

The Unwelcome Consuls: The Contested Appointment of Chinese Consuls in Colonial Malaya

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Abstract. The prospect of the appointment of Chinese Consuls for colonial Malaya following Britain's recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in January 1950 illustrated the tension between Britain's colonial and international priorities in Southeast and East Asia. While the Foreign Office and its regional representatives were eager not to antagonise China by refusing to admit consuls to Malaya, the colonial authorities were alarmed by the fact that Chinese Consuls in Malaya would give succour to Chinese insurgents in Malaya. Confronted with the communist insurgency, British colonial administrators sought to delay and prevent the arrival of Chinese Consuls. This article examines the debates among the British policy makers within the imperial framework for British policies in the formative decade of the Cold War. It argues that the question of Chinese consular representation was contentious because of the colonial government's inability to secure the loyalty of the Chinese communities in the midst of the communist insurgency.

Keywords and phrases: Chinese Consuls, Sino-British relations, Malayan Emergency, the People's Republic of China, Cold War

Introduction

The British decision to recognise China sent a shock wave through the British Malayan colonial authorities, who were eager to bring the "Britain's Asian Cold War" to an early end (Deery 2007, 29). The question of the British recognition caused concern towards the survival of the "British Cold War" in Malaya. Scholars were sceptical towards such a move. The decision to recognise China, as argued by Stubbs (1989, 85) "did nothing to gain Chinese help in returning the country to law and order". The British commitments to Malaya were questioned at a time when the nation was at war with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). Confronted with the MCP armed insurrection, the potential threat of the overseas Chinese population as a fifth column remained a thorn in the side of the Malayan counter-insurgency efforts. Both the Malayan government and the public stood strongly against the acceptance of Communist Consuls. The causes of the local misgivings were clear, ranging from military, administrative, social and political aspects. According to Mills (1958, 40), Communist Chinese diplomatic and consular representation would provide "an additional means of supervising and

organising local Chinese on Mao's behalf". Anti-communist Malaya (as well as other Asian states) were concerned with "what a Chinese Communist embassy might do" (Martin 1986, 88).

The question of Chinese Consuls stood at the contradiction between the Malayan British administration (supported by the Colonial Office [CO]) and the Foreign Office (FO). The CO's concern that recognition would strengthen the communist cause failed to convince the British government (Wolf 1983, 312). To those in the FO, the rejecting of any Chinese Consuls in Malaya would impact the negotiation for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the UK and China. Preventing the formation of a Sino-Soviet bloc and the protecting of British commercial interests proved to be more the important of considerations in Britain's Far Eastern policy. In other words, the British recognition was initiated to "secure a convenience" (ibid., 321). Ashton also agreed that the British policy was then "keeping a foot in the [Chinese] door to protect British interests" (2004, 79). Moreover, the UK was not necessarily constrained by the views of other Powers since their interests in China were much greater than those of the other Powers.¹ While early recognition provided the British with an effective means to protect London's interests in China, it had a "discouraging effect throughout Southeast Asia" (Qiang 1994, 41).

The story of the Chinese consular representation, then, should be understood in terms of a triangle, with debates taking place between the FO, CO and local forces coming together within the context of the Cold War. Fearing unwanted repercussions on the counter-insurgency effort, British colonial administrators sought to reject the arrival of Chinese Consuls through various compromises: delaying their arrival, closing Chinese Consulates in certain areas in Malaya, separating the issue of consulates from the establishment of relations, making the acceptance of consuls conditional upon certain criteria, restricting their jurisdiction, and finally avoiding any official commitment on the issue at hand. This article examines how Malaya responded to the British recognition of China and the consequent need to consider the appointment of Communist Consuls. It demonstrates how the issues were ultimately resolved by a silent wait since the People's Republic of China (PRC) did not move to vie for recognition during the Malayan Emergency and thus, the issue remained in abeyance.

In examining the debates among British policy makers, we attempt to probe deeper into the dynamics of the British Government in the wider aspect of policy debates and to contextualise the British Empire's policy on this matter. The debates that form the focus of this paper will be set in the context of Britain's position and the overall strategic imperatives in the Cold War.

Britain's Position and Strategic Imperatives in the Cold War

The British government did not ignore the Malayan government's appeals because it was pro-PRC. The British calculation of their strategic imperative required the UK to adopt a pragmatic policy towards the PRC even though they remained adversaries in the Cold War in this period. This context is well examined in Steve Tsang's "The Cold War's Odd Couple". According to Tsang's examination of the context of the Cold War in which the UK had to operate, "The British policy was driven first and foremost by realist and pragmatic calculations" (2006, 18).

The crux of the Malayan consular debates in London was about how the UK could best protect its basic interests in the Cold War regardless of the US pressure. The "loss" of China to Communism saw a divergence in British and American approaches to China. When London considered recognising Peking in the autumn of 1949, the Cabinet explained to the Americans, that the continued support of the Kuomintang (KMT) would only drive the Chinese Communists in the direction of Moscow. The British wanted to avoid driving China deeper into Soviet's sphere and to avoid provoking Chinese pressures on Hong Kong (Perkins 1986).

Britain extended recognition to China on 6 January 1950. The US, which was constrained by its record of supporting the KMT and a powerful China lobby instead demanded that China first recognised its international obligations. As the loss of China was a hot issue in American politics, British recognition brought Anglo-American relations in the Far-East to a low point. The US even said that the British tactic was an echo of the 1930's appeasement policy. The US pursued the policy of containment and suspected that appeasement would be interpreted as weakness (Hack 2001). The American policy makers were deeply affected and concerned with the Sino-Soviet encouragement towards Southeast Asian Communist insurgencies. The US believed that the pattern of the Soviet post-war expansion in Eastern Europe was to be repeated in Asia with China serving as Russia's partner and as its Asian base (Colbert 1977).

If London had to devise a "pragmatic" approach in its relations with China for wider interests, despite US pressure (at a time when the welfare of the UK was dependent on Marshall Aids), it was highly unlikely that the security requirements in Malaya could change British policy towards China. The importance of China to the British post-war policy is clearly enunciated in the Cabinet Paper (memorandum by Mr. Bevin on recognition of the Chinese Communist Government) dated 21 October 1949. The paper sets forth the major arguments guiding the UK's China policy.

