A Study of the *Salafi* Jihadist Doctrine and the Interpretation of *Jihad* by Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah

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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to analyse the *salafi jihadist* doctrine and the concept of *jihad* as interpreted by the followers of the *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* movement. Because this movement adopts the concept of *da'wah wal jihad* to achieve its mission, this paper will discuss the different views that exist in defining the concept of revolutionary *jihad* (*jihad qital*). The paper also explores how the *salafi* jihadist ideology penetrated this movement and the key salafist scholars who influenced its views. Some of the scholars who reinterpreted the boundaries and requirements of *jihad* have close links with the followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. These scholars reject the traditional limitations of *jihad*, particularly in relation to the killing of Muslims and non-Muslims. In this sense, this group promotes a broader and more aggressive concept of *jihad*. Finally, this paper identifies radical elements within *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* that reject the traditional definition of *jihad* and redefine global *jihad* in an attempt to justify more aggressive actions and accept collateral damage to people of their own religion.

Keywords and phrases: *jihad*, radicalism, terrorism, *salafi*, *wahhabi*

Introduction

Islam has identified terrorism as a disease that has tarnished the beauty and sanctity of Islam. To understand Islam's stance on terrorism, one must refer to its original sources, the Quran and the teachings of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), which are precise in their prohibition of any form of injustice, including that of unjustifiable violence that seeks to instil fear, injury, or death upon civilians. The Quran turns our attention to the high value of human life, whether it is Muslim or non-Muslim and how it is absolutely forbidden to take an innocent life unjustly. The gravity of such a crime is equated, in the Quran, with the killing of all humanity (al-Mumthahanah 60:8).[1]

The fact that Islam is now associated with terrorism and violence has caused alarm and dismay among the Muslim *ummah* at large (al-Qadri 2009; al-Qaradhawi 2002; Ali Syu'aibi 2004, 7). This phenomenon indirectly projects a negative image of those who profess the religion of Islam and the image of Muslim communities. This is despite the fact that the religion of Islam is, in

reality, a religion that advocates peace, equality and harmony, as stated in the Quran: "God also wants us to make peace with our neighbours and the people we know, even with our enemies" (an-Nisa 4:29). The Muslim *ummah* throughout the world is dismayed by all acts of violence, regardless of whether they are committed by Muslims or non-Muslims and whether they take place in the Muslim world or outside of the Muslim world. Muslim scholars such as al-Qadri, al-Qaradhawi and Ali Syu'aibi have clearly stated that these acts of violence are against the teachings of Islam.

This article aims to analyse the *salafi* doctrine and the concept of *jihad* as practiced by the *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* movement. Subsequently, the article reiterates that acts of terrorism, such as the killing of innocent people, are not part of the teachings of Islam. On the contrary, it is the responsibility of the Muslim *ummah* to fight against such acts so that peace and justice may prevail in this world. For several centuries, radicalism, extremism and fundamentalism[2] among Muslims have been frequently associated with religion. These were the labels used by researchers and scholars (Singh 2007; Abuza 2003; Gunaratna 2002). Religious doctrines that serve as an inspiration and influence for the struggle of various Muslim groups are often associated with *wahhabism* or *salafism* (Vincenzo 2002, 15; International Crisis Group [ICG] 2002). In fact, when examined closely, radical Islamic movements are a social rather than a religious phenomenon.[3] There is not a single religion that advocates violence. Islam, in particular, is a sacred and comprehensive religion that strongly rejects violence. Nevertheless, religion may be merely a contributing factor towards the radicalisation of social movements within society. The disruption of traditional communities, the economic marginalisation and political repression of peoples and the offensive force of secularism, all of which are modern phenomena, contribute to the revival of religion in the age of globalisation.[4]

Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah: An Overview

Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah, referred to as *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) by some researchers, is an Islamist movement that was established on 1 January 1993 in Malaysia by two religious teachers from Indonesia, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, and a number of their followers who had fled Indonesia to avoid being captured by the Suharto regime in 1985. This movement was listed by the United Nations (UN) as a terrorist organisation in 2002. The movement is the legacy of Darul Islam's (DI) struggle to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia under the leadership of SM Kartosuwiryo in 1949 (van Dijk 1981). *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* was formally established after it separated from DI in 1993 following a dispute between Abdullah Sungkar and the leader of DI, Ajengan Masduki, in the early 1990s (ICG 2002). From a theological perspective, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* holds the view that Islam is a universal (*kaffah*) way of life and provides answers

for all matters relating to life and nationhood. It believes that the Muslim *ummah* has an obligation to implement Islamic *sharia* law, without which one would be a non-believer (*kuffar*). *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* also views Islam as the integration of religion and politics (power), or "*Al Islam huwaddinu wa daulah*" (Interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, 2012). Consequently, Ba'asyir holds the view that the Muslim *ummah* has an obligation to establish an Islamic State and to implement Islamic *sharia* based on the Quran.

The aim of this group is to establish an Islamic State (*Daulah Islamiyah*) in Indonesia by adopting the *da'wah* and *jihad*. This group subscribes to the belief of *ahlus sunnah wal jamaah minhajis salafus soleh* (PUPJI 1996; Interview with Nasir Abas, 2012; Interview with Said, 2012; Interview with Ustaz Abu Rusydan, 2012). Nevertheless, the group, which was established in 1993, experienced internal divisions following the death of its first leader, Abdullah Sungkar, in October 1999. After 2000, splinter groups of differing ideologies emerged. Although these groups were officially no longer members of the parent group, they shared a common background and history.[5]

Some of the group's followers used theological arguments to justify violence and radical actions, such as acts of bombing and killing civilians, including Muslim civilians. Followers of splinter groups use selected verses and passages extracted from the Quran and Hadith (which will be discussed later) to justify their actions. Some *Salafis* (this term will be discussed in detail later) go so far as to say that all interpretations of the Quran except theirs are wrong. This is the strongest possible proof of their extreme and outrageous ignorance because, notwithstanding the verses that pertain to legal rulings (*ahkam*), the Quran is a self-declared "open text" that encourages people to deliberate its parables, lessons and wisdom. Moreover, some *Salafis* even say that there is no good in the Quran except through their interpretations of it. Indeed, the *Salafi* Syeikh Abd al-Rahim al-Tahhan said in one of his recorded and publicly distributed sermons, "There is no good in the Quran without *sunnah* and there is no good in the *sunnah* without our righteous *Salafi* understanding of it". Another *Salafi* scholar, Syeikh Abdullah bin Baz, also mentioned that there is no allegory (*majaz*) in the Quran and that every word in the Quran must be taken literally (Vincenzo 2001, 29–31).

