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Negotiating a New Order in the Straits of Malacca (1500–1700)

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Abstract. The Portuguese conquest of Malacca in 1511 was a watershed moment, revolutionising the history of the Straits region. Its impact and the local response, as well as the arrival of northern Europeans at the turn of the 16th into the 17th centuries, breaking into the Portuguese trade monopoly, are examined and analysed. War was the catalyst for change. The conquest of Malacca in 1641 by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was another significant moment in the history of the region and a continuation of the European presence and influence.

Keywords and phrases: encounters, war, control, diplomacy, fission

Introduction

The Straits of Malacca, the important shipping lane for trade from China to India and the Middle East, was the receiver and transmitter of ideas and changes on a large scale. These dynamics characterise its history and accelerated with the 1511 arrival of the Portuguese, who came from outside the traditional borders of interactions. The region was thrown into confusion as if hit by a shockwave, with the existing order disrupted by enforced contact with maritime and technical prowess and different ideas and interests. The Portuguese perceived of their new surroundings as the realm of pirate states. They created hardship in the region by attacking Muslim trade[1] and territory, instating the *cartaz* system for shipping in their "sphere of influence" and raising the Cross in an Islamised region.[2] They were carrying out the obligation placed on them by the bull of Pope Alexander VI (Hall 1981, 264).[3] The Ottoman intrusion in the Iberian Peninsula, its expansion into central Europe and towards the maritime spaces in the Indian Ocean undoubtedly played a role in how the Portuguese conducted their operations in Asia.

Thanks to several major studies, the main lines of the historical narrative of the encounters among this region, the Portuguese and later the northern Europeans (Dutch, English and French), who came at the start of the 17th century, are well known. Recent studies, such as Amirul Hadi's *Islam and State in Sumatra* (2004) and Peter Borschberg's *The Singapore and Melaka Straits: Violence, Security and Diplomacy in the 17th century* (2010) shed light on other issues of concern in this study. There is, however, a lacuna in the existing literature in explaining and analysing the impact and scale of the European presence. This article attempts to discuss the occurrences in the course of this revolutionising and revolutionary

period. The author intends to position her analyses of the events and developments in the frame of circumstances and choices, calling to mind the words of the Indonesian scholar Soedjatmoko that "we all make our choices by our own lights – perceptions that are skewered by our own limited knowledge, values, aspirations and fears, by our sense of what options are available and in circumstances often beyond our control. This is especially so in revolutionary periods, when the unfolding of events is greatly accelerated and human actions infused with feelings of great intensity. This makes revolutions so highly unpredictable, with their own internal dynamics".[4]

In the harsh reality of the Portuguese conquest of Malacca and their efforts to monopolise the spice trade, restricting the operations of the Muslim traders, crucial choices had to be made by the local ports. Aceh Dar as-Salam, founded in approximately 1500 out of two rivalling north Sumatran polities, stood out as Portuguese Malacca's nemesis. Why and how it assumed the leading role in the struggle against the Portuguese is one of the themes of this article. One should, however, realise that Aceh did not sit comfortably on the periphery of the Portuguese quest but rather was right in the middle of the tempest, its shores washed by the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Straits, gateways of shipping and exploration. The relocation of Muslim trade networks from the conquered port of Malacca to Sumatra's eastern ports was the impetus for Aceh's economic rise, laying the foundations for its becoming one of Asia's greatest maritime powers of that time.

Determinants of War and Conflict

There is some legitimacy in the contention that rivalry for trade was the *raison d'ětre* of the struggle between Aceh and the Portuguese; however, this argument ignores the logic that the first meeting of East and West was not only a collision of mercantile interests and greed but also of faiths and ideologies. The Portuguese historian Alves (2000, 79) saw what others failed to see – which supports my proposition – that the dispute between Islam and Christianity was decisive in the struggle between Aceh and the Portuguese. The question of a "just war" – *jus ad bellum* – a theory that, simply said, renders war a moral, ethical or religious necessity, comes to mind. There is a caveat. Can the historian determine the character of a struggle that took place centuries ago when the traces of this history are muddled because the sources are sparse or lacunose? This lack of historical information may pose serious difficulties if extant sources do not indicate the reasons for war.

It is easier to answer the question of why Aceh took the lead in the struggle against the Portuguese, when Johor assumed the role of successor state to the fallen Malacca Sultanate. From the available sources from the 16th and 17th

centuries, we gather that Johor could not sustain its efforts to recapture Malacca. The Portuguese responded to every action with vengeance, attacking Johor and destroying Bintan, the residence of the refugee sultan of Malacca, in 1526. We also note that Johor was at times very lenient towards the Portuguese, collaborating with them against the rising Sumatran sultanate Aceh Dar as-Salam.[5] The conflict between these two sultanates braided itself into the East-West struggle. It cannot be denied that Johor was in an unenviable position, situated at arm's length from Malacca, which gave it little room to manoeuvre or follow a steady policy of resistance. Its survival depended greatly on good neighbourship with Malacca.

As the exponent of local opposition against the Portuguese, Aceh was confronted with matters of containment and survival. Islamic identity and cohesion – existential and perhaps contentious issues – eventually acquired great significance in Aceh's view, which shall be clarified further in this article. While identity was (everywhere) difficult to define, establishing it became more unpredictable. There are important indications, supported by written proof, that religion was a major issue for Aceh in battling the Portuguese "infidel" in the *Dar al Harb* – the abode of war and the antonym of *Dar as-Salam*. Initially, the Portuguese held the view that Aceh's actions against their shipping were *razzias* (raids or military attacks); however, they gradually recognised that military and moral support from the Ottoman emperor and caliph of the largest Muslim community lent the actions the fierceness and other characteristics of a *jihad* (Alves 2000, 97). In a religiously motivated war, an Islamic ruler may summon all the eligible men of his realm to prepare for the struggle (Lewis 1991, 73). John Davis, one of the first European visitors to Aceh, visiting in 1599 and again in 1602, notes that the sultan could summon all the people of his realm for war.[6] Almost two decades later, in 1619, the French general Augustin de Beaulieu, who was in Aceh with a fleet from Normandy, made the same observation. Here again is a caveat. Even if the jurists of Islam were concerned with moral values and standards regarding the call to a military *jihad* and the Acehnese rulers were advised on all kinds of matters by trusted Islamic scholars at their court, it is impossible to ascertain if and how these concerns were accommodated in initiating and conducting a military *jihad*. Scholars who follow the letter of the law have difficulty conceiving of Aceh's struggle as a *jihad*. Their arguments should not lead to unproductive dialectics. Christian crusading in the region needed a firm response[7] – a religious obligation even the jurists of Islam would acknowledge. The Portuguese incursions in Asia were discussed at the annual meetings of Muslim leaders in Jeddah. In 1565, the sultan of Aceh, Alau'd-din Ri'ayat Shah Al Kahar (r. 1537–1571), who was the sixteenth century's relentless pursuer of the Portuguese, sent an official mission to Constantinople to appeal for assistance from the Ottoman emperor in his struggle against the Portuguese. A fleet assembled from different corners of the empire arrived in the Straits in 1567

under Kurtoglu Hizir Reis; however, the combined large Muslim armada was not able to wrest Malacca from the Portuguese.[8] An Islamic effort in 1509 to rescue Diu on India's west coast from the hands of the Portuguese also failed. The *Pacta Islamica*[9] was not effective on the Asian seas.