They [China] have trade to offer and we have an immovable stake in their territory which can only be maintained by trade. Too long delay in according them recognition cannot fail to make them ill-disposed towards us. We may thereby gratuitously vitiate our future relations. Similarly, delay will increase the existing tendency of the Communist Government to look to the Soviet Union...²

Full recognition of the new regime is highly recommended on political and practical grounds. The timing of the recognition could only be decided until the FO had considered the impact upon UK interests in the Far East (including Malaya) based on the outcome of the Singapore Conference in November 1949.³ During the Singapore Conference held at Bukit Serene in November 1949, Malcolm MacDonald, Commissioner-General for the UK in Southeast Asia and Franklin Gimson, the Governor of Singapore took a hard line to oppose such recognition. Recognition meant that British colonies and protectorate states in the region—Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei—would now be obliged to accept consular representation. At the end of the three-day conference, the FO's position prevailed and the Conference agreed that recognition at the earliest possible date was desirable (Qiang 1994).⁴

The Conference emphasised that recognition did not imply any inconsistency with the UK policy of opposition towards Communism. Recognition of a Chinese Communist Government and resistance to communism in Southeast Asia were two different considerations. The decision was merely to recognise the fact that communism had taken hold of the Mainland. It would in no way affect the opposition of the communist threat in Southeast Asia.⁵ The Conference acknowledged that the arriving Chinese Consuls had to be accepted as soon as the PRC was recognised. The problems created by their arrival did not warrant the delay in recognition. The British High Commissioner of Malaya, Henry Gurney, was made to understand that His Majesty's *Chargé d'Affaires* was instructed to ask the PRC to accord recognition to the British Consuls in China and to express the willingness of the UK to accord similar recognition to Chinese Consulates in British territories. The conclusions made at the conference were reluctantly agreed to by Gurney.⁶

CO and FO Differences over the Issue of Consulate Appointment

In the midst of anticipating the arrival of the new consulates, the CO stated its wish to keep Chinese Consuls out of Malaya. If the appointment could not be denied, the Malayan authorities, according to the CO, should at least restrict the activities of Communist Consuls. Accordingly, they must not be allowed to interfere in the political life of the country, in labour disputes, in the deportation of squatters and in any type of collective representation of the local Chinese

against the local government. In other words, their activities were to be placed under strict surveillance: any extension of the activities of consuls must be reported.⁷

Moreover, the CO found it unacceptable to have Chinese Consuls operating information services. Even the establishment of any Chinese organisation whether in the form of cultural, economic or financial form, must be reported. Amongst all of them, the most drastic suggestion was expelling consuls who threatened the security of the country and supported the MCP. If these restrictions proved difficult to be implemented, the easiest solution was pointed out by the CO as follows:

Everything should be done to delay the issue of exequaturs, or any other formal recognition of the appointment of Communist representatives in Malaya.⁸

To all intents and purposes, recognition was thought to be disadvantageous. The negative aspect of recognition would be the presence of Communist Chinese Consuls throughout Malaya. This presented a grave danger to internal security. The consuls were in a strategic position to supply information, financial aid, leaders and arms to the communist members. The best alternative was to create a considerable time vacuum between the closure of the Nationalist Consuls and the arrival of the Communist Consuls. The delay could allow sufficient time for the Malayan authorities to take necessary preventive steps. Nevertheless, there were opinions that recognition would be advantageous to Malaya in the sense that the local government could ask the Chinese government for non-interference in return. The latter opinion was not subscribed to by the Malayan government.⁹

To those in the FO, the refusal to accept any Chinese Consuls in Malaya would impact the negotiation for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the UK and China. Breaking off relations with the People's Government caused an uneasy loss of a bargaining chip. The British had less leverage to influence China's support for the communist cause in Malaya, Vietnam and Southeast Asia.¹⁰ Prior to the establishment of diplomatic relationships, there were 17 Chinese Consulates (under the KMT) in the UK and dependent territories and 13 British Consulates in China (refer to Table 1 and Table 2).¹¹

Table 1. British Consular posts in China in order of importance in 1950

Consular Post	Status
Shanghai	Consulate-General
Tientsin	Consulate-General
Canton	Consulate-General
Mukden	Consulate-General
Hankow	Consulate-General
Tsingtao	Consulate-General
Chungking	Consulate-General
Kunming	Consulate-General
Nanking	Consulate
Tamsui	Consulate
Amoy	Consulate
Swatow	Consulate
Tihwa	Consulate

Source: Memorandum on Chinese Consuls in Malaya prepared by Secretary of State, Sir W. Strang, 5 April 1950, FO 371/83549, FC 1903/37

Table 2. Chinese Consular posts in the UK and Colonies in 1950 (before recognition of the PRC)

Consular Post	Status
London	Consulate-General
Birmingham	Consul (Hon.)
Liverpool	Consulate
Sheffield	Consulate
Georgetown (British Guiana)	Consulate
Kingston (Jamaica)	Consulate
Port of Spain (Trinidad)	Consulate
Singapore	Consulate-General
Kuala Lumpur	Consulate
Penang	Consulate
Ipoh	Consulate
Malacca	Consulate
Jesselton	Consulate
Kuching	Consulate
Suva (Fiji)	Vice-Consulate
Apia (W. Samoa)	Vice-Consulate
Mauritius	Consulate

Source: Memorandum on Chinese Consuls in Malaya prepared by Secretary of State, Sir W. Strang, 5 April 1950, FO 371/83549, FC 1903/37

When J. C. Hutchinson, the British representative to the PRC, was instructed to secure an indefinite postponement of the arrival of Chinese Consuls, he replied decisively that "I see no possibility of being able to temporise successfully except for a very short time". According to him, the exclusion of Chinese Consuls could only be achieved at the price of sacrificing British Consular posts in China and sacrificing diplomatic discussions. In Hutchinson's view, China, with its huge number of overseas nationals residing in Malaya, had an important stake there.¹²

In the view of Malayan officers, the FO did not seem to appreciate that it was more of a Chinese problem. The FO underestimated the threat of the MCP, particularly its capability in gaining the support of the Chinese squatters. This was emphasised by Gurney "the key to our problem (which is essentially a Chinese problem) is the rallying of the Chinese community on the side of law and order".¹³ His Majesty's Government was giving an impression that the retention of British consular posts in China was achieved at the expense of Malayan interests. The public regrettably believed this was the case. Gurney reiterated his point to the Secretary of State on 3 April 1950, "I regret that I must make it clear that I should not find it possible to justify the acceptance of Chinese Consuls in the Federation of Malaya in the present circumstances".¹⁴