As a result, a concept is currently advocated by some Muslims who claim to follow the method of *Salafus Soleh*. This concept is termed "translate directly". Based on this concept, these people believe that what has been conveyed by Allah, the Almighty and the Prophet and what has been exemplified by the *Salafus Soleh* must be accepted and followed without changes based on a literal interpretation of the verses and passages of the Quran and Hadith (as suggested by *bin Baz*) because the Quran was revealed in clear Arabic language. The proof

used to justify this concept is the Quranic verse that can be translated as "in clear Arabic language" (ash-Shu'ara' 26:195). There is no doubt that this argument and justification may influence followers who have little knowledge of the religion but who are fanatical and have great passion towards their religion. These types of followers are easily recruited, influenced and manipulated.

The *Wahhabi* Doctrine

This article will discuss the *wahhabi* doctrine to explain the ideological basis and the manhaj[6] of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. To understand the concept of *jihad* practiced by *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* in a holistic manner, one must first understand the ideology and belief of the followers of this group. Thus, the main theme that must be analysed is the doctrine of the *salafi wahhabi,* also known as the those who profess the unity of God (*muwahhidun*), which is considered the main basis of the beliefs of this group. The majority of the literature associates this group with the doctrine of *salafi* (salafism) or *salafiyyah* (ICG 2002; Singh 2007; Abuza 2003; Gunaratna 2002). Although *salafi* and *wahhabi* are two different terms, in reality, both refer to the same doctrine or teachings.

This article will attempt to clarify the synonymous nature of the two terms, which has often caused confusion among the public and among researchers. Such a clarification is essential to demonstrate how the followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* conceal their beliefs by calling themselves followers of *salafus soleh*. The general public, who do not understand the history of the *wahhabi* doctrine, may easily recognise the struggle of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* in establishing an Islamic State. This is despite the fact that this doctrine has led the Muslim *ummah* to practice religious extremism and radicalism in the name of religion, which ultimately tarnishes the image of Islam and the image of Muslims themselves.

*Wahhabi*sm is a strict form of Islam promoted by its founder, Muhammad Abd al Wahhab (1703M–1792M). Its main characteristics are that it follows the three first generations of Muslims (*al salaf al soleh*), is strictly monotheistic, rejects Sufism and Shi'ism, concentrates on the *Hadith* (sayings of the prophet Muhammad), rejects any illegal innovations (*bid'a*), considers Muslims that do not adhere to its form of Islam to be unbelievers (*kuffar*) and discourages all contact with non-Muslims.

Although it is labelled *wahhabi* by its opponents, the followers of this faction call themselves *muwahhidun*. The labelling of Muhamad bin Abdul Wahhab's doctrine *wahhabi* is rather confusing as Abdul Wahab is the name of the founder's father, who was a scholar of *ahlus sunnah wal jamaah*. Therefore, naming the doctrine *wahhabi* is a misnomer. Nevertheless, some *wahhabi* scholars do not object to the use of the term and, in fact, use it in their books, as

highlighted in *al Hadiyyah al Saniyyah wa Tuhfah Wahhabiah al Najdiah,* published by Ummul Qura', Makkah, in 1344H (Muhammad Fuad 2006, 5; Waskito 2011, 178).

A *Shafi'e* scholar in Makkah, Sayid Ahmad Zaini Dahlan (1231H–1304H) also authored a book rejecting wahhabism. The title of the book, *Ad Duratus Saniyah firraddi alal Wahabiyah*, is proof that the term *wahhabi* has long existed (Sayid Ahmad Zaini Dahlan 1991, cited in Muhamad Fuad [2006]). Wahhabism is often regarded as a continuation of Ibnu Taimiyyah's (661H–728H) views. In fact, wahhabism is more radical than Ibnu Taimiyyah's views on numerous issues (K. H. Sirajuddin 1994, 310).

Who are the *Salafus Solehs*?

In the following section, this article will discuss how the term *salafi* is linked to *wahhabi* and whether these are two different terms or whether they refer to the same doctrine. The term *salafi* is a relational adjective of *salaf*. Linguistically, *al-salaf* means those who precede, or the predecessors (al-Fadhl 1410H). In simple terms, *al-salaf* refers to the early generations of the proponents of Islam, that is, the companions of the Prophet (PBUH), the *tabi'in*, *tabi' al-tabi'in and* the Muslim scholars who followed the teachings of the early generations. This was stated clearly in the Hadith of the Prophet (PBUH):

> The best of my nation is my generation then those who follow them (*tabi'in*) and then those who follow them (*tabi' al-tabi'in*) ...
>
>   (Narrated by Bukhari and Muslim, *al-Manaqib*, 3377)

Hence, those who admit being salafist are those who follow the teachings of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH), the *tabi'in* and *tabi' al-tabi'in*. Here, a rather confusing issue arises: are Muslims who follow and practice the *sharia* and Islamic teachings according to the four *mazhabs* not considered *salafis* despite the fact that the four imams of the *mazhabs* are *salafis* who belonged to the best generations mentioned in the Hadith? In fact, these imams were closer to the *tabi'in* and *tabi' al-tabi'in* compared to Ibnu Taimiyyah, who was born 600 years after the death of the Prophet (PBUH) and Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, who was born 1400 years after the death of the Prophet (PBUH).

Some scholars later added the adjective *al-soleh* to the term *al-salaf* (*al-salaf al-soleh)* to differentiate between the earlier generations (*al-salaf)* and the present generation (*al-khalaf*) (al-Thalibi 2006, 8; al-Qaradhawi 2005, 20). In temporal terms, the best generations are the first three that existed within the period of 300

years after the death of the Prophet (PBUH). Thus, a salafist is a person who admits that he follows the way of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH), the *tabi'in*, *tabi' al-tabi'in* and the Muslim scholars who inherited and fully understood the knowledge and teachings of these three generations. From the word *salaf* several other words emerged, such as *salafiyyah* (meaning salafism) and *salafiyyun/salafiyyin* (the plural of *salafi*). *Salafiyyah* can also refer to knowledge that is based on a deep understanding of the teachings of the *salafus soleh* (al-Thalibi 2006, 9). *Salafiyyah* also refers to the enthusiasm to return to that which is authentic because what is authentic is purer, closerand more consistent with the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah (Muammar 2010). The *salafis* seek to return the Muslim *ummah* to the authentic teachings of Islam as understood by *al-salaf al-soleh*.