Evidence that Portuguese religious fervour was an unbridgeable obstacle for Aceh is drawn from a 1610 letter from Sultan Sri Perkasa Shah Alam, known posthumously as Iskandar Muda (r. 1607–1636), to Prince Maurice of Nassau of the United Republic of the Netherlands. He declared his lifelong commitment to battling the Portuguese *om oorzaake van religie en tyrannie* (because of religion and tyranny) (VOC 11263).[10] This declaration may seem odd given that the letter was addressed to a Christian ally. It was in response to the message of the Prince that an armistice was pending between Spain and the United Republic. The armistice was in place from 1609–1621. Portugal had come under the crown of Spain in 1588, a fact that must have tainted Portuguese prestige among Asian rulers.

In 1602, Aceh and the United Republic established a "brotherly bond" against the Iberians. The approach towards this alliance shall be explained further in this article. Even after a century of the Iberians' presence in the Straits, religion was a chief element in Aceh's resistance to them. The long struggle between Aceh and the Iberians was not exceptional; the 80 Years War between Spain and the United Republic (1568–1648) was also fundamentally based on religious differences between Catholics and Protestants, whatever other course it may have taken.

Order and Control

A perusal of the extant sources, both local and European, shows that ousting the Portuguese from the region was a constant in Aceh's stance and policies, whoever was the ruler and however he had ascended the throne – whether by primogeniture, usurpation or appointment. Driving out the Portuguese was Aceh's goal. This enduring obsession had repercussions for the local ports, which were invaded and castigated by Aceh when they traded with the Portuguese for their own sustenance. Aceh determined the terms of engagement.

The persistent view of Aceh in the existing literature is that of a rapacious conqueror out to plunder the riches of the ports. The Portuguese were the first to document Aceh's actions; later, Dutch, English and French merchants reported on the successive military expeditions and their impacts on the region. The idiom used in these reports to describe the events and the attitudes and character of the local power holders often reveals the self-interest of these Europeans. Nuru'd-din al Raniri, the Sheikh al-Islam at the court of Sultan Iskandar Thani (r. 1636–1641) and the composer of the *Bustan as-Salatin*, enumerates the invaded ports in

the royal genealogy of Aceh (part II, vol. 13) in chronological order, omitting the reasons for their subjugation. He posthumously bestowed the title Iskandar Muda (young Alexander) on Sri Sultan Sri Perkasa Shah Alam and on his successor the title Iskandar Thani (Alexander II). Alexander the Great was regarded in the Muslim world as the herald of Islam. The Acehnese chronicles and epics were written during the 17th century and directed to literate contemporary and future audiences. The written words survived and were also orally transmitted from generation to generation. The Islamic scholars established the sultans as glorious conquerors and defenders of Islam who followed in the footsteps of Alexander the Great, a view that is shared by local historians, such as Hasjmy (1975), Hasan Basry and Ibrahim Alfian (1990), Rusdi Sufi (1995) and Amirul Hadi (2004), who accept conquests as their memorable legacy and a striking quality of Acehnese kingship. The claims that the Acehnese rulers were conquerors are thus based on the reading of two different historiographies, one European and one local, yet both with similar claims. The epic *Hikayat Aceh*, presumably written by Sheikh Shamsu'd-din Pasai, the influential Islamic scholar at the court in the first decades of the 17th century, explicitly mentions the historic embassy of 1565 to the Ottoman emperor in Constantinople, who called himself the King of the West and the Acehnese sultan the King of the East (Iskandar 1958, 18). If this appellation was coined by the Sheikh, whose aim seems to have been to establish Aceh as an Islamic superpower by magnifying its role, its outcome was that Aceh's status was exalted. Echoing throughout the centuries, it has contributed significantly to creating an Acehnese identity.

The author positions conquest and territorial expansion in the setting of negotiating a new order. Conquest was important to enhancing the status of rulers all over the world. In their letters to the Acehnese sultans, the European power holders, especially the English sovereigns (like their Acehnese counterparts), used this medium of communication to refer to the conquered territories under their power. The merchant/envoys were instrumental to impressing the Asian rulers with their sovereigns' territorial gains and political achievements at a time when Spain was still a menace in Europe, a fact known in the far corners of Asia. The conversations among Sultan Alau'd-din Ri'ayat Shah (al Mukamil) (r. 1589–1604) and the Englishmen, John Davis and James Lancaster about England's victory over the Spanish armada are significant. Two decades later, Sultan Iskandar Muda showed his knowledge of the state of affairs in Europe by keenly questioning France's position in its relations with England in his conversations with de Beaulieu (1619/1620).

This questioning necessitated a bold statement from the admirals Cornelis de Houtman (1599), Lancaster (1602) and de Beaulieu (1619/1620) to impress upon the Asian rulers that the respective kings or sovereigns of these admirals and visitors' monarchs were rightful sovereigns. Lancaster was interrogated by the

shahbandar and an Islamic "bishop" at the court about the state of affairs in England. We note, however, that Prince Maurice of Nassau, the chief executive of several provinces of the United Republic and its military commander, "dwarfed" himself in his letter of 1600 to Sultan Alau'd-din Ri'ayat Shah, calling himself "your servant".[11] He was eager to establish a military alliance with this sultan of standing, a fierce enemy of the Portuguese. Effusive letters offering peace and assistance clearly show the intentions of the senders and are illustrative of a political situation in which they were not just observers but ambitious players. From the beginning of their presence in the Straits, the Dutch made no effort to conceal their wish to drive the Portuguese from Malacca.

Let us look at Aceh's conquests in the 16th century to determine what conclusions can be drawn. Analysis demands seizing on an important argument and evaluating it empirically to develop an informed opinion rather than make easy assumptions.