The highest priority for the British anti-insurgency campaign in Malaya was to prevent any probable Chinese communist influence among the neutral rural community. Malaya had to win over the loyalty of the local Chinese population. As the consuls' prime endeavour was to claim the loyalty of their overseas nationals, keeping consuls in Malaya would not serve the purpose. Henry Gurney believed that a great majority of the local Chinese would like to give their loyalty to the Federation Government but they were restrained from doing so. They feared the uncertain outcome of the Emergency and feared British withdrawal. In this sense, admitting Communist Consuls would increase their doubts and fears. Most importantly, they might be compelled to declare their allegiance to the people's Government.¹⁵ In other words, the Chinese help was acknowledged as the winning factor of the war. As pointed out by a member of the House of Lords, "At the moment, we cannot possibly win the war in Malaya without Chinese help. The Chinese will not help until we are winning the war. How is this vicious circle to be broken?"¹⁶

Gurney reiterated on several occasions that the war with Malayan Chinese communists could only be won by mobilising the support of the Chinese population. There was no reason to doubt that the consuls would carry out their active propagandist works [converting the local Chinese into communism]. However, it remained unclear whether or not (1) the dissemination of communist propaganda could be regarded as part of a Consul's functions and (2) their

harmful criminal acts against the Federation would serve as sufficient grounds to call for their banishment. Any attempt to accept Chinese consular officers was regarded by the High Commissioner as "most unfortunate". Gurney regretted that "I shall have no alternative but to stall as long as possible before accepting any Communist consular officers."¹⁷

Gurney's initiative was stoutly supported by Macdonald, the Commissioner General of Southeast Asia. In a telegram to the Secretary of State, MacDonald highlighted that Gurney requested merely for a postponement of the appointment of Consuls for the duration of the emergency. MacDonald still believed that it was the responsibility of the British to ensure the security of Malaya although he understood that the question of Consuls in Malaya must be considered in relation to larger issues.¹⁸ In Malaya, the main consideration was to wean the Chinese away from China and Chinese Consulates. In Malcolm MacDonald's words:

I cannot emphasise: too strongly the need firstly, to delay arrival of Chinese Communist Consuls for as long as possible, and, secondly, need to take any practicable steps to effect a reduction in their number.¹⁹

The pressure was high for the Malayan authorities as there was a massive crisis building up between October 1949 and March 1950. Compared to the incidence rate of the mid-1949, it had significantly surged in this period, coinciding with the establishment of the PRC, communist gains in Indochina and culminating in a communist attack on the Bukit Kepong Police Station in February 1950, killing more than 20 Malay police. Local authorities were calling for reinforcements to better protect the Chinese population. All this led to Sir Harold Briggs' appointment as the Director of Operations. With the increased terrorist activities, the recognition of a communist China presented a real crisis in Malaya and therefore, consuls ought not to be forced on Malaya (Hack 2001).

De Facto Recognition and the Malayan Prospect

Three months before the British recognition of China, there was speculation in Malaya that the British would inevitably recognise the Communist Government in China. Since October 1949, many questions were raised regarding the position of the present KMT Consular Officers in Malaya. Pending any decision from His Majesty's Government, the Malayan government was reassured of the status quo.

It would be inappropriate to banish the present officials.²⁰ Wu Paak-Shing, the Chinese Consul General, first brought up the issue with Malcolm MacDonald, Commissioner General in Southeast Asia.²¹ During their discussions, Wu expressed the uneasiness of the Chinese Consular officers after the closure of the

consulates. Wu was eager to gain assurance that his subordinates would not be shipped back to China against their will and be allowed to continue to reside in Malaya.²² Those who were afraid of being shipped back to China tried to declare their willingness to serve the Communist Government. Among the consuls, the staunchest supporters of the nationalist government were now facing a dilemma between defecting to communism and their sense of duty to the local Chinese community.²³

After the war, there were Consulate Generals in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur and Consulates at Penang, Malacca and Ipoh. The existing KMT Consuls exercised a great deal of influence over the Chinese community especially after the closure of the Chinese Protectorate. Besides the issuance of passports, registration of Chinese Societies, and the registration and protection of Chinese nationals, their influence extended over domestic affairs. The complete control of the Chinese Ministry of Education and the Overseas Affairs Commission in the supervision of the Chinese schools was viewed negatively. In the view of curbing the Chinese influence, the main concern was on how to "close down Chinese Consulates in Malaya, without risking serious prejudice towards British interests in China".²⁴

The official views toward the presence of the KMT Consulates were influenced by several considerations. First, it was detrimental to the assimilation process of the local Chinese. The presence of Chinese consular officials would make sure that the students continued to pledge loyalty to China, remain Chinese and look towards China. The continuation of such an influence must be prevented after the KMT Consuls left their position.²⁵ British recognition of the new communist government became a reality on 6 January 1950. Consequently, all the KMT Consulates in Malaya were closed down. Prior to the anticipated closure, the Malayan KMT, which was a party of foreign political nature, had been banned under the Societies Ordinance of 1949. The party decided to close down all KMT branches in September 1949. Such closure was not without protest. Local KMT leaders criticised the British for failing to appreciate the cooperation of the party and the friendship of the China KMT (Yong and McKenna 1990).

The switch of British recognition would cause the Malayan Chinese to transfer their loyalty to the People's Government, thus putting an enormous amount of pressure on the British in Malaya (Tsang 2006). The highest priority of the British anti-insurgency campaign in Malaya was to prevent any probable Chinese communist influence among the neutral rural community. The cold war in Malaya was the people's war and it must be ended by strengthening "the will of the local people to resist it" (Tsang 2006: 13). In Malaya, the main consideration was to wean the Chinese away from China and Chinese Consulates. MacDonald

stated to the FO that, "Acceptance of Consuls may well defeat our efforts to create intercourse with Malayan citizenry".²⁶

Once Communist Consuls took over their posts, there was no way the Federation Government could check on what type of information they wanted to disseminate to their own nationals. Not only to Chinese students with only a Chinese citizenship, but Chinese students with a Federation of Malaya or British citizenship might also be subject to communist influences. The difficulty faced by the Federation Government in controlling the lawful activity of Chinese Consuls in schools was acknowledged by P. D. Coates from the FO.