Based on the definitions discussed above, there is no predicament for anyone to claim himself or herself to be a *salafi* because every Muslim acknowledges the status of the Prophet (PBUH) and the two best generations after him. All Muslims who follow one of the four mazhabs carry some elements of salafism in them in one way or another, although they may not claim this explicitly. The problem arose in the late 20th century when a group of Muslims claimed that they were salafist and followers of the *manhaj* of the *salafs* and they accused other groups of not following the *manhaj* of the *salafs* (Interview with Habib Rizieq, 2012). Based on research, this group, which claimed to be *salafi,* is also known as *wahhabi*. Thus, there is no difference between *salafi* and *wahhabi*. This doctrine is known as *wahhabiyah hanbaliyah* in the Arabian Peninsula. When it was exported outside the Arabian Peninsula, the name changed to *salafi* (Hassan 1992).

Muhammad Sa'id Ramadhan al-Buthi (1929M–2013M), in his book *as-Salafiyah Marhalah Zamaniyah Mubarakah La Madzhab Islamiy*, exposed the disguise of *salafi wahhabi,* stating that the *wahhabi* movement disguises itself under several names, such as *salafi* and *ahlus sunnah* (which is not followed by the phrase *wal jamaah*), because it feels uncomfortable being labelled *wahhabi* (al-Buthi 1996, 236). The *wahhabi* movement changed its name to *salafi* to recruit followers and to spread its views outside the Arabian Peninsula. Retaining the *wahhabi* label would create obstacles for the movement because the movement had created many controversies and was associated with bloody events in the Arabian Peninsula, such as the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Makkah in 1979.[7]

The term *salafi* is believed to have been introduced by a *wahhabi* scholar named Syeikh Nasiruddin Al-Albani (1914–1999)[8] to revive *wahhabi*sm and render it more appealing (*As-Sunnah* 2000). Following the relabeling of *wahhabi* to *salafi*, the *wahhabi da'wah* began to gain popularity due to its mission to invite the Muslim *ummah* to return to the teachings of the *salafs.*

Salafi Wahhabi and *Salafi Jihadi*

An issue that has been the focus of debate among Muslim scholars and thinkers is *salafi jihadi*, the doctrine held by *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. The issue of *salafi wahhabi* and *salafi jihadi* is indeed a confusing one due to the different terms used in different contexts. Debate on this issue often results in confusion about the category in which *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* belongs. According to the followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*, the belief to which they subscribe is that of *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah ala' Minhajis Salafis Soleh* (PUPJI 1996; Interview with Said, 2012; Interview with Nasir Abas, 2012).

These followers understand Islam in a holistic manner, as understood by *as Salafus Soleh*. Nevertheless, a number of issues arise when they claim that they follow (*taqlid*) the *salaf* scholars. In reality, the term *salaf* does not refer to a group with a common conviction, nor does it refer to a sect in Islam. Furthermore, there is no Hadith or any other evidence that states that the companions of the Prophet (PBUH), *mujtahidun* scholars and experts of Hadith called themselves and their followers *salafi*. The discussion of the terms *salafi wahhabi* and *salafi jihadi* must be based on a historical perspective and the personalities behind these movements. From there, a conclusion can be drawn as to whether there are any similarities between these two terms.

Salafism has become a platform for various Islamic movements for several decades. Enthusiasm towards reformation was the reason for the emergence of these movements and salafism played a key role in shaping them. There are two main reasons for the emergence of salafism. The first reason was to purify Islamic thought by emphasising that the Muslim *ummah* must revive the glory of Islam to resolve their religious and worldly crises. The second reason was to advance the Muslim *ummah* through religious and moral reforms (Syamsu Rizal 2006, 84–85).

However, an extreme group called *Salafi Yamani* emerged from the *Salafiyun* movement. Among the characteristics of this group is its inclination to label other groups as committing *bid'a*, uncovering the faults of others, accusing others of going astray and labelling others who do not agree with their views. The followers of *Salafi Yamani* do not participate in the process of *da'wah* and interaction within society as they consider such cooperation *bid'a*. It is evident that this group is far more rigid in their relationship with fellow Muslims than they are with non-Muslims (Irfan 2003).

The Emergence of *Salafi Jihadi*

In addition to the extreme group *Salafi Yamani*, the *salafiyyun* also served as a platform for the emergence of the *Salafi Jihadi* group. *Salafi Jihadi* is a term given to Muslims who subscribe to views similar to those of the *salafiyyun* (i.e., returning to the Quran and Sunnah, purifying the *aqidah* and rejecting *bid'a*). Furthermore, this group has the aim of establishing an Islamic State and Caliphate through war (*jihad qital*) and does not hesitate to judge Muslim rulers who do not implement *sharia* law as non-believers (*kuffar*). This concept of *salafism* indicates that although the group seeks to follow the teachings of *ahlus-salaf*, it has derailed from the true path. This concept has become a specific school of thought for a specific group of people who claim that they are the followers of particular scholars, such as Ibnu Taimiyyah and who reject other scholars whom they consider to have gone off track. Although the word *salaf* seems synonymous with the *salafi* group, it is not the exclusive right or the exclusive characteristic of this group. According to al-Buthi, *salafiyyah* is not a school of thought but a blessed era. It is a *bid'a* to make *Salafiyyah* a specific sect that is different from *ahlus sunnah wal al-jama'ah*. Al-Buthi was one of the scholars who exposed the disguise of the *salafi wahhabi*. He stated that the *wahhabi* movement disguises itself under several names, such as *salafi* and *ahlus sunnah* (which is not followed by the phrase *wal jamaah*), because it feels uncomfortable being labelled as *wahhabi* (al-Buthi 1996, 274–275).

The issue of *salafi wahhabi* is complex and difficult to define. Hence, a deep understanding of the terms *wahhabi*, *salafi*, *salafus soleh*, *salafiyyun*, *salafi yamani* and *salafi haraki* is crucial to differentiate between the various groups that claim to belong to *salafism*. This distinction is important to avoid confusion among the Muslim *ummah* and to prevent them from labelling a group as misguided. In the following paragraphs, this article will discuss another branch of *salafism* known as *salafi takfiri*. The word *takfiri* is derived from the word *takfir,* which means to judge someone a *kuffar* (Abu Aman et al. 2011, 193–195).