In 1520, Aceh subjugated the port of Daya on the west coast of Sumatra. The Portuguese were frequent visitors to this port. The ports Pedir (Pidie) and (Samudra) Pasai, which gave access to the Straits with all the rich commerce passing through them, were invaded and incorporated in 1522 and 1524, respectively. It seems logical to assert – as suggested in the existing literature – that Aceh's actions against these ports were directed to usurping their trade, requiring no further investigation of the geopolitical realities nor of Aceh's real concerns. Surprising therefore is Tomé Pires' description of the Acehnese ruler Ali Mughayat Shah, the conqueror of these ports, whom he had earlier called a *homem cavaleiro*, a gentleman of authority, comparing him to the petty port rulers, whom he considered chiefs of pirate states (Cortesao 1944, 38).

There is evidence that the Portuguese were under great pressure to make their way into Sumatra to take charge of the trade lines Malacca-Pasai-China; they were at the same time looking for the island of gold (Lobato 2000, 38). Alves (2000, 91) notes the existence of a treatise of 46 chapters, which was sent by the bishop of Malacca, D. Jao Ribeiro Gaio, to the king of Portugal in 1588 and in which he advocated the conquest of Aceh and Johor. Although this proposal came 77 years after they had settled in Malacca, the Portuguese had been adamant from the beginning about gaining a foothold in Sumatra. In 1515, they built a factory in Pasai, appointing the Italian Giovanni Da Empoli head of the business; he wrested a concession for an annual tribute of pepper for the Portuguese Crown and for the governor of Malacca. In 1519, the Portuguese received permission from Pasai's ruler to build a fort in his port. Given that Pasai was one of the first ports in the archipelago that embraced Islam, its positive stance towards the Portuguese with their religious fervour is remarkable,

especially because this ruler sought refuge in Malacca against Aceh (Alves 2000, 90), which shows his inclination towards the Portuguese.

It appears that as if by invading these ports, Aceh created a *cordon sanitaire* to stifle Portuguese ambitions to become dominant in Sumatra, threatening its territorial integrity and its trade. The invasions also underscore the weakness and perhaps the reluctance of the ports, especially of Johor, head of the Malay constellation, which spread over a considerable part of the east coast, to stop the Portuguese from gaining dominion over their trade and territory. Johor was even incensed by Aceh's actions, which it regarded as a threat to its authority, steadily cultivating this idea. While Aceh's armada was on its way to attack Malacca in 1547, a combined fleet of Johor, Pahang and Patani arrived to assist the Portuguese, who had already beaten off the Acehnese in the Panai River. Aceh retaliated by burning down a number of villages on the Johor River. In 1565, Aceh invaded the tin port of Perak in the Malay peninsula, where it constructed a fort "to protect the trade of the merchants from the Malabar coast against the Portuguese". Johor regarded Aceh's intrusion in Perak as an act of aggression (Hall 1981, 367).

The Portuguese spoke of the "imperialistic conflicts between the two sultanates Aceh and Johor, based on political and economic rivalry", describing Johor as the protector of the Malay dominions and Aceh as the conquering, centralising power (Lobato 2000, 34). It is tantalising to posit that the Portuguese drew attention away from their own ambitions and infiltration of the ports.

Johor was not always successful in maintaining the loyalty of all the Malay ports. There were implicit and explicit rivalries among them. If we credit the reports written by Dutch merchants in Johor, there were bloody rebellions in Pahang against Johor from 1612–1615 because Johor appointed its own candidates vassals in Pahang. In Patani, the king, a brother of the ruler of Johor, had been murdered, which prompted Johor to invade Patani. The rebellions against Johor show that the Malay constellation was not an accepted given. The thesis put forward by the influential Dutch historian, the late M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz (1962, 298), that the fierce rivalry between Aceh and Johor was an important factor in the continued existence of Portuguese Malacca does not explain the origin of the antagonism between the two. The critical factor that bedevilled their relations from the start was Johor's stance towards the Portuguese, setting the course for the hostilities and wars between them.

Realpolitik versus Power Politics

Although not on the agendas of Aceh and Malacca, peace suddenly descended in 1593, when traders from Malacca requested from Sultan Alau'd-din Ri'ayat Shah

(al Mukamil) permission to trade in Aceh's ports. It was a watershed moment, a break with the long history of war. Portuguese sources even speak of diplomatic relations between the old foes with the sending and receiving of envoys (Lobato 2000, 55–56), which can also be gathered from the journals of Frederick de Houtman and John Davis (see the Bibliography). It is instructive to examine the reasons for this dramatic change after almost a century of war. Historians generally note the war between Aceh and the Portuguese as a mere blip in time, failing to recognise the real concerns and the transformations that took place. The Portuguese merchants were evidently tired of the relentless hostilities that threatened their existence and favoured establishing trade relations with their tenacious pursuer. Considering Alau'd-din's positive demeanour, the author posits that recognition by Malacca of his sovereignty was the overriding motif. Drawing from the *Bustan* and the early historiography, it is apparent that Alau'd-din usurped the throne, which was destined for the young crown prince Buyong, grandson of the murdered Acehnese ruler, who was a captured prince of Perak, and the son of his daughter and the sultan of Johor. Marriage between the two may seem inconceivable; however, there was a brief moment of peace between Aceh and Johor in 1574 in which they cooperated against Malacca. It was not unusual to conclude marriages between royals of victorious and defeated states; however, the new kinship bonds did not as a rule overcome the latent problems and hostile feelings between them, as the historical realities show. The murdered Acehnese ruler (the grandfather of Buyong) was an immediate descendant of the sultan of Malacca and thus closely related to the Johor royal family. He was installed as the ruler of Aceh by the Acehnese *orangkaya* because Aceh's reigning Mahkota Alam dynasty was exhausted by rivalry and bloodshed. One wonders whether the enthronement of this captured Perak prince was also intended to embarrass Johor. This ruler is described in the *Bustan* as pious, instating the Friday prayers in Aceh. However, after 10 years on the throne, he was murdered. Had he become too close to Johor by marrying off his daughter to the sultan of Johor? The climate in Aceh was highly politicised, and conspiracies were part of everyday politics.