I am afraid that this is not going to be of much help to you, and indeed the problem of curbing the activity of Chinese Consuls in schools is likely to prove elusive, because there is nothing to stop the Consuls from exercising personal influence so long as they do not break the law.²⁷

When the prospect of rejecting Chinese Consuls appeared poor, Gurney initiated a more radical approach: making an open statement, which clearly restricted the activities of Chinese Consuls in Malaya, which was on similar lines with the suggestion of the CO. These restrictions also applied to the activities which had been allowed in the past.²⁸ The FO strongly opposed the issuance of any public statement. Commenting on Gurney's suggestion, the FO deemed it as "undesirable on general political grounds". At the FO, he was reminded of the comparable consequences that the redefinition of the functions of communist Chinese Consuls will pose on the activities of British Consuls in China and even in the Iron Curtain countries. In substance, it was not a reasonable suggestion to prevent Chinese Consuls from functioning as information agencies. The British must be prepared to expect retaliation on the operation of British information services in China.²⁹ Furthermore such a statement might be taken by the Chinese as depriving their Consuls of their rights and denying the local Chinese of their right to consular protection.³⁰

In the eyes of the Chinese, this statement might seem aggressive since it was directed at the position of Chinese representatives. Given that the Chinese government had not initiated any intention to appoint its Consuls in Malaya, Gurney was advised not to prompt them "into taking action earlier than they would otherwise intend" Gurney's request was thus quickly turned down by Griffiths, the Secretary of State for the Colonies as follows: "We do not feel that it would be desirable for Governments to take the initiative in making a formal statement".³¹

Expectedly, the British representative in Nanking also questioned the aptness of Gurney's suggestion. Certainly it was not the right approach at the right time. Before diplomatic relations were fully established, it was not wise to unilaterally declare a restriction on the functions of Chinese Consuls in Malaya. A better approach, according to them, would be making a public statement after both countries have agreed on such appointments. Even if the Malayan internal situation warranted an earlier statement, the statement should not exclusively be aimed at Chinese Consuls. Their rights must be the same as that of any other consul in Malaya. In reassuring Malayan public opinion, the Malayan administration was reminded of British interests in China.³² Besides jeopardising British interests in China, the statement would also invite unnecessary aggravation from the Chinese Government and bring the whole issue to the forefront of diplomatic debates. In order to avoid any further enquiries to the Malayan Government, Gurney was advised not to pursue the statement.³³ Despite the negative responses, Gurney reiterated his viewpoint. There was a need to draw a clear dividing line as to the function of new Chinese Consuls. This was imperative to dispel public anxiety.³⁴

The government's inaction caused confusion among its citizens. The Chinese were forced to purchase \$500 (Malayan dollar) worth of victory bonds of the PRC and to join the Sin Hua Yew Society (Friends of New China Society). There were fears of violating the Emergency Regulations if the Chinese citizens did not buy the bonds and join the society. On the other hand, the reluctance to do so would cause them to be considered as "reactionary" and to suffer banishment to China for punishment once Communist Consuls were stationed in the Federation. On 24 January 1950, the government finally announced the precise functions of the impending Chinese Consuls:

A consul exercises protective functions with respect to citizens of the appointing state only... The protection of citizens includes assistance to them in respect of proceedings before the authorities of the receiving state and, when necessary, arranging legal assistance. It does not, however, extend to interference with local judicial proceedings and certainly not to interference in matters affecting the administration or political life of the receiving state (*Straits Times* 24 January 1950).

The following activities were banned: the dissemination of communist propaganda, the sale of victory bonds, the collection of subscriptions towards them, the registration of the Sin Hua Yew Society, and the liquidation of KMT party elements (*Straits Times* 24 January 1950). In Singapore, the government also favoured a bilateral agreement, which spelled out the jurisdiction of Chinese Consular officers in Malaya. Singapore wanted to restrict the jurisdiction of

Chinese Consuls to the affairs of local-born Chinese. Its primary concern was with the status of Chinese dual nationals born in British colonies. The Chinese Consuls must not be allowed to exercise any jurisdiction over the Straits Chinese. They were solely British subjects while they were in British territories.³⁵

Assessing the Malayan Chinese Reaction

While opinions were divided among the British ranks, public opinion in Malaya was united against any appointment of Communist Consuls. The leaders of the Chinese community were anxiously trying to exert their pressure on the Malayan authorities. During the meeting of the Emergency Chinese Advisory Committee in February, Chinese leaders from all parts of the Federation expressed its deep disapproval. At the state level, the Chinese Advisory Boards in Johore and Negeri Sembilan also passed similar resolutions so as to not cause a split in the Chinese community. In the Perak State Council, a motion was tabled suggesting to the Federation Government to make a strong representation to the British government against the appointment of a Chinese Consul in Perak.³⁶

The MCP, on the other hand, welcomed the British recognition of the PRC and the expected arrival of Chinese Consuls. Gatherings and large scale celebrations were held in Singapore, Kuching, Sibul and Malaya by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-affiliated and MCP related organisations to celebrate the establishment of diplomatic relations between the UK and the PRC. It was difficult for the British to ban these gatherings as the celebrations were held for them as well. In the Borneo territories, the celebrations were much more enthusiastic due to the looser restrictions by the authorities. One year later, the British Borneo colonial administration outlawed pro-CCP groups and newspapers. CCP-sponsored events were no longer allowed (Hara 2003). In a pamphlet issued in March 1950, the MCP reassured the overseas Chinese of their rightful protection once their consuls arrived. Those who had been wronged by the British Imperialists would be able to appeal to the consuls, who would make a diplomatic protest to the British. Thus the MCP advised those suffering from cruelty to record their loss and demand compensation when the consuls arrived.³⁷

As it turned out, all the leaders expressed an anti-communist attitude and showed their willingness to resist interference by Chinese Consuls. Acceptance of any Communist agents was unimaginable to them as it gave a psychological victory to the MCP. The act was interpreted by the Chinese community as a "suicidal folly". Following the nationwide apprehension, Gurney represented to the British Government that no Chinese Consuls should be appointed to Malaya at least until the emergency was over. The rationale for this decision was spelled out in a telegram to the Secretary of State as follows:

We should be risking the loss of support of law-abiding Chinese and without that there seems to be no prospect of an end to the present state of affairs within any reasonable space of time, however many more troops may be forthcoming.³⁸

On 5 April 1950, the Perak State Council unanimously passed the motion moved by Leong Yew Koh against appointment of any Chinese Consul in Perak. All members of the Council voted for the motion except three abstentions. The resolution was approved by 31 votes to none. The Council wanted the Federal government to make strong representations to the British government. According to Leong, the stationing of a Communist Consul was detrimental and would "sabotage" the anti-insurgency campaign. His motion was fully supported by the other members, who agreed that "the present time was most inopportune to exchange consular representation" with Red China (*Straits Times* 5 April 1950).