The *takfiri* group is another splinter of the *salafi wahhabi* group that emerged in the 1970s. An analysis of the contemporary *takfiri* group reveals that the *sanad* of its knowledge stops short of reaching the scholars of *salaf*; it stops at *Jamaah Takfir wal Hijrah, Jamaah al-Jihad* and *al-Jamaat al-Islamiyya,* which emerged in the 1970s in Egypt. The *takfiri* ideology was developed based on the views of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966). Qutb's views were influenced by the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) in 1928. However, later in his life, Qutb distanced his views from the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. The main proponents of the *takfiri* ideology are Ayman al Zhawahiri and Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, who were from the first generation of *Jamaah al-Jihad* in Egypt after Qutb was sentenced to death in 1966. Thus, it

is not surprising that most of the literature describes contemporary radicalism and terrorism as a combination of wahhabism and Qutbism, and that they were founded in Afghanistan by Ayman al Zhawahiri, who is a key figure in al-Qaeda alongside Osama bin Laden (ICG 2002; Singh 2007; Abuza 2003; Gunaratna 2002; Vincenzo 2002).

Among the beliefs of the *salafi takfiri* group is that it reserves the right to declare other Muslims who commit a crime (whether true or only in their imagination) or who practice religion in a way different from theirs to be apostates.[9] They also reject the political power of legitimate governments (Vincenzo 2002, 44). The *takfiris* believe that political authorities that do not abide by their interpretation of Islam are illegitimate and they describe the leaders of such authorities as those who have seized power illegally and can therefore be killed and overthrown. The *salafi takfiri* group also interprets the concept of *jihad* differently. Their concept of *jihad* is discussed in detail in subsequent sections on *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah's* concept of *jihad*.

The *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* splinter group, which is led by young members who are very enthusiastic about implementing global (offensive) *jihad,* has a different interpretation of *jihad*. Its concept of *jihad* is used to fuel the revival of Islam in South-East Asia. *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* often claims that its existence is based purely on religion. By using a religious platform, it combines the ideas of two fundamental *salafi* groups, Qutb's radical views and Azzam's *jihadi* views.[10] According to these two perspectives, *da'wah* alone is not sufficient and violence must be used to establish an Islamic state. It is through such views and ideologies that violence found its way to some followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*.

Based on the definitions of *salaf* and *salafiyyah* discussed at the beginning of this article, there is no problem for any person or group of people to describe themselves as salafist or as followers of *salaf* because every Muslim acknowledges the status of the Prophet (PBUH) and the two best generations after him (*tabi'in* and *tabi' at-tabi'in*). These three generations lived within a period of 300 years of the death of the Prophet (PBUH). Nevertheless, the image of *salaf* and the way in which the term is used began to shift away from its original image and meaning in the 18th and 19th centuries, particularly under the leadership of Muhamad bin Abd Wahhab (the founder of the *wahhabi* movement in the Arabian Peninsula). These teachings were subsequently spread by scholars such as Syeikh Abdullah bin Baz (1909–1999), Syeikh Nashiruddin al-Albani (1914–1999), Ibnu Utsaimin, Syeikh Salih Fauzan al-Fauzan and, finally, by Syeikh Abdullah Azzam (1941–1989) in the 1980s and 1990s during the Afghan-Soviet war. Certain groups claim that they are the only salafist groups and that others are not considered salafist.

The efforts of al-Albani in rebranding the *wahhabi da'wah* with a new name (i.e., *salafi*) had results both within and outside of the Arab world. One of their *da'wah* efforts was to invite and urge the Muslim *ummah* to return to the way of the *salafs*. Although this movement called the Muslim *ummah* to return to the teachings of the *salafs*, it also prohibited the Muslim *ummah* from following the teachings of *salaf* as advocated by the four imams, Imam Malik, Imam Abu Hanifah, Imam Shafie and Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal. This was despite the fact that all four imams lived in the best three centuries of the *salafs*. On the contrary, they encouraged the Muslim *ummah* to follow the views of those who lived after the first three centuries (300 years after the death of the Prophet [PBUH]), namely, the views of Ibnu Taimiyyah and his disciple Ibnu Qayyim al-Jauziyah as well as Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (al-Azhari 2011, 215).

If Ibnu Taimiyyah himself was born 600 years after the death of the Prophet (PBUH), subsequent *wahhabi* scholars are not *salaf* scholars (the correct term would be *al-khalaf*). Therefore, in reality, they are not *salafist* or followers of the *salafs*; on the contrary, they are followers of *salafi wahhabi*, that is, followers of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. There is no doubt that Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab had high regard for Ibnu Taimiyyah, Hence, we can see that the facts were distorted by the followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah,* who claimed that they were followers of the *manhaj* of *salaf*. Based on research and interviews conducted by the author, the origin of the *aqidah* of *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah 'ala Minhajis Salafis Soleh* is in Afghanistan and it was pioneered by Abdullah Azzam. This can be easily understood because almost all of the *mujahidin* of the first and second generations who went to Afghanistan, including Sungkar (1937–1999) and Ba'asyir, had the opportunity to meet and learn, whether directly or indirectly, from Azzam[11] (ICG 2005, 21–22; Interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, 2012; Interview with Nasir Abas, 2012).

In the 20th century, this religious trend was carried on by *salafi* scholars such as bin Baz and al-Albani. In 1984, during the Afghan war, Azzam (a disciple of bin Baz and a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) dedicated himself to *jihad* in Afghanistan. He authored books, *Ad Difa' An Aradli Al Muslimin Furudl Al' A'yan* (The Defence of Muslim Lands) and *Hukmul Jihad* (Principles of Jihad), which stated that *jihad* in Afghanistan was an individual obligation (*fardhu 'ain*) on every Muslim throughout the world and that abandoning *jihad* in Afghanistan was tantamount to abandoning prayers and fasting. This view is in contrast to the view of his teacher, who stated that *jihad* was a *fardhu 'ain* obligation on Muslims in Afghanistan and only a communal obligation (*fardhu kifayah*) on Muslims outside of Afghanistan (Azzam 2007, 39).

It was Azzam who promoted new views of *salafi wahhabi*. These new views were later known as *al Salafi al Jihadi* or *Salafi Jihadi* and are considered to be the views upheld by the followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* today. Azzam defines *jihad fisabillillah* as fighting in the way of Allah (*qital fisabilillah*). He rejects the Hadith that states that fighting is a minor *jihad,* claiming that the Hadith is fabricated (*maudu'*) and therefore cannot be used as a valid reference. Azzam also issued a *fatwa* stating that the revelation of verses 5 and 36 of Surah at-Taubah, also known as the sword verses (*ayatus saif*), abrogated (*naskh*) more than the 120 previous verses that did not define *jihad* as armed fighting (*qital*) (Azzam 2005, 240).