By receiving legitimisation of his sovereignty from Malacca, the usurper Alau'd-din gloried over Johor, which made several assaults on Aceh's territory to avenge the murder of Prince Buyong. The question of why the *orangkaya* chose to eliminate prince Buyong and thus prevent him becoming the sultan may be answered as follows: it served the higher purpose of saving Aceh the ultimate humiliation of becoming Johor's vassal state (Mitrasing 2011, 51). Given the usually good relationship between Johor and Malacca, the enthronement of the prince could facilitate Portuguese infiltration in Sumatra. The *orangkaya* installed Alau'd-din Ri'ayat Shah (al Mukamil), who was a descendant of Aceh's second dynasty Dar al-Kamal (mentioned in the *Bustan*) and a principal official at the court, on the throne. This brief digression has much relevance when viewed in

the light of the struggles among the different sultanates, and it is essential to understanding the political realities and the strategic choices that were made. The fact that the *orangkaya* favoured persons of royal pedigree to ascend the throne, even if these were foreign princes, is remarkable. The general claim in the historical literature is that these *orangkaya* or elites rivalled for the throne and favoured an *inter pares* government. The fact that the *orangkaya* accepted Sultan Iskandar Muda's 1621 appointment of a captured Pahang prince as his successor without rebellion was unique in the history of succession (Mitrasing 2011, 50–57). The appointment of the Pahang prince as sultan of Aceh may again have been accepted due to geo-strategic considerations and undoubtedly to humiliate Johor. After this ruler, known as Sultan Iskandar Thani (Alexander II), died under suspicious circumstances in 1641, the *orangkaya* appointed his widow, the eldest daughter of Iskandar Muda, as the new ruler, going against the wishes of the orthodox Islamic leaders and overcoming their own rivalry for the throne. She ruled under their protective eyes. While these elites did not oppose the installation of a prince of Perak and one of Pahang on the throne of Aceh, they jealously ensured that the queen did not marry a Johor prince. The author discovers a lacuna in the historical literature in identifying meaningful occurrences and developments, loyalties and shifts. A curiosity for what can be known is often lacking. The claim that the *orangkaya* could make or break kings has not been helpful in appreciating their actions and ambitions because it is not placed in a contextual framework of the political realities within which they acted. The circumstances signalled the way to the choices and decisions. The two *coups d'état* show the dedication of the *orangkaya* to protecting Aceh's position as the sovereign, leading state in the region.

Towards a New Era

The arrival of the northern Europeans set in motion a chain of events and developments, accelerating the existing flux. Not only did the first Dutch expedition arriving in Aceh in 1598 break up the Portuguese monopoly but Sultan Alau'd-din demanded assistance from admiral Cornelis de Houtman for a military expedition to Johor in exchange for a shipload of pepper. The Aceh-Johor wars climaxed with his usurpation and the liquidation of Prince Buyong. De Houtman agreed to assist, signalling the start of an equal partnership between Aceh and the Dutch, later the VOC.

The Dutch immediately became embroiled in the geo-politics of the Straits, upsetting the power equilibrium. The Portuguese merchants in Aceh spread rumours of de Houtman's unrestrained actions against the people of Bantam in 1595 on his first expedition to the archipelago, calling the Dutch pirates. They zealously guarded their new trading grounds and the power equilibrium by intervening to halt the military expedition to Johor, in which a possible Acehnese

victory could tilt the balance in its favour. Their instigations ultimately led to a violent Acehnese attack on the two Dutch ships, leaving admiral Cornelis de Houtman and many of his crew dead and his younger brother, Captain Frederick, a hostage of the sultan.[12] The expedition to Johor did not occur. The Portuguese were in a spirited mood. Anxious to keep up the momentum, so it seems, they harassed the ships of Muslim traders coming to Aceh and furtively supported the east Sumatran port of Aru against Aceh's aggression. Aru was inclined to Johor. Goa even sent an embassy to Alau'd-din, who cunningly proposed constructing a fort in Aceh, maintaining that a fort was indispensable to defending the wooden city of Aceh from destruction by fire. Alau'd-din sneered at this impudence and asked whether the governor of Goa was so concerned about the safety of Aceh because he had a daughter to give in marriage to Alau'd-din's son. Alau'd-din requested Goa's assistance to attack Johor, which was refused.[13] This rhetoric sketches the political scene at a precise moment. Obviously, *realpolitik* and the politics of power in which it was bound up were different realities for both parties. These unpredictable relations led to instability. Lancaster, who was at the court in 1602, mentions that plans were made between the sultan and envoys of Siam and Patani for an attack on Malacca. It was a new chapter in the struggle between Aceh and the Portuguese, triggered by the arrival of the Dutch.

The efforts of several Dutch fleets coming to Aceh to release Frederick de Houtman and his mates were unsuccessful. A dramatic change came in 1601, when a special mission sent by Prince Maurice of Nassau, the military commander of the United Republic, was allowed to pay a visit to Sultan Alau'd-din. Maurice's letter, mentioned above, offering peace and assistance against the Iberians, arrived at the right time because Alau'd-din was wary of the Portuguese. He embraced the opportunity to establish relations with this enigmatic country governed by *aristocracia*,[14] vigorously fighting for its independence from Spain. Aceh was the first port in the Straits to be visited by northern Europeans, and his prestige rose as a result of their presence in his port. The violence against the de Houtman expedition had tainted Sultan Alau'd-din's reputation. He released Frederick de Houtman and committed a significant historical act by sending his ambassadors with the returning fleet to the United Republic, where they were introduced to the States General and Prince Maurice. The author established earlier that this was the first diplomatic mission of a Southeast Asian polity to Europe (Mitrasing 2011, 89). Thus, the debut of a sovereign Southeast Asian state on the stage of European politics came to signal the beginning of a new era in the politics of ambition and power in the Malacca Straits and, one may say even in Europe. The political purport of the Acehnese mission to the Republic was well understood in the Escorial and in Lisbon. Alau'd-din keenly manoeuvred the dynamics of power in favour of Aceh. He established friendly relations with England in 1602, granting the first English expedition, under Lancaster, the Great Privilege out of his admiration for Queen Elizabeth, who had

been victorious over the Spanish armada, as he told Lancaster.[15] The States General of the United Republic exploited the political niche by inviting European courts to send their representatives to be introduced to the ambassadors of the most powerful Southeast Asian ruler. These developments may show the birth of a "brave new world", in which a Eurasian bond was formed against the Iberians. The implications of the diplomatic visits were significant, and Aceh and the Dutch were from then on brothers-in-arms. The envoys stayed in the Republic for over 15 months, a costly affair for the States General; however, with an eye to trade monopolies, a place for their ships to *rendez-vous* in the Straits and an alliance against the hated Iberians, no costs were spared. The States General duly presented the bill to the just-established United East India Company (VOC).