The determination of the Chinese community was interpreted by the British as a "courageous" act since the leaders might risk retaliation from the communists and might be accused of disloyalty to China.³⁹ Many Chinese residents of Malaya might "run into difficulties" if there were no Chinese Consulates. They would have difficulties to maintain their family and business connections with China without any official channels. Despite these difficulties, Leong Yew Koh believed that there was no reason why Perak should have a Chinese embassy since the state had not have any Chinese Consul in the pre-war period (*Straits Times* 6 April 1950).

The motion received favourable editorial comments from the English-language press of Singapore and of the Federation. The Chinese newspaper's editorial columns were surprisingly silent on this issue. In fact their silence implied the dilemma faced by the majority of the Chinese. The attitude of the Chinese masses and the Chinese press towards the Emergency was the same. They remained seated on the fence until they were confident that the British were winning the war. This explained why "almost the entire Chinese press has remained strictly neutral in this respect". Although many Chinese newspaper editors were anti-communist, they held back from publicly attacking the Chinese government. The Chinese press dared not oppose the appointment of Chinese Consuls, who would possibly be assigned to Malaya and take action against them later on. Such an opposition might be interpreted as an act of disloyalty.⁴⁰

This proved to be true when a Singapore left-wing newspaper described Leong Yew Koh as a traitor to China. However, the opinion was not shared by the majority of Chinese in Singapore. By and large, they silently agreed to the Perak state's resolution. They did not see any necessity in such appointments. The

interests of local Chinese could be taken care of by the local associations. Similarly, the local Chinese, majority of who were businessman and shopkeepers did not welcome the arrival of Chinese Consuls. They disliked the interference of consuls in their own affairs. Once the consuls arrived, they were expected to conduct the registration of all overseas Chinese and conduct investigations into their family and financial affairs. A large number of Chinese school teachers also disliked the idea of the consuls taking control over their educational activities.⁴¹ Among the loyal British subjects, there were fears that Chinese Consuls in Singapore would exploit the Chinese overseas to the political interests of China. F. Gimson, the governor of Singapore refused to accept Chinese Consuls.

I consider therefore that the presence of these Consuls in Singapore would have a most disastrous effect on the preservation of maintenance of law and order which has been so far successfully accomplished during the past few years...⁴²

In April 1950, the issue reached a deadlock with two contrasting viewpoints. Henry Gurney, supported by Malcolm MacDonald and the Governor of Singapore strongly opposed the appointment of Chinese Communist Consuls to Malaya. Hutchinson, the British representative to China did not agree to "temporise" on the question of Consuls. The former view was backed up by the CO whereas the latter's view was taken up by the FO. Thus, it was necessary to come to an agreed view to prepare a joint paper for the Cabinet. A decision about Chinese Consuls in Malaya could only be decided after the cabinet meeting.⁴³

Standoff between FO and CO: Awaiting the British Cabinet's Decision

Emerging differences between the FO and the CO on Chinese Consuls were fundamentally irreconcilable. The main issue of the day was whether the appointment of Communist Consuls for Malaya would build up the strength of the Communist cause as had been strongly argued by Malcolm MacDonald, Henry Gurney and the Commander-in-Chief [Malayan Forces]. Could they overestimate the influence of China? Given that the FO did not receive any reports to the cause, there were reasons to believe that the communist activity in Malaya was locally inspired. Another consideration was whether internal security threats justified the need to forgo British relations with the People's Government and consequently British interests in China. Malcolm MacDonald even suggested excluding Chinese Consuls from British territories in Southeast Asia altogether, which was totally unacceptable to the FO.⁴⁴

Delaying the appointment of Chinese Consuls was also thought to be unfeasible. According to the FO, the delay could not be made indefinite. Once the British

had established diplomatic relationships on the equal basis with the People's Government, exchange of Consuls had to take place. Malaya could only restrict the functions of Chinese Consuls based on the principle of reciprocity if the Chinese government took the same course of action on British Consuls in China. The FO also considered another alternative: closing Chinese Consulates in certain areas in Malaya. However, this suggestion did not solve the whole problem. The communist influence still could not be completely removed in Malaya. There were no sensible reasons to justify such actions without doing the same damage to their relations with China. As discussions between the CO and the FO did not lead to any new conclusion, they were considering "what unobtrusive steps can be taken in advance to restrict their [Chinese] capacity to do damage". This meant establishing a mechanism to closely watch and report on the activities of Chinese Consuls.⁴⁵

Following the continuous pressure from the Malayan government, the FO approached Beijing for an "objective" and "dispassionate" investigation. In April 1950, a telegram issued by the FO instructed the British representative to consider the impact of the exclusion of consuls. The FO regarded the arguments favouring the exclusion of consuls to "have been biased and [are] lacking in objectivity".⁴⁶ In considering the practicability of the course of action, the British representative was reminded to consider the impact of the exclusion on the loyalty of the Malayan Chinese. Would the Chinese community continue to support the government's anti-communist effort? Since many Chinese were fence sitters, the arrival of Communist Consuls was likely to have an impact on their choice between loyalty to the Malayan Government and loyalty to the Chinese Government. Among the population, the merchant community was the most likely group to support the Malayan government since their interests were at stake if Communism were to succeed in Malaya.⁴⁷

Shortly thereafter, the British representative to China indicated to the FO not to do anything which could risk the closure of British consular posts in China. Maintaining British influence in China was essential to check the formation of a Sino-Soviet bloc. British consular posts particularly in Tientsin, Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, Tsingtao and Swatow were important to British commercial interests and to the interests of British subjects. Hutchinson concluded his opinion without any recommendation:

Having these considerations in view it seems clear that we should try to maintain all our consular posts here and there seems no likelihood of doing that if we exclude Chinese Consuls from Malaya.⁴⁸