The Controversy over Global Jihad

Because *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* upholds the concept of *da'wah* and *jihad* (*ad-da'wah wal jihad*) to achieve its goal, this article will discuss how *jihad* is understood by the followers of this group. The term *jihad*,[12] which is derived from the Arabic root word *jahada*, is often misinterpreted as "holy war". To describe *jihad* as fighting only is inaccurate because fighting is only one aspect of *jihad*. *Jihad* has a wider meaning and covers various aspects, such as the struggle to enjoin what is good and to forbid all forms of evil, injustice and oppression in society. This is a spiritual, social, economic and political struggle. Therefore, the concept and domain of *jihad* are very broad and are not limited to armed conflict. From an Islamic perspective, *jihad* in the battlefield is the last option and is subject to certain conditions. It can be implemented only by an Islamic state (not individuals or groups) under the rule of a Muslim leader to defend its freedom, including religious freedom (al-Sya'rawi 2011, 189). Allah, the Almighty, said in the Quran,

> Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged. And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory.

> (al-Hajj 22:39)

Allah, the Almighty, also said,

> [They are] those who have been evicted from their homes without right - only because they say, "Our Lord is Allah". And were it not that Allah checks the people, some by means of others, there would have been demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques in which the name of Allah is much mentioned. And Allah will surely support those who support Him. Indeed, Allah is Powerful and Exalted in Might.

> (al-Hajj 22:40)

Differing Views and Interpretations of *Jihad*

There are differing views among Muslim scholars and Islamic movements on the concept of *jihad*. For instance, Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, saw *jihad* as a God-ordained defensive strategy, stating that most Islamic scholars agree unanimously that *jihad* is a communal defensive obligation upon the Islamic *ummah* to broadcast the summons and that it is an individual obligation to repel the attacks of unbelievers upon it (al-Banna 1978, 150–151). Ghannouchi, the exiled leader of the Tunisian fundamentalist Al-Nahda movement, promotes the defensive jihad. According to him, the Quran calls for the establishment of truth and justice both by peaceful means and by *jihad* (Ghannouchi 1995). Another prominent scholar, Qutb, views *jihad* as both defensive and offensive, stating that *jahiliyya* (Qutb divides the world into two camps, Islam and *jahiliyya*) is always evil in whatever form it manifests and *jihad* by force must be used to defeat evil *jahili* regimes and to replace them with Islamic systems. According to Qutb, there is only one law, *sharia* and all other laws are human innovations; furthermore, there is only one system, Islam and other systems are *jahiliyya* (Qutb 1990, 43–50; 101–103)

Al-Mawdudi views jihad as revolutionary struggle to establish God's order on earth. Mawdudi seem to go further by stating that it is the duty of true believers to wipe out tyranny, wrongdoing, immorality, arrogance, rivalry and unlawful exploitation from the world by force of arms. This is why he suggests that the Islamic party has no option but to wrest the authority of the government from evil hands and to transfer it to the hands of true Muslims (al-Mawdudi 1997, 4–6; 10–11). Finally, Azzam, a prominent Palestinian *jihadi* fighter in Afghanistan, views jihad as the greatest religious obligation after faith (*iman*). Azzam claims that the *jihad* obligation has been forgotten and its neglect is the cause of Muslim humiliation. Azzam goes further by saying that when Muslims are not under attack by unbelievers, *jihad* is a communal obligation (*fardhu kifayah*), but when *kuffar* occupy Muslim lands, *jihad* has become an individual obligation (*fardhu ain*) and remains so until the liberation of the last occupied piece of Muslim land (Azzam 2007, 39).

Based on the differing views discussed earlier, it can be said that *jihad* is divided into two categories, the defensive and offensive *jihad*. The first concept of *jihad* is the *jihad* to defend oneself (defensive *jihad*). The evidence for this type of *jihad* is found in the following verses:

> Warfare is ordained for you, though it is hateful unto you; but it may happen that ye hate a thing which is good for you and it may happen that ye love a thing which is bad for you. Allah knoweth, ye know not.

> (al-Baqarah 2:216)

They question thee (O Muhammad) with regard to warfare in the sacred month. Say: Warfare therein is a great (transgression), but to turn (men) from the way of Allah and to disbelieve in Him and in the Inviolable Place of Worship and to expel His people thence, is a greater with Allah; for persecution is worse than killing. And they will not cease from fighting against you till they have made you renegades from your religion, if they can. And whoso becometh a renegade and dieth in his disbelief: such are they whose works have fallen both in the world and the Hereafter. Such are rightful owners of the Fire: they will abide therein.

(al-Baqarah 2:217)

And those who believe say: If only a surah were revealed! But when a decisive surah is revealed and war is mentioned therein, thou seest those in whose hearts is a disease looking at thee with the look of men fainting unto death. Therefor woe unto them!

(Muhamad 47:20)

Whoso on that day turneth his back to them, unless manoeuvring for battle or intent to join a company, he truly hath incurred wrath from Allah and his habitation will be hell, a hapless journey's end.

(al-Anfal 8:16)

This verse is proof of the view that states that revolutionary jihad (*jihad qital*) can be implemented only if Muslims are being attacked. For example, this *jihad* can be implemented in Palestine, which is being attacked by Israel, as well as in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are occupied by the US and its allies. Thus, *jihad qital* can be implemented only in the event that an Islamic country is being attacked or occupied and not otherwise. Muslims who are not directly affected by the attack or occupation may assist the *jihad* in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq by going to the affected Islamic country as *jihad* volunteers, by providing financial assistance, or simply by praying for the success of the *jihad*. This is in line with the following Quranic verse:

And what is [the matter] with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah and [for] the oppressed among men, women and children who say, "Our Lord, take us out of this city of oppressive people and appoint for us from Yourself a protector and appoint for us from Yourself a helper?