The peace between Aceh and Malacca was over before a decade had passed. Factually, it was an *inter bellum*. The special relationship between Aceh and the Dutch, sealed by the 1602 visit to the United Republic by the Acehnese embassy and the establishment that same year of the VOC, which received special powers by Charter from the States General giving it the right to keep a military force, maintain fleets, wage wars, erect forts and appoint governors, were developments that were anxiously watched by the Portuguese.

Portuguese troops arriving from Goa eventually landed in Aceh in 1606 but were quickly stopped by a large VOC fleet under Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge, which had arrived in the Straits to attack Malacca and confronted the Goa fleet. Although Matelieff was unsuccessful in capturing Malacca from the Portuguese, he inflicted severe damage on the Portuguese naval machine.

The fact that Aceh threw in its lot with the Dutch is not surprising because support from the Malay ports in the all-absorbing struggle against Malacca was lacking. A *Pacta Islamica Malaica*, a notion conceived by several historians, such as the late Teuku Iskandar, did not exist, although there were brief moments in which Aceh and Johor worked together against Malacca, for example in 1574 and again in 1614 when Johor became a vassal state of Aceh.

The VOC and the incumbent sultan of Aceh, Ali Ri'ayat Shah (r. 1604–1607), signed a treaty known as the Accord of 1607, which laid down the conditions for military cooperation and trade, a corollary to the brotherly alliance. The VOC received the right to establish a *rendez-vous* for its ships and a Dutch colony within Aceh's territory. The English perceived this Accord as a threat to their own rights as laid down in the Privilege of 1602 granted by Sultan Alau'd-din, the father of Sultan Ali Ri'ayat Shah. Aceh was to become the theatre for Anglo-Dutch competition, which gradually spread to the corners of the archipelago. John Davis, the chief navigator of the de Houtman expedition, was also the navigator of Lancaster's expedition in 1602. The Dutch believed that Davis was a

spy, which was not unfounded because he addressed his journal of the Dutch expedition to the Earl of Essex, advisor to Queen Elizabeth I.

With the coming of the northern Europeans, the geopolitical struggle received new impetus, creating another watershed moment in the history of the Straits of Malacca. The VOC straightforwardly set out its trade ambitions on military lines. Admiral Matelieff de Jonge, who arrived with 11 ships, negotiated a military treaty with Johor in June of 1606 to capture Malacca before the Accord of 1607 with Aceh came about.[16] Johor's geo-strategic importance was now sufficiently clear to the Dutch. It was not clear in 1599 when de Houtman was ready to cooperate with Aceh in a military expedition to Johor. The treaty stipulated the spoils of war: the VOC would obtain the inner city of Malacca, and Johor would obtain the outer territories. Because Matelieff had not conquered Malacca, the treaty lost its value. The second treaty of September 1606 only gave the VOC the right to maintain a factory in the chief town of Batu Sawar – a setback for the Dutch, who had hoped to construct a fort in the Straits and create a *rendez-vous* for their ships. In 1615, the VOC was given a place in the Carimun islands to erect a fort.

Geopolitical ambitions and trade were the threads of a tangled tale. We see the VOC performing its balancing footwork by signing treaties with both Aceh and Johor. The Dutch were more inclined towards Johor, not just for geo-strategic reasons but out of a deep friendship with Prince Raja Bongsu, the later Sultan Abdullah Ma'ayat Shah (r. 1614–1623).

The Accord of 1607 and the Privilege of 1602 were denied by Sultan Iskandar Muda when he ascended the throne of Aceh in 1607. The treaties had not been implemented. Jurisdiction of the VOC within his territory could threaten Aceh's sovereignty and safety. Brought up as a prince in the court of his grandfather Sultan Alau'd-din, he had experienced Portuguese interventions and was appointed the leader of the Acehnese troops against the invading Portuguese in 1606. He knew of the competition between the European trading companies and Dutch ambitions to capture Malacca – there can be little doubt that it helped shape his view of the future. Strategic considerations moved him to continue the brothers-in-arms relationship with the Dutch, which is clear from his many requests for military assistance. It was not an easy relationship; during his long rule, they frantically negotiated trade for military assistance and vice versa (Mitrasing 2011). There is little evidence that they cooperated in a united attack on Malacca.

Whatever the scholarly scepticism with regard to Iskandar Muda's religious vagaries, his commitment to pursuing the Portuguese until the end of his life "because of religion and tyranny" meant that the war could only end when the

"infidel" was completely defeated. His grandfather Alau-'d-din used words to the same effect in a 1602 letter to Queen Elizabeth I, declaring that he would pursue the Portuguese to the ends of this world and make them die a bitter death.

The brothers-in-arms apparently never cooperated against the Portuguese but rather operated independently. In the nexus between alliance and war, the notion of maintaining a balance of power can produce inaction. We draw from the VOC documents that the high officials in Bantam and later in Batavia from the start preferred a "dead friendship" to war with the king of Aceh. This king was Iskandar Muda, the longest ruling sultan of that period. The 1639 letter of Sultan Iskandar Thani to Prince Frederick Hendrik, the successor of Prince Maurice, is noteworthy; in it, the sultan uttered what the author views as historic words, that their bond was similar to "a golden chain that could not break" (VOC 11264).

Terms of Engagement

Was Iskandar Muda a rapacious conqueror out for glory or a paladin obsessed by the desire to shatter Portuguese ambitions in the region? The chronology of his actions is helpful to obtaining some insight. The motives for these actions are even more important to understanding his concerns, whether real or imagined.

In 1608, another large VOC fleet under the command of Verhoeff made an unsuccessful attempt to conquer Malacca after discussion with the sultan of Johor. Verhoeff had anchored in the Bay of Aceh on his way to Johor but did not visit Iskandar Muda, although his instructions mentioned soliciting assistance from the sultan of Aceh. Iskandar Muda, still new to the throne, was surprised that his "confederate" did not visit him (Mitrasing 2011, 106–107). The Portuguese avenged the attack by Verhoeff by blockading the river to Johor's chief town Batu Sawar for an entire year in 1609; no ships could leave nor enter. The blockade was successful in forcing Johor to sign an armistice in 1610. The sultan of Johor, also named Alau'd-din Ri'ayat Shah, and his *orangkaya* favoured peace with Malacca to stimulate their trade. His younger brother Raja Bongsu opposed a peace treaty with Malacca and significantly favoured the Dutch. Although the two differed over the course to follow, Raja Bongsu remained loyal to his brother, the Yang di Pertuan Alau'd-din Ri'ayat Shah. The treaties with the VOC had not delivered results. We again note a case of circumstances and choices in which the Dutch were a divisive element in Johor's internal politics.