However, in his subsequent telegram, Hutchinson highlighted a new alternative without having to sacrifice British interests in China: following the models of India and USSR. In these cases, the establishment of consulates was treated as a separate question by the Chinese Government. This question would only be taken up after the establishment of full diplomatic relations. While the option appeared to be flexible, he insisted that "no public announcement should be made".⁴⁹

Throughout the debates since the end of 1948, the Malayan government had remained silent on the decisive issue. It wanted to avoid any unnecessary queries before a decision could be reached. The difficulties confronted the government were understandable by the local community. In Malaya, the subject was so sensitive to be discussed publicly that the local press was hesitant to comment on the Perak state's resolution. In his memorandum prepared for the cabinet meeting, Griffiths, the Colonial Secretary decided that (1) Chinese Consuls should be excluded from Malaya until the emergency was over and (2) a public announcement **should be made** to this effect.⁵⁰

The second recommendation of the CO was unacceptable to the FO. The FO decided to draft a new Cabinet paper which stood in contradiction to the CO's paper.⁵¹ In the opinion of the FO, the effect of admitting Communist Consuls to Malaya was overestimated by the High Commissioner of Malaya and the Governor of Singapore. Their speculation might go too far. Since the British had no concrete proof of the Chinese Communist Party's assistance towards MCP, making a public statement, that was tantamount to accusing the Chinese Government, was undesirable.

If we were to make a public announcement, it would be equivalent to saying to the world at large that the Chinese Government are appointing officials for subversive purposes.⁵²

Other arguments in the FO against the policy of Gurney were also worth noting. Winning the war in Malaya, from the FO's view, did not depend solely on the rejection of Chinese Consuls. A more decisive factor was the ability of the British to intercept the intelligence system of the terrorists. There were over 300,000 Chinese squatters, functioning as the backbones of the bandits. The squatters would not support the government until they were fully integrated into the Malayan administration. In addition, the FO was not convinced that "the Chinese community can really be won solidly over to our side by excluding Chinese Consuls from Malaya". This was a "ridiculous assertion" according to the FO, as the presence of Communist elements in Malaya [rather than an external influence] played a more effective role in influencing the support of the local

community. Due to the differences in opinion, the FO and the CO prepared their own cabinet paper to be submitted to the Cabinet on 18 May 1950.⁵³

In the Cabinet paper prepared by the FO, Ernest Bevin, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs argued that "the internal situation in Malaya cannot be the sole criterion in the conduct of international affairs". His Majesty's government had granted *de jure* recognition to the PRC, and both nations agreed to establish diplomatic relations. In line with the decision of the Cabinet and the agreement with the US, this policy must be pursued. Excluding Chinese Consuls from Malaya was tantamount to challenging the present policy and was not agreeable to the FO. Among the nation states, only the Soviet Government presented an exceptional case of excluding the appointment of Chinese Consuls. The FO did not desire to "consider Malaya in isolation from international affairs in general". Malaya must not be afforded an exemption so as to not affect British standards of conduct in international affairs. If a reply to the Malayan public were necessary, Ernest Bevin proposed the following response: "no question of the appointment of Chinese Consuls arises for the present".⁵⁴

Infinite Postponement and the Future of Malayan Chinese

As the discussion dragged on without any solution, it was decided that the issue would not be presented to the Cabinet. It was deferred until Griffiths returned from his forthcoming visit to Malaya on 24 May.⁵⁵ The Secretary of State stressed the fact that he was not prepared to become involved in the issue before it had even arisen. In the case that Griffiths were asked to provide a definite answer to the issue during his visit to Malaya, the following formula was agreed upon by the Secretary of State [Ernest Bevin] and the Colonial Secretary [Griffiths]:

His Majesty's Government are of course aware of the views which have been expressed in Malaya on the question of the acceptance of Chinese Consuls, e.g., in the discussion on the resolution in the Perak State Council on 4th April. The question of the appointment of Consuls has however not yet arisen, but should it do so His Majesty's Government will of course take fully into account the opinions expressed in Malaya.⁵⁶

However, the whole question was not pursued since the return of Griffiths. There was no ministerial decision on this subject. For the British, this had been probably the best solution ever.⁵⁷ In a joint memorandum submitted to the British Cabinet, it was suggested that the conflicting issue of Chinese Consuls should be deferred until the whole question of relations with China had been discussed with

the US Secretary of State. They were prepared to put the issue on hold. In other words, the British should remain silent at both fronts: in Malaya and in Beijing.⁵⁸

The issue was finally put to rest in August 1950 after two years of intense debates. The intense discussions were generated much too early as the communist Chinese made no such request to station its representatives in Malaya (Ashton et al. 2002). Sino-British negotiations for the exchange of ambassadors extended endlessly. The CCP would not discuss recognition with the British representative until the British agreed to sever residue relations with the Republic of China in Taiwan and to support the PRC's representation at the United Nations (UN). The British offer to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC was left on the side and thus the issue of Chinese Consuls for Malaya was not raised because the PRC had other priorities. The PRC's Chairman, Mao chose to "lean to the side of the Soviet camp" (Tsang 2006: 21).

Tsang evidently argued that Mao believed that China should rely on the assistance of the Soviet bloc. The leaning to the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc failed the UK's aim in the granting of recognition to the communist state. After extending recognition, the British offer failed to engage the PRC and to distance the PRC from the Soviet camp. The Chinese "did not respond to the British effort" as the CCP leadership placed importance on relations with the Soviet camp (2006: 23). In Mercy Kuo's "Contending with Contradictions", the Chinese relations with the Soviet bloc served as a central factor for PRC's legitimacy. Identifying with the socialist camp (rather than with the western powers), Mao hoped to situate China in the post-war world order against the backdrop of the iron curtain (Kuo 2001). A prominent Chinese scholar, Chen, also agreed that Chairman Mao was "unwilling to pursue western recognition or to establish diplomatic relations with western countries" (ibid., 38).

The Chinese responses to the British demarche of January 1950 significantly affected the issue of Chinese consular representation in British Malaya. The context for the PRC's policy ultimately relegated the issue of Chinese Consuls for Malaya into a non-issue. Thus, the turning point in the deadlock was attributed to the PRC's strategic foreign policy of not aligning with the Western bloc in the 1950s. It was the anticipation of the Sino-British relationships which brought the whole question of Chinese consular representation in a heated triangular debate between the FO, CO and Malayan authorities. Similarly, it was also the unrealised Sino-British relationships which put an end to the debates. Within the short lifespan of two years in debates, the issue demonstrated where the priorities of the British Asia's policy lied. It was not the case that Malaya's predicaments were not fully appreciated by the FO. Rather, the UK's China policy was driven by Britain's overall strategic imperatives in the Cold War. Although Malaya was

the Empire's most profitable colony, the colony did not play a pivotal role in the post-war British policy in the Far East. As pointed out by Wolf, "In the FO, however, Malayan affairs garnered only a fraction of the attention accorded to Hong Kong and the other Chinese issues" (Wolf 1983, 312).