(an-Nisa 4:75)

There is also another view that states that it is also permissible to implement *jihad qital* to attack "infidel" countries (*darul harb*) that oppose Islam. According to this view, *jihad qital* is perceived as the only way to recover lost Muslim lands. However, *jihad qital* must be implemented only with the approval of the ruler (caliph) and within the framework of the call (*da'wah*) to uphold the words of Allah, the Almighty, as exemplified in the era of the *Khulafa' ar-Rashidun* (Ibrahim, Asim and Esaam-ud-Deen 1997, 48–51; 76–77; 115; 123). Nevertheless, it is the primary view that is widely accepted and subscribed to by the majority of Muslim scholars and Islamic movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Based on this view, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt never carried out any armed resistance against the Egyptian government despite the fact that they were oppressed for decades.[13]

The second view of *jihad* is global *jihad* or offensive *jihad*. This view was developed based on a number of Quranic verses, such as the following:

> O you who have believed, fight those adjacent to you of the disbelievers and let them find in you harshness. And know that Allah is with the righteous.
>
> (at-Taubah 9:123)

> And fight against the disbelievers collectively as they fight against you collectively. And know that Allah is with the righteous (who fear Him).
>
> (at-Taubah 9:36)

> And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you ….
>
> (al-Baqarah 2:191)

Some of the followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* use these verses as a basis to wage war against the citizens of *darul harb* wherever they are. In general, countries such as Israel, the United States, Britain, Australia and their allies, which are involved in the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq and the oppression in Palestine, are considered countries against which they can wage war. This includes damaging all forms of assets, infrastructure and interests owned by these countries, whether in Muslim countries that are under attack or outside Muslim countries that are not under attack. By now, we should understand the reason why this view of global *jihad* is subscribed to by some of the leaders and followers of the *salafi jihadi*-oriented *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. From a religious perspective, the followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* justify their actions by using the above

verses. The killing of non-Muslims and the confiscation of their property are considered legitimate in the context of *jihad fisabillillah*. Furthermore, Muslims who are believed to have committed apostasy are considered infidels (*kuffar*).

The above verses are interpreted differently by jihadists. For example, the verse from al-Baqarah instructs Muslims to kill their enemies who are fighting against them only in the context of a war and not otherwise. Thus, Muslims are not allowed to kill non-Muslims outside the battlefield, such as at shopping centres and other public places. Similarly, verse 5 of Surah at-Taubah, "And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them ..." and verse 36 of the same surah, "And fight against the disbelievers collectively as they fight against you collectively…" are interpreted in a way that fulfils the interests of certain parties (Interview with Prof Dr Ahmad Shafi'i Mufid, 2012; Ali Syu'aibi 2004, 151–160). The differences in interpreting these verses can be attributed to the concept of "direct translation" (literal), as explained earlier in this article.

In this context, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* is not an exception. Younger members of the group, namely Riduan Isamudin @ Hambali, Mukhlas @ Ali Gufron, Amrozi @ Ali Imron, Dr Azahari, Noordin Md Top and Imam Samudera @ Abdul Aziz were not satisfied with the leadership of Ba'asyir, who succeeded Sungkar following the latter's death. Ba'asyir was accused of being too weak and easily influenced by others. Therefore, these younger members decided to adopt a radical and offensive approach. For Imam Samudera, the ruling on *jihad* is similar to that on fasting. Because fasting is a *fardhu 'ain* obligation, anyone who abandons the *jihad* would be committing a sin (Imam Samudera 2004, 128–129). Imam Samudera classifies the stages of *jihad* against the infidels into several stages: patience, permission to fight and obligation to fight. He asserts that the command to fight has come with the revelation of verses 5 and 36 of Surah at-Taubah. According to him, this is the fourth stage of *jihad*, that is, the offensive stage, which led to the Bali bombings in 2002.

At this stage, war must be waged against all non-believers except those who repent, embrace Islam, establish the prayers and pay *zakat*. The target is individuals who are non-believers regardless of their location (Imam Samudera 2004, 130; 133; 160). In this context, one can see how the views of Azzam and the *fatwa* of Osama bin Laden 1998[14] influenced him and how this led to the Bali bombings. There is no doubt that this view was obtained in Afghanistan through Azzam, who maintained that there is no other meaning of *jihad* but fighting and that *jihad* is a *fardhu 'ain* obligation. Those who hold this view also state that it is permissible to fight against an oppressive ruler who does not rule by the *sharia*. Although he does not agree with the actions of the groups involved in the Bali

bombings, Ba'asyir stated that their actions were permissible within the framework of *jihad* against a tyrant ruler (Ba'asyir 2006, 277–279; 280–284). However, Ba'asyir did not explain about the innocent civilian victims of the bombings.

The Views of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyyah* on Global *Jihad*

Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah's concept of *jihad* has been significantly influenced by the works of intellectuals from the Middle East since the 1960s. This influence increased between the 1980s and the 1990s. Personalities who influenced and inspired *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah's* concept of *jihad* include Qutb, Mawdudi, Azzam, al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. Some of the group's followers, particularly Imam Samudera, openly reject the traditional concept of *jihad* and prefer scholars and thinkers who have been tested on the battlefield. To him, scholars who have never performed *jihad* in the battlefield do not have the capacity to understand the issues and complexities of *jihad*. Only scholars who have experienced *jihad* have an understanding and are therefore entitled to talk about Islam, particularly in matters pertaining to *jihad* (Imam Samudera 2004, 67–69).

Jihadist leaders and intellectuals have reinterpreted the boundaries and requirements that define *jihad*. For instance, Shukri Mustafa (1942–1978), the leader of the Egyptian *Takfir wal-Hijra* and Abd al-Salam Faraj (1952–1982), the founder and theorist of the Egyptian *Jamaah al-Jihad,* both declared the regime and society in Egypt as being under *takfir*, and both the society and regime as the primary enemy to be dealt with by jihad (Faraj 1986, 159–179; 207–213; Hamid 1984, 136–137). These groups reject the limitations imposed by the traditional concept of *jihad,* particularly in relation to the killing of Muslims and non-Muslims. In this sense, this group promotes a broader and more aggressive concept of *jihad*. These groups also introduced a new pan-Islamic dimension and perception to the concept of *jihad*. The Muslim *ummah* is no longer performing *jihad* against the enemies of Islam in their countries but also beyond the geographical borders of their countries. This group justifies its action by claiming that the anti-Islamic sentiment that has prevailed throughout the world requires the Muslim *ummah* to react globally.

In this scenario, the influence of Azzam is seen as critical. His work, titled *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah,* which was published in 12 series, was translated and distributed by a jihadist publishing company, Pustaka al-Alaq in Solo, Java. The book is mandatory reading material for all followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. In his book, he urges the Muslim *ummah* to participate in *jihad* and emphasises the contemporary concept of global *jihad*:

This duty (jihad) will not end with victory in Afghanistan; jihad will remain an individual obligation (fardhu ain) until all other lands that were Muslim are returned to us so that Islam will reign again....