The Acehnese armada invaded the ports of Aru and Deli on Sumatra's east coast in 1611 and 1612. These ports sheltered under Johor's umbrella and were therefore easily accessible to the Portuguese. This action by Iskandar Muda appears strategic because in 1613, his armada sailed to Johor without being exposed to attacks from these ports. The Acehnese invaders destroyed Batu

Sawar, the chief town of Johor, and took thousands of captives, including members of the royal family. It was undoubtedly a castigation campaign for giving in to the Portuguese – an obvious fact not brought forward in the literature. Dutch merchants who were conducting business in Johor took up arms against the Acehnese invaders, their "brothers-in-arms". The Dutch visitors in Johor were captured and brought to Aceh. The VOC officials in Bantam were not at all pleased with their merchants' actions against the Acehnese. The relationship at that moment between the company and Aceh was already at a nadir; the VOC flexed its muscles by placing an embargo on the VOC ships travelling from the Moluccan islands to Aceh from 1612–1614. Spices, needed to barter for the Indian textiles that were in high demand in the ports of Sumatra, did not come from the islands – a setback for Aceh's trade. The reason for this embargo was that the English obtained a contract to trade in the ports on Sumatra's west coast at the exclusion of the VOC. The embargo came on top of Iskandar Muda's denial of the existence of the Accord of 1607. However, he too preferred peace with the VOC to war and released his Dutch captives in 1614.

Iskandar Muda appointed the captured prince Raja Bongsu, the youngest brother of Johor's ruler, the Yang di Pertuan Alau'd-din Ri'ayat Shah, his vassal after marrying him off to his sister. The vassal took the name Abdullah Ma'ayat Shah (r. 1614–1623) and was sent back to Johor in 1614 to occupy the throne. That same year, a combined fleet of Aceh and Johor went to Pahang; there, the Portuguese supported the *orangkaya*, who requested their assistance in convoying their own candidate for the throne from Bugis stock to Pahang before the Johor candidate could usurp the throne. The Portuguese repelled the Johor/Aceh fleet. The following year (1615), the Portuguese succeeded in forcing Abdullah Ma'ayat Shah to sign an armistice to break Aceh's control over Johor. With this armistice with Johor in place, the Portuguese now convoyed the Johor candidate to Pahang (Tiele 1877, 118), turning their back on the *orangkaya*. This episode is illustrative of the Portuguese ability to exploit local disaffections to their advantage. However, it also demonstrates their unending struggle to exist in an inherently hostile environment. Iskandar Muda again destroyed Batu Sawar in 1615, after he had reconstructed it, and pursued the fleeing Abdullah Ma'ayat Shah. He would pursue the miserable sultan until the latter's death in 1623 in his refuge in the Tambelan islands.

The Acehnese armada attacked Portuguese ships coming from Goa, destroying several. A VOC fleet, coming to the Straits from Bantam to seize a Spanish carrack with valuable cargo from the Philippines, encountered three Portuguese galleons near Malacca and sank two of them. Admiral Verhagen was eager to attack the Acehnese, who had burnt down Batu Sawar, where the VOC had re-established its factory. The situation was chaotic and highly unpredictable, with shifting loyalties and many warmongers.

In 1617, Aceh invaded Pahang, where Johor had installed its own candidate in 1615 with the help of the Portuguese. In 1614, the combined Aceh-Johor fleet went to Pahang to install the Johor prince on Pahang's throne. The armada brought thousands of citizens from Pahang as war captives to Aceh, among them a prince who would eventually become Iskandar Muda's successor. Aceh invaded Pahang a second time in 1618. The reasons for this invasion are not clear.

In 1619, Iskandar Muda undertook a *hongi* expedition to the pepper port Kedah on the west coast of the peninsula, where the Portuguese had been trading for many years and obtained huge amounts of pepper.[17] The Acehnese destroyed all the pepper vines and killed all the cattle. This extirpation turned Kedah into a no-man's land, and the European traders were obliged to buy pepper in Aceh. The captured sultan of Kedah, members of his family and many of his *orangkaya* were executed in Aceh and de Beaulieu, who was in Aceh in 1619, from there travelling to Lankahui (Pulau Lada), a dependency of Kedah, to buy pepper, tells us that the people there felt no regret for the king's execution "because he was impious and had evoked God's wrath because of his bad inclinations".[18] He found himself in the middle of the Aceh-Kedah war. Kedah's ruler, the eldest son of the executed sultan, who was saved because he had fled to Perlis, asked him for two cannon to defend himself against another Acehnese invasion in exchange for a cargo of pepper. Because de Beaulieu was returning to Aceh to negotiate a trade contract with Iskandar Muda, he refused to comply with the request.

In 1620, the Acehnese armada invaded Perak, where the Portuguese were buying tin and had started patrolling the entrance to the port with four large warships. This invasion signifies, among other things, that Perak had not previously been under Aceh's permanent control.

Iskandar Muda also threatened to destroy Patani because its queen had supported Kedah by sending 2,000 men and food overland to the unfortunate port and because the Portuguese gained her permission to trade in 1620 by entering her territorial waters. The queen also feared that the VOC would retaliate because it was the chief buyer of pepper and silk in Patani, where it had maintained a factory since 1601. Her letter to the governor-general in Batavia reveals her anxiety and shows the complexity of the geopolitical situation. She begged him not to interfere with her ships going to Malacca and the Moluccan islands, as well as Portuguese ships in her waters.[19] The VOC apprehensively consented. Trade was the lifeline of the ports, which struggled to survive the onslaught.

Aceh's interventions in the affairs of the ports were among other things intended to ensure that an ally was on the throne; Johor is a clear example of a failed vassal state where the Portuguese remained influential. We saw earlier that Pahang too slipped out of Aceh's control and was invaded a second time in 1618.

Kedah was attacked a second time in 1620. Perak had been subjugated in 1565 and was again invaded in 1620. These ports collapsed in their own particular ways but for the same reason: the Portuguese presence. The subjugation of these ports did not result in their incorporation into the Acehnese realm but merely their temporary submission.

The utter disregard for the many thousands of Malay war captives in his realm from Johor, Pahang, Kedah and Perak, who were starved or left to die in the streets of Aceh from hunger, certainly does not support the general proposition that Iskandar Muda was out to "populate" Aceh by conquests.[20] One should recognise that capturing citizens, artillery and ships not only strengthens the invader but also very much weakens the opponent, who is bereft of manpower and the fundamental instruments to wage war against the conqueror. The author believes that the invasions were meant to isolate and weaken the Portuguese, who depended on trade with the local ports.

