1945*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shaw, W. (2006). The consequentialist perspective. In. James Dreier (Ed.), *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory* (pp. 5-21). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Sober, E. (2008). Empiricism. In S. Psillos & M. Curd (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science* (pp. 129-138). London: Routledge.
- Tucker, A. (2009). Introduction. In. Aviezer Tucker (ed.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*. West-Sussex: Blackwell Publishing.
- Vasicek, Z. (2009). Philosophy of history. In Aviezer Tucker (ed.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*. West-Sussex: Blackwell Publishing.
- Waldmann, M. R., Nagel, J. & Wiegmann, A. (2012). Moral Judgement. In Keith J. Holyoak & R. G. Morrison (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning*. London: Oxford University Press.

## Journal Articles

- Arba'iyah Mohd Noor. (2009). The elements of myth and legends in selected Malay historical manuscripts. *The International Journal of the Humanities*, 7 (4). pp. 67-80.

- Azmi Arifin. (2014). Local historians and the historiography of Malay nationalism 1945-57: The British, The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malay Left. *Kajian Malaysia*, 32 (1). pp. 1-35.
- Broad, C. D. (1970). Determinism, indeterminism, and libertarianism. In. Gerald Dworkin (ed.), *Determinism, Free Will and Moral Responsibility* (pp.149-171). New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc.
- Babbage, S. (1964). The place of moral judgements in the interpretation of history. *The Churchman*, 78. pp. 32-47.
- Child, A. (1951). Moral judgement in history. *Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political and Legal Philosophy*, 61 (4), pp. 297-308.
- Coady, C. A. J. (1973). Testimony and observation. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 10 (2). pp. 149-155.
- Fischhoff, B. (1980). For those condemned to study the past: Reflections on historical judgment. *New Directions for Methodology of Social and Behavioral Science*, 4. pp. 79-93.
- Fitzmaurice, K. (2018). Propaganda. *Brock Education Journal*, 27 (2).
- Hooker, B. (2017). What makes a judgement a moral judgement. *Journal of Political Theory and Philosophy*, 1 (1). pp. 97-112.
- Lacewing, M. (2003). A relative defence. *Think*, 3. pp. 71-77.
- Loewenberg, B. J. (1949). Some problems raised by historical relativism. *The Journal of Modern History*, 21(1). pp. 17-23.
- McCullagh, C. B. (2002). Bias in historical description, interpretation and explanation. *History and Theory*, 39 (1). pp. 39-66.
- Morgan, K. (2012). Stereotypes, prejudices, self and 'the other' in history textbooks. *Yesterday & Today* (7). pp. 85-100.

- Morgenthau, H. J. (1945). The evil of politics and the ethics of evil. *Ethics*, 56 (1). pp. 1-18.
- Oldfield, A. (1981). Moral judgments in history. *History and Theory*, 20 (3), pp. 260-277.
- Parker, D. H. (1913). The metaphysics of historical knowledge. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, 2 (5), pp. 103-188.
- Romanowski, M. H. (1996). Problems of bias in history textbooks. *Social Education* 60 (3). pp. 170-173.
- Sandwell, R. W. (2003). Reading beyond bias: Using historical documents in the secondary classroom. *Revue Des Sciences De L'Education De McGill*, 38 (1). pp. 168-186.
- Sawaoka, T., Newheiser, A. & Dovidio, J. F. (2014). Group based biases in moral judgement: the role of shifting moral standards. *Social Cognition*, 32 (4). pp. 360-380.
- Trevelyan, G. M. (1947). Bias in history. *History*, 32 (115). pp. 1-15.
- Vann, R. T. (2004). Historians and moral evaluations. *History and Theory* (43). pp. 3-30.

### **Thesis and Dissertation**

- Lamus, F. (2016). Machiavelli's moral theory: Moral christianity versus civic virtue. Master Dissertation submitted to the Graduate Liberal Studies Program, Duke University.
- Taylor, T. E. (1988). The emergence of the White Supremacist movement: A criminal justice issue. Master Thesis submitted to the California State University, Sacramento.