(Azzam 2007, 95)

Based on these views, some followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* have justified their actions and redefined the concept of global *jihad* or offensive *jihad*. The "Islam is under attack" cry has become the heartbeat of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah's* fight against non-Muslims. Although their *jihad* has resulted in the death of fellow Muslims, under this new and broader definition of *jihad,* such deaths are justified. In general, radical elements within *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* have rejected the traditional definition of *jihad* and redefined it to justify more aggressive actions and to accept collateral damage to people of their own religion. As stated by Said Abdul Hassan during his trial for the bombing of the Australian Embassy, which resulted in the death of several Indonesian Muslims,

We never felt any remorse. They died because of Allah's will ... Although all 10 people who died were Indonesians; our concept of jihad accepts collateral damage...

(*Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 June 2005)

Conclusion

This article has discussed in detail how the ideology of *salafi wahhabi* was well received by the followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. The discussion also identified the similarities that exist between the terms *wahhabi* and *salafi*, which have caused much confusion among the public. The *salafi wahhabi* movement also produced several splinter groups that were more extreme in nature, such as the *Salafi Yamani, Salafi Takfiri* and *Salafi Jihadi* groups. There are also more moderate splinter groups, such as the *Salafi Haraki* group. Nevertheless, all of these splinter groups have one thing in common: they differ from the real mainstream teachings of Islam. Our discussion of salafism has explained how radicalism, *jihad* and terrorism spread in the contemporary world of Islam. By using the label *manhaj salaf*, some Muslim factions have adopted a definition and interpretation of *jihad* that differ from those adopted by mainstream groups. In conclusion, the aims, actions, activities, ideas, doctrines and the final objectives of the *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* movement are primarily based on a religious doctrine grounded in the doctrine of belief (*iman*) and an understanding of *tawhid*. By exploring *salafi wahhabi* and a doctrine of *tawhid* that is different

from that of mainstream Islam, we are able to position *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* within the contemporary scenario of Islamist movements.

Notes

1. The message of the Quran is clear; we have seen that the sanctity of any human life is to be respected and any violation in that regard is paramount to the worst crime. Mercy is at the heart of the Islamic call: "We sent thee (O Muhammad) not save as a mercy for the peoples" (al-Anbiya 21:107). This is a completely different message from what the terrorists are sadly imparting to humanity. A similar message can be found in verse al-Maidah (5:8, 32).

2. There is no single definition of terrorism, fundamentalism, radicalism, or extremism that includes the religious factor in general or the Islamic factor in particular. In more general definitions, for instance, "terrorism" is described as the conscious, premeditated use of violence by organised groups or individuals against non-military targets to exert pressure on certain sectors of the population or on organs of the state to achieve goals that cannot be met through lawful means. "Extremism" is regarded as a kind of radical negation of a state's prevailing social norms and rules by individuals or groups. Furthermore, in the majority of cases, it assumes the use of illegitimate means, including terror, to satisfy certain goals. The linking of religion with the concepts described above results in a highly negative image of members of the Muslim faith as potential terrorists and extremists. For further discussions, see Cooper (2001, 881–893) and Juergensmeyer (2002, 5–10).

3. The association between religion and violence is always debatable. For instance, the situations in Palestine, Maluku, Poso and Mindanao are complex issues. It has been increasingly recognized that what feeds the conflicts in these places is not just religion but also all of the classic characteristics of a protracted civil conflict revolving around questions of identity and territory. In the case of Palestine, Zionism is and always has been a colonialist project, similar in its actions and philosophy to other European colonialist projects such as those in Africa and the Middle East and its explicit intention has always been to dispossess the Arab inhabitants of Palestine of their lands and resources. The historic injustices committed against Jews, which were, in any case, committed almost exclusively by Europeans, are used by Israel as a cover to deflect criticism and to discredit opponents of Zionism. The violent acts that Palestinians have committed have been overwhelmingly legitimate acts of self-defence by a colonised and disposed people. Similarly, the situations in Mindanao, Maluku and Poso are portrayed as religious conflicts, but they are fuelled by territorial, identity and social disputes between two parties. Coincidentally, the parties involved are Christians and marginalised Muslims. Therefore, this conflict is labelled a religious conflict. For further discussion on the struggle of the Palestinians, see Ghassan Kanafani (2011) and for the struggle of Bangsamoro in Mindanao, see Andrew Tan in Ramakrishna and See (2003, 111–112).

4. Religious fundamentalist movements are a modern phenomenon that has increasingly strengthened in the age of globalization. Despite their anti-modern attitude, they are the product of modernity. The influences of modernity can be found, for instance, in their literal reading of scripture, pragmatic rationalism, nationalist attitudes and modern strategies, and operation. This is not surprising because the leaders of fundamentalist movements are, or were, mostly the product of modern education, as can be seen in the case of fundamentalist and radical Islamic groups in Indonesia. In the Arab world, where freedom is restricted and few pathways are allowed for dissent, the mosques become places to discuss politics. Islam has become a powerful ideology in challenging corrupt governments and the Islamic organisations are the only outlet for the opposition. For further discussion, see Manning Nash in Marty and Appleby (1991, 691–740).

5. It is important to highlight this internal division at the beginning of the article to differentiate between groups of different ideologies, tactics and strategies within *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah.* The splinter groups discussed in this article are those that were pioneered by Hambali, Mukhlas, Amrozi, Ali Imron, Imam Samudera, Nordin Md Top, Dr Azahari, Dulmatin and a number of other personalities from Mantiqi I (the Malaysia/Singapore region). This group has launched a series of bomb attacks across South-East Asia. This must be highlighted to explain that *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* experienced internal division following the death of its first leader, Abdullah Sungkar, in 1999. For further discussion on the internal division within *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah,* see Noor Huda and Ungerer (2009, 2) and Jones (2009, 11).

6. Linguistically, the term *manhaj* means a clear path. In this context, it is defined as the religious path to achieve a particular goal.

7.   The 20th of November 1979 witnessed an armed rebellion against the rulers of Saudi Arabia. The rebellion was led by Juhaiman Al Utaibah (a former follower of *Jamaah Salafiyiah Al Muhtasibah*), who accused the Saudi rulers of deviating from the teachings of the *salafs*. Juhaiman and 300 of his followers seized the Grand Mosque in Makkah and injured Muslims who were performing *hajj* at that time. For further records of the event, see al-Yassini (1985, 124–129).