In 1624, Aceh invaded the port of Andragiri, where the Portuguese had been buying pepper. The Dutch had been trading in this port for several years, which had apparently not been viewed by Iskandar Muda as a reason to invade Andragiri at an earlier time. He threatened to castigate neighbouring Jambi, according to Dutch witnesses because the widow and son of the deceased Sultan Abdullah Ma'ayat Shah of Johor had taken shelter there. Jambi received assistance from Palembang and the Minangkabao highlands, which sent troops to fight the Acehnese aggressor. Portuguese warships also arrived in Jambi to deter the Acehnese. The Dutch also sent a small fleet to protect their own interests in Jambi, where they maintained an office. Iskandar Muda faced great opposition for the first time during his rule. He did not follow up on his threat. The Dutch were relieved; they did not favour war with him. The Anglo-Dutch Defence Alliance, which came into being in 1620 after fierce rivalry between the two trade companies, was a threat to Iskandar Muda. He despised the new alliance of old foes. He had long taken advantage of their competition in the pepper trade, putting at risk his special relationship with the VOC.

While religion was clearly not a constraint in the various dealings of the successive Acehnese sultans with the northern Europeans, there were strict rules that the Europeans were obliged to follow.[21] Trespass was usually punished irrespective of the perpetrators; however, reports of foreigners being punished are rare. In 1615, the Dutch merchant Rysser was punished for violating the rule to await the sultan's *tsiap* (royal token of permission) for landing and was thrown to elephants, suffering broken limbs. Several Dutch merchants left Aceh without obtaining the sultan's *tsiap*, which was also necessary for departure. Iskandar Muda was furious at this violation and communicated his feelings to the VOC authorities in Bantam. It became a matter of his vexation. Jan Pieterszoon Coen,

at that time director-general of the VOC business in Bantam, sent his special envoy to Iskandar Muda in 1617 to apologise for this unforgivable negligence by blaming the merchants' drinking habits for their unceremonious behaviour.[22] Coen was keen to obtain a contract to trade in the ports on Aceh's west coast at any cost and would not endanger the friendship with the sultan, his despised brother-in-arms. It should also be understood that the issuing of a *tsiap* carried built-in guarantees for the territorial integrity of the realm, the sultan's sovereignty and – not usually understood – the protection of the foreign visitor. Rather than being a quaint formality, the *tsiap* carried judicial weight.

An interesting question is whether political authority and its location had become more decentralised because of the expanded Acehnese realm. It will be understood that Aceh's claim over wider territory not only paved the way for the dispersion of political centres but also facilitated centripetal power. However, centres of royal power did not exist; the sultan was represented by a governor or vassal king, assisted by officials, in the different ports under his control. These governors or vassal kings were installed to execute tasks as directed by the sultan. The Acehnese sultan was not an itinerant ruler. He remained in the conurbation in the port town of Bandar Aceh, where his court was the centre of power, trade, diplomacy and ceremony.

The letters of the Dutch merchants mention contacts with the "coninck" and the *penghulu* of Tiku, two different functionaries who kept each other in check. Envoy/merchant Cornelis Comans, frustrated by the unproductive talks with Iskandar Muda and his false promises, even after three visits to Aceh, negotiated an agreement with the governor of Priaman to drive the Acehnese out of his territory (1619). Comans also advised the governor-general in Batavia to join forces with Aceh for an attack on Malacca and, once inside the city, to capture the Acehnese and take the city for the VOC. This proposal apparently did not find favour with the high officials in Batavia, for evidence that it actually occurred is lacking.

All physical boundaries were fluid rather than strictly demarcated; however, an understanding of the limits was clearly present in the minds of the rulers and the ruled. The system of vassal states and dependencies intrinsically meant that physical borders had to be negotiated or conquered. The *Bustan* enumerates Aceh's conquered territories, evidencing a notion of both geographical and political borders. In the preambles to their letters to European sovereigns, the Acehnese rulers enumerated the territories under their control. While this control was to a certain extent acknowledged by the Europeans, the Europeans' own economic and geopolitical ambitions in the region rendered the Acehnese claims invalid. The chiefs of the western ports wanted to eliminate the tyrant of Aceh and were eager to assist the Dutch in their efforts.

Descending on Malacca

In 1629, Iskandar Muda suffered a terrible humiliation. Since 1626, his fleets had assembled on the Sumatran side of the Straits, preparing for the ultimate attack on Malacca. The ports were nervous, expecting attacks on Patani and Jambi. Even the VOC was confused. The full armada entered the Johor River, and from there, the troops went on land. The Portuguese estimated that the armada consisted of 246 ships, which included 48 galleys "much larger than ours" and 19,400 men. After months of fierce fighting on land between the belligerent troops, the mighty Acehnese armada was besieged by the combined forces of Portuguese Goa, Johor and Patani coming to Malacca's aid, closing off the mouth of the river. One after another, the warships exploded, sank or were seized by the Portuguese, who were now in possession of most of Aceh's artillery and warships, including the "terror of the world", the Cakra Dunya.[23] This humbling defeat was the result of the lack of a unified command system, which caused military blunders. Iskandar Muda himself was to blame for appointing two commanders, who disagreed over strategy. Even the *Bustan* identifies this disagreement as the cause of Aceh's defeat, noting that great numbers of Muslims lost their lives "*Kerana kedua2 panglima itu berantah2 antara satu sama lain maka banyak-lah orang Islam mati shahid*".[24] The reader is unequivocally reminded that the battle was between Islam and the "infidel". Although the mighty armada was obliterated and Aceh was vulnerable to outside aggression, no foreign invasion of Aceh occurred. The Dutch were ambivalent; they dreaded seeing Iskandar Muda claim victory over Malacca but also hated to see the victorious Portuguese in possession of much of the Acehnese artillery and their greatest warship. The VOC merchants in Jambi and Patani advocated a fresh attack on Malacca in close cooperation with Aceh. A delegation was sent to Aceh in 1632 to renew brotherly relations and negotiate assistance against trade contracts to capture Malacca. Iskandar Muda was utterly pleased with the restoration of the relationship.