Though the local opposition could hardly influence the British Far Eastern policy, we must remember that the strong resistance was a sign of a transformed political attitude. The British developed a strong relationship with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and other Chinese elites, who actively sought to unite the Chinese population behind the government's anti-insurgency efforts and promote loyalty to the Malayan government (Renick 1965). For the local Chinese, remaining as Chinese nationals would not bring any benefits since they would be seen as targets of subversion and the Chinese government could not protect them without the existence of any Chinese Consuls. The heightened relations between the PRC and the non-communists countries eventually encouraged the Chinese to settle permanently and eventually to obtain local citizenship (Tan 2011). Moreover, the Chinese felt "a special need for becoming Malayan citizens" since the Chinese nationalist and communist governments did not have consulates in Malaya to issue passports and citizenship.⁵⁹

Constitutional developments further accelerated the sense of political identification with Malaya. There had been signs of acceptance and compromise for bringing in a more locally conscious Chinese into the fold of Malayan citizenry when the British promised self-governance to Malaya in early 1952 (Mills 1958). General Sir Gerald Templer, upon his appointment as the new High Commissioner, issued a directive recognising the community's aspirations: "To achieve a united Malayan nation there must be a common form of citizenship for all who regard the Federation or any part of it as their home and the object of their loyalty" (Stubbs 1989, 141). It was the proclaimed policy of the British government that "Malaya should in due course become a fully self-governing nation" (ibid.). Templer transformed the counter-insurgency strategy from a colonial war to a Malayan independence struggle, lending much credence to his "hearts and minds" campaign (Ucko 2010). Templer sought to encourage new settlers to become "ordinary citizens" in the resettlement areas now known as "New Villages". The New Villages—equipped with schools, stable water supply, sanitation and public health facilities, roads and drains, a place of worship, Home Guard and village committees—allowed the Chinese squatters to become better integrated and politically socialised (Stubbs 1989).

An amendment to the Federal citizenship ordinance and state nationality enactments in May 1952 had made 1.1 million Chinese (as well as 2.65 million Malay and 0.18 million Indians) Federal citizens (Cheah 2002). Other

constitutional advancements soon followed: continuing municipal elections, allowing Chinese entry into the Malayan Civil Service, the formation of the Alliance party, the holding of a national election, and the granting of independence on 31 August 1957 (Hack 2009). According to Fitzgerald, political development of the country offered "an alternative political future" to all who did not wish to support the Communists (1969, 66). Perhaps, Templer's predecessor, Gurney was right to suppose that "When Emergency is over we shall have demonstrated our ability to hold country which will give Chinese sufficient confidence to make the consular question less important than it is now."⁶⁰

Conclusion

This article argues that the question of Chinese consular representation was contentious because of the government's inability to secure the loyalty of the Chinese masses in the midst of the communist insurgency. Until and unless the British could win the Chinese support during the Emergency, any external influences were not to be compromised. The British kept a low profile on the issue. Throughout the deliberations, the British policy was to avoid any commitment and avoid making any public statement to either side but would stay put in China. Gradually, as events unfolded, the Malayan government had what it wanted most: rejection of Chinese interference in local affairs. In the words of Fitzgerald (1969, 78), the Peking government in 1950 had "forgone the opportunity to take over the Nationalist Chinese Consulates in Malaya". This missed opportunity "relieved the Chinese communities of the risk of being forced into a political commitment which would have been regarded with deep suspicion and hostility by the colonial rule and later by the independent government of Malaya" (ibid.).

Thus, this article suggests that the issue has to be understood in terms of its significance to the Malayan nation-building effort. A delay in the appointment of Chinese consular representatives made integration of the Chinese an easier task for the Alliance government. Without the presence of the consuls, the local population turned to local government and local Chinese organisations to protect their interests. Above all, the political vacuum left after the closure of KMT Consulates allowed the government to isolate the local Chinese population from Chinese influences and to embark on the domestication process of the Malayan Chinese (Harper 2001). There was no diplomatic relations between Malaya and any of the Chinese governments during the period of the Malayan Emergency (Suryadinata 1997). When the Federation of Malaya achieved independence, normalisation of state relations with the PRC was delayed. Peking recognised the new nation but Malaya did not reciprocate the recognition. Thus, the question of Chinese Consuls was again rendered a non-issue (Fitzgerald 1969).