8.   Syeikh Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani was born in the city of Ashkodera, then the capital of Albania, in the year 1332H (1914 AD). He began to specialize in the field of Hadith and its related sciences by the age of 20 and was influenced by articles in *al-Manaar* magazine. The Syeikh's studies of the Hadith of Allah's Messenger (PBUH) had a great effect on him and resulted in his turning away from blindly following his former mazhab and accepting and acting upon the Book and the Sunnah with the understanding of the *salafus soleh* of the *ummah*. After a number of his works appeared in print, al-Albani was chosen to teach Hadith in the new university in Madinah, Saudi Arabia for three years, from 1381H to 1383H, where he was also a member of the university board. Al-Albani became the pre-eminent scholar of Hadith (al-Muhaddith) in the recent era. Al-Albani passed away on 2 October 1999. For further information on al-Albani, see Abu Nasir Ibrahim and Abu Maryam Muslim (2007).

9.   This doctrine emerged from the concept of *tauhid hakimiyah/mulkiyah,* which is a branch of *tawhid* in *wahhabism*. This doctrine spread very quickly in Afghanistan because the environment was very conducive for the followers of *salafi wahhabi* to practice the *hakimiyah/mulkiyah tawhid* doctrine to fight against the apostate rulers (the puppet government) and the infidel occupational forces. For further discussion, see Solahudin (2011, 31).

10.   Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) was the ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s who was tortured and executed by President Nasser for his book *Milestone (Ma'alim fi al-Tariq)*, which reinterpreted traditional Islamic concepts to justify a violent takeover of the state. Syeikh Abdullah Azzam is an activist from Muslim Brotherhood who raised the idea of global *jihad* to free Afghanistan from Soviet occupation. He was dubbed "the Godfather of Jihad" and was the mentor of Osama bin Laden. Qutb's views on *jihad* can be seen in his book *Qutb* (1990, 43–50) and Azzam's views on *jihad* can be seen in his book Azzam (2007, 39; 95).

11.   The meeting in Afghanistan took place sometime in 1988, while both Sungkar (the person in charge of foreign affairs) and Ba'asyir (Minister of Justice) were still members of Darul Islam (DI). The main purpose of the visit, headed by Ajengan Masduki and top DI leaders, was to streamline the sending of DI recruits to Afghanistan and to raise funds from Saudi Arabia and *Rabitat Al Islami*. Sungkar reportedly used this visit to introduce Masduki to Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the Mujahidin Commander in charge of Camp Saada (where DI recruits from Indonesia were trained) and to meet with Abdullah Azzam, the leading ideologue of *Salafi Jihadism* and the person in charge of *Maktab Al Khidmat* (all DI recruits are transited at this *Maktab* before proceeding to Camp Saada). Therefore, DI recruits (who, after splitting with DI in 1993, were known as member of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*) sent to Afghanistan meet Abdullah Azzam at *Maktab al Khidmat* (Interview with Ba'asyir, 2012; Interview with Nasir Abas, 2012). For further discussion on the meeting, see ICG (2005, 21–22).

12.   *Jihad* is mentioned in the Quran 41 times: eight times in *makkiyyah* verses and 33 times in *madaniyyah* verses. *Jihad* in its religious sense is mentioned in three *makkiyyah* verses and 24 *madaniyyah* verses. In the rest of the verses, the word *jihad* is not used in its religious sense. Etymologically, the word *jihad* means "striving to achieve an objective". See Rohimin (2002, 16). Scholars have three ways of distinguishing *makkiyyah* and *madaniyyah* verses. The first is in terms of the time it was given to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). *makkiyah* verses were given prior to the *hijra* (emigration) from Mecca to Medina. Second, they refer to places; *makkiyyah* are verses given in Mecca and *madaniyyah* are verses given in Medina after the *hijra.* Third, the target audience is a factor. *Makkiyah* verses are meant for the Mecca population and *madaniyyah* verses are targeted for the *Medina* peoples. For further discussion, see Ahmad (2011, 159).

13.   The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) participated in 2011 Egypt election and got into power. The 2011 uprising ended three decades of authoritarian rule by Hosni Mubarak. However, Morsi, Egypt's first freely elected president, came under massive pressure within a year in office, with his opponents accusing him of failing the 2011 revolution by concentrating power in the hands of his MB. His government was toppled by the military on the 4 July 2013 (see news CNN, 4 July 2013). The political environment within which the MB was constrained to work unquestionably had a tremendous effect on how the organisation could act. Of the three MB groups studied (Egypt, Syria and Jordan) by Fondren (2009), the Syrian branch ceased to exist. The history of the group within

Syria bears this out as an unsurprising reality. The group's early history in the country gave them little chance to plant deep and healthy roots due to the country's fragmented leadership and the ever-changing political environment. When a stable government finally took shape, it was extremely brutal in its repression of the Brotherhood and was willing to employ any measure, no matter how violent, to subdue them. When Hafiz Asad came to power in 1970, his repression of the Brotherhood was heavy handed almost without pause. Consequently, the support from the population that was needed by the MB was difficult to obtain given the deep sectarian divides, not only in the country as a whole but also because of the divides that existed in the Sunni majority. In Egypt, the Brotherhood remains one of the strongest opposition groups in the country, but the repressive and political measures of past regimes, as well as past failures by the Brotherhood, have caused them to back away from using violence in their ever-present battle against the current state. These facts seem to indicate that the political/cultural environment under which the MB groups operate heavily influences the actions in which these groups are willing to engage. The more violent the political environment, as demonstrated by the case of Syria, the more aggressive the actions undertaken by the Brotherhood. In contrast and in possible support for the assertion made for the Egyptian case, Jordan's permissive political environment has served to keep the MB in line, as evidenced by the fact that the group has never used violence against the Hashemite regime and remains a political force in the country. For further discussion on the MB in Egypt, Syria and Jordan, see Fondren (2009, 71–72).

14. On 23 February 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a *fatwa* declaring war against the United States. The *fatwa* was issued under the name of the World Islamic Front. It was signed by Ayman Al Zawahiri (Jihad al Islami, Egypt), Rifa'i Ahmad Taha (Jamaah Islamiyah, Egypt), Syeikh Mir Hamzah (Jamiatul Ulama, Pakistan), and Fazlur Rahman (a jihadist from Bangladesh). Prior to this, on 23 August 1996, bin Laden issued the "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places". This fatwa can be accessed at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm.

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