When Antonio van Diemen became governor-general of the East Indies, he immediately devised plans for the capture of Malacca. Since 1637, a host of captains and diplomats had visited Aceh to talk with the successor of the deceased Iskandar Muda, Sultan Iskandar Thani (r. 1637–1641), a prince of Pahang, regarding the preparations for the siege of Malacca. It became high-level diplomacy, which lasted for almost four years, with the sending and receiving of envoys between Aceh and Batavia. The VOC failed to gain the support of the sultan, who was enraged that Johor was included in the coalition to capture Malacca. Van Diemen regarded the objections and protests as coming from a cantankerous man, failing to recognise that the new sultan wore the burden of two crowns: as the ruler of Aceh, he inherited Aceh's enemy Johor; however, on a personal note, as a prince of Pahang, he was the blood enemy of Johor, which had

ousted his father Sultan Ahmad and appointed a puppet ruler in his place. Van Diemen was adamant about including Johor in a coalition: "to take Johor under our wings to reduce the chance of Johor providing the Portuguese in Malacca with foodstuff".[25] Establishing Dutch rule over Malacca was one of Van Diemen's greatest ambitions, for which he tactically summoned support from Malacca's friend and foe. Malacca should finally come into Dutch hands. How the spoils of war would be divided was at that moment not clear. Iskandar Thani was distraught and felt betrayed, and he threatened that the Dutch would never again set foot in Aceh if Johor were included. His anxiety is plain in the letters he sent to Prince Frederick Hendrik and to Van Diemen, written between 1637 and 1639, urging them to maintain the brotherly bond "as if we are of one blood". Fearing a combined attack by the VOC and Johor, he began to deviate from the course of the river on the western side of his capital. After a siege of six months, the VOC finally conquered Malacca in February 1641 without Aceh's help but with some assistance from Johor and Patani. Sultan Iskandar Thani passed away in January of the same year, most likely from poisoning. He had several enemies, both internal and external.

Final Remarks

The VOC was not interested in remaking Malacca the chief centre of trade because Batavia held this position. However, tin from Perak remained high on its list. Stretching its muscles, the VOC began demanding special privileges from the ruler of Perak, who did not submit to the demands easily. Mediation by Sultana Tajul Alam Safiatu'd-din Shah of Aceh, the daughter of Iskandar Muda and widow of Iskandar Thani, helped resolve the problems. The irony of history is that Portuguese Malacca was disbanded, and its nemesis the Sultanate Aceh Dar as-Salam gradually lost its political relevance and power. Malacca entered a new era of European presence under the banner of Protestantism. Malacca remained important for the VOC as a strategic foothold in the Straits to deter Portuguese shipping. Johor and the VOC negotiated the terms for peaceful co-existence. Johor profited from the trade of the area and gradually regained its prominence in the Malay world (Lewis 1995, 14).

Notes

1. The trade of the Muslim merchants from the ports of India and the Red Sea ports, who controlled the spice trade to the southern ports of Italy.
2. A *cartaz* was a written permit issued to ships passing and trading within the Portuguese sphere of influence (as perceived and instated by the Portuguese themselves).
3. D. G. E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia* (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1981). It is instructive to note that the two Iberian nations divided the world

beyond Europe among themselves. By the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, overseen by Pope Alexander VI, the Portuguese obtained the right to explore and trade east of the north-south meridian. The Spanish obtained the right to do the same in the western portion.

4. See Soedjatmoko's contribution: The Indonesian Revolution 45 years on, some personal reflections in *The Decolonization of Indonesia International Perspectives* (1988) published by the Roosevelt Study Centre, Middelburg, 9–20.
5. The author refers to the writings of Sir Richard Winstedt published in *JMBRAS*, vol. X, in which he discusses the relations between Johor and Aceh. I also refer to the letters of the resident and visiting merchants of the Dutch East India Company in Johor in 1609–1615 to the officials in Bantam. Portuguese sources shed light on the relations between the two sultanates during the 16th century.
6. His journal is published by Unger (1948) and by the Hakluyt Society (1880).
7. On the Portuguese Inquisition in India and the rest of the Portuguese empire, I refer to H. P. Salomon and I. S. D. Sassoon: The Marrano Factory, in *The Portuguese Inquisition and its New Christians 1536–1765* (Brill 2001, 345–348).
8. Goksoy Ismael Hakky wrote a very illuminating article: Ottoman-Aceh Relations according to Turkish Sources in *Mapping the Acehnese Past*, eds. R. M. Feener, P. Daly and A. Reid, KITLV Press (Leiden 2010).
9. This term is used by, among others, Amirul Hadi (2004) and Teuku Iskandar (1958), both Acehnese historians.
10. This is a Dutch translation of the copy of the letter that is in the possession of the National Archives in The Hague; the original letter is missing. The VOC clerks in Bantam and later in Batavia were responsible for translating the letters into Dutch before they were sent to the Board of Directors, "The Gentlemen Seventeen", in the Netherlands.
11. Banck, *Atchin's verheffing en val* (1873) and Unger, *De Oudste Reizen van de Zeeuwen* (1948).
12. Frederick de Houtman used his two years in prison in Aceh to write a grammar of the Malay language titled *Spraeck ende woordboek in de Maleische en Madagaskarse taal.* He was probably the first European to write a Malay grammar.
13. Mentioned by Lancaster, who visited Aceh in 1602.
14. Cornelis de Houtman explained the system of government of the United Republic to the sultan in Unger, ed. *De Oudste reizen*.
15. East India Company records, *The Voyage of Sir James Lancaster*, vol. 1, (London: Hakluyt Society, 1940), 1–3.
16. The treaties are published in Heeres, ed., *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando Indicum*, vol. 1, p. 45 and 46, and in de Jonge, *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsche Gezag*, vol. 1.
17. This term is used for an extirpation strategy, the destruction of food crops and trees and the killing of animals.
18. Denys Lombard, *Memoirs d'un Voyage au Indes Orientales 1619–1621 Augustin de Beaulieu un Marchand Normand a Sumatra* (Paris: Maison Neuve et Larose, 1996), 169.

19. Colenbrander, vol. 1: 613; vol. 2: 574.
20. This statement was first made by the French admiral Augustin de Beaulieu, who was in Aceh in approximately 1620. It was echoed by Denys Lombard, D. G. E. Hall, A. Reid and several other historians.
21. Bernard Lewis discusses the social contract between the Muslim state and representatives of a non-Muslim state in *The Political Language of Islam*, 1988: 77.
22. Colenbrander, *Coen's Bescheiden*, vol. 1, 156–160.
23. Mentioned by C. R. Boxer in "The Achinese Attack on Malacca in 1629", as described in contemporary sources in *Malayan and Indonesian Studies*, eds. J. Bastin and R. Roolvink, 1964.
24. p. 35.
25. The message was delivered to the Acehnese envoys visiting Batavia and by representatives of the governor-general travelling to the sultan of Aceh between 1637–1640, *Daghregisters 1937–1941*.

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