Notes

1. CP (49) 214 [CAB 129/37] Memorandum by Mr. Bevin on recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, FO, 24 October 1949. In *Documents on British policy overseas: Britain and China 1945–1950*, Series 1, Vol. 8, ed. S. R. Ashton, G. Bennett and K. A. Hamilton (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 397.
2. CP (49) 214 [CAB 129/37] Memorandum by Mr. Bevin on recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, FO, 24 October 1949. In *Documents on British policy overseas: Britain and China 1945–1950*, 399.
3. *Ibid.*, 402.
4. Among the Commonwealth countries, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands and France, either for domestic reasons or colonial interests, preferred to delay recognition.
5. CP (49) 248 [CAB 129/37] Memorandum by Mr. Bevin on recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, FO, 12 December 1949. In *Documents on British policy overseas: Britain and China 1945–1950*, 420.
6. CAB 129/39, CP (50) 75 "Chinese Consuls in Malaya": Joint Cabinet memorandum by Griffiths and Younger, 21 August 1950. In *British documents on the end of empire, Series B, Vol. 3, Malaya: Part II The Communist Insurrection 1948–1953*, ed. A. J. Stockwell (London: HMSO, 1995), 206–207.
7. Minutes by CO "Chinese Consuls in Malaya after recognition of the communist regime in China", 17 November 1949. The United Kingdom National Archives (TNA), FO 371/75954, F19056/1908/10. Available from British Foreign Office Files China, 1949–1980, *Archives Direct*. Retrieved 21 February 2013 from <http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au>.
8. *Ibid.*
9. CO537/4374. Note on tour of Southeast Asia October 1949: Report by Field Marshal W. Slim on the importance of civil action in counter-insurgency. Minutes by O. H. Morris and W.C. Johnson in *British documents on the end of empire*, 175.
10. Telegram from FO to MacDonald, 6 April 1950, FO 371/83550, Far Eastern Department: China (hereafter FC) 1903/46.
11. Telegram No. 402 from FO to Peking, 17 April 1950, FO 371/83549, FC 1903/40.
12. Telegram from Hutchinson, Peking to FO, 31 March 1950, FO 371/83549, FC 1903/40.
13. Telegram from Gurney to Griffiths, 3 April 1950, FO 371/83550, FO 1903/48.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Telegram No. 342 from Gurney to Griffiths, 19 April 1950, FO 371/83550, FC 1903/64.
16. *House of Lords debates on the Federation of Malaya*. Speech by Lord Mancroft, 27 February 1952, 337, CO 1022/174.
17. Telegram from Gurney to Griffiths, 3 January 1950, FO 371/83548, FC 1903/1.
18. Telegram from MacDonald to Griffiths, 1 April 1950, FO 371/83549, FC 1903/43.
19. Telegram from MacDonald to Griffiths, 7 January 1950, FO 371/83548, FC 1903/1.
20. Despatch from Deputy Commissioner-General, Foreign Affairs to the Colonial Secretary, Singapore, 7 October 1949, FO 371/75954, F 15643/1908/10.
21. Telegram from MacDonald to FO, 26 October 1949, FO 371/75954, F 16039/1908/10G.
22. Telegram from MacDonald to FO, 9 December 1949, FO 371/75954, F 18548/1908/10.
23. Telegram from MacDonald to FO, 12 December 1949, FO 371/75954, F 18548/1908/10.

24. Minutes by CO, "Chinese Consuls in Malaya after recognition of the communist regime in China", 17 November 1949, FO 371/75954, F 19056/1908/10.
25. Minutes by P. H. Coates to Vallat, Southeast Asia Department, 16 January 1950, FC 1903/11, FO 371/83548.
26. Telegram No. 325 from MacDonald to FO, 10 April 1950, FO 371/83550, FC 1903/50.
27. Minutes by P. H. Coates, FO to O. H. Morris, CO, 18 January 1950, FO 371/83548, FC 1903/11.
28. Telegram from Gurney to Griffiths, 3 January 1950, FO 371/83548, FC 1903/1.
29. Minutes by P. D. Coates, FO to CO, 5 January 1950, FO 371/83548, FC 1903/1.
30. Minutes from P. D. Coates to Vallet, S.E.A Department, 13 January 1950, FO 371/83548, FC 1903/8.
31. Telegram from J. Griffiths to Gurney, 7 January 1950, FO 371/83548, FC 1903/7.
32. Telegram from Nanking to FO, 10 January 1950, FO 371/83548, FC 1903/2.
33. Minutes from R. H. Scott, 13 January 1950, FO 371/83548, FC 1903/8.
34. Telegram from Gurney to Griffiths, 12 January 1950, FO 371/83548, FC 1903/8.
35. Letter from F. Gimson to T. Lloyd. Annex: memorandum by T. P. F. McNeice, G. C. S. Adkins and G. W. Webb, CO 537/3758, No. 23, 8 December 1948. In *British documents on the end of empire*, 84.
36. The Secretariat for Chinese Affairs and Chinese Advisory Boards had taken over the role of the old Chinese Protectorate as means of liason between the Malayan Chinese and the Malayan administration. Telegram from Gurney to Griffiths, 29 March 1950, FO 371/83549, FC 1903/37.
37. Telegram No. 349 from MacDonald to FO, 15 April 1950, FO 371/83550, FC 1903/53.
38. Telegram from Gurney to Griffiths, 29 March 1950, FO 371/83549, FC 1903/37.
39. Telegram from MacDonald to FO, 6 April 1950, FO371/83550, FC 1903/49.
40. Similarly the pro-communist Chinese newspapers also refrained from commenting on the Perak motion since their focus on events in Malaya was minimal. Despatch No. 21 from Deputy Commissioner General in Southeast Asia to FO, 27 April 1950, FO 371/83551, FC 1903/75.
41. Telegram No. 306 from F. Gimson, Singapore to Griffiths, 14 April 1950, FO 371/83550, FC 1903/56.
42. Ibid.
43. Letter from Dening to W. Strang, "Chinese Consuls in Malaya", 4 April 1950, FO 371/83549, FC 1903/37.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Telegram from FO to Peking, 15 April 1950, FO 371/83549, FC 1903/40.
47. Telegram No. 402 from FO to Peking, 17 April 1950, FO371/83549, FC 1903/40.
48. Telegram No. 354 from Hutchinson, Peking to FO, 19 April 1950, FO 371/83550, FC 1903/60.
49. Telegram No. 364 from Hutchinson, Peking to FO, 20 April 1950, FO 371/83550, FC 1903/61.
50. Draft cabinet paper, "Chinese Consuls in Malaya" memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1950, FO 371/83551, FC 1903/80.
51. Letter by M. E. Dening, FO, to J. J. Paskin, CO, 11 May 1950, FO 371/83551, FC 1903/80.

52. Minutes from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, "Chinese Consuls in Malaya", 13 May 1950, FO 371/83551, FC 1903/83.
53. Ibid.
54. Draft cabinet paper, "Chinese Consuls in Malaya" memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, FO 371/83551, FC 1903/80.
55. FO Minutes by J. S. H. Shattock, "Chinese Consuls in Malaya", 22 May 1950, FO 371/83551, FC 1903/85.
56. Minutes by Denning, FO, 24 May 1950, FO 371/83551, FO 1903/90.
57. Letter from Private Secretary to R. E. Barclay, 18 July 1950, FO 371/83553, FC 1903/116.
58. "Chinese Consuls in Malaya": Joint Cabinet memorandum by Griffiths and Younger, 21 August 1950, CAB 129/39, CP (50) 75. In *British documents on the end of empire*, 210–211.
59. *The New York Times*, 19 July 1952.
60. FO371/83550, FC1903/64 Telegram No. 342 from Gurney to Griffiths, 19 April 1950.

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Perak's warning to Peking. *Straits Times*, 6 April 1950. Retrieved 15 February 2002 from <http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article.aspx?articleid=straits-times19500406-1.2.132>.

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