

The Dynamics of Shipping and Trade of Majene Port in Indonesian Archipelago, 1950s–1970s

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Abstract. This article discovered the turbulent dynamics of the Majene Port and its surrounding areas between the 1950s and the 1970s because of the seizure of the economic resources of the region by the army and guerrilla forces. The guerrillas who controlled the hinterland boycotted the flow of commodities to the army-dominated Majene Port. In response, the army fortified the city and its harbour to prevent infiltration. Army troops of Battalion 710 and the TBO imposed a trade monopoly through violence and caused suffering to people, displacing citizens from Parepare, Makassar and the islands of the Makassar Strait. Unlike other residents who were forced to leave Majene, two successful entrepreneurs, Pua Abu and Hajj Sikir, managed to overcome the constraining structures of these difficult times. As a survival strategy, the Mandar sailors and traders developed new shipping routes to the north by successfully smuggling. The present article's elucidation of economic and political life in the port city of Majene, using a combination of archival and oral sources to reconstruct the local past, is expected to enrich the study of maritime history. Ultimately, the analysis of the obtained data revealed difficulties pertaining to regional and central interests.

Keywords and phrases: Majene Port, army, guerrillas, shipping, maritime trade

Introduction

The presence of a port in an archipelagic state such as Indonesia is not only a major need but also a factor affecting the nation's socio-economic development. The functioning of a port economy is not always regular or typical because natural

factors such as geographical location, seasonal winds, waves and commodities determine the functioning of a port economy. Furthermore, a port-dependant community is influenced by social and political factors that govern the land at and around the harbour. When conditions are normal, the port is a place where people and goods enter inland (hinterland) or travel in the opposite direction (foreland). It becomes difficult to operate in times of disturbance, insecurity, or strife. Security disturbances are triggered when certain parties attempt to control the port because it is the centre of prosperity within a region (Zuhdi 2017, 112).

After the Indonesian independence revolution (1945–1950), conditions in the country should have stabilised as the power of the colonial regime came to an end. However, the sailors and residents of Mandar in the Makassar Strait area experienced even more difficult conditions due to domestic security disturbances triggered by the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) rebellion led by Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar (1950–1965). Since the beginning of this rebellion, the Mandar area has been included in its operational area. Apart from recruiting the locals, they also exploited the natural resources. Government troops eradicated this rebellion because it was a separatist movement. These conditions put the locals in a hard situation between the influence of the national army and the guerrillas.

This article discusses the Majene Port and its surroundings in turbulent times sparked by the struggle between government troops and regional guerrilla forces. This dispute was triggered by the struggle for the most sought-after commodity to meet the economic needs of both groups. In this case, the Majene Port is the main gateway for copra from the Mandar region. The army was responsible for protecting the people against the upheavals caused by the guerrillas. An operational assistance reserve force, the Tjadangan Bantuan Operasi (TBO) also acted as an unofficial organ of Battalion 710 led by Andi Selle Mattola. The opposing group of revolutionaries organised themselves in the form of the DI/TII movement. In the Mandar area, particularly, a group of rebels followed Muhammad Tahir Rachmat. In such volatile circumstances, communities lived in a state of extreme vulnerability, forced either to make a choice between the government forces and the guerrilla groups or to risk their survival by not choosing at all.

This study aims to describe life as it was lived in the Majene Port and its surroundings between the 1950s and the 1970s. To achieve this objective, four questions are posed: (1) What arrangement was made by the army regarding the copra trade? (2) What efforts did society make against such an arrangement by the army? (3) What activities did soldiers (Troop 710 and TBOs) undertake in the copra trade? and (4) What kind of problems occurred in the port city of Majene? The focus on the Majene Port is vital to reaching a deeper understanding of the

concept of *tanah-air* (homeland) (Zuhdi 2014, 157), relating to the mutuality of the relationship between ports with the hinterlands and harbours of other regions (Lapian in Zuhdi 2016, xii). This investigation employed the historical research method and obtained its data from archival sources, newspapers and interviews with historical witnesses.

Government Policy of Sailing and Trade Environments

The Majene Port is in Mandar Bay in the Makassar Strait. Prior to 1950, this port was controlled by the Dutch East Indies government. It is the most bustling shipping and trading centre on the Mandar coast, which functions as a collection centre. Between 1920 and 1940, the *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij* (KPM) ships visited this port four times a month. After that, government ships from Makassar visited it once or twice a month. The primary trading commodity of the region is copra (dried meat or kernel of the coconut). The peak of copra trade occurs in the west season when Mandar boats arrive from Singapore, Batavia and Surabaya in the west and merchant ships such as the KPM arrive every month. Residents sell plantation products (copra), handicrafts (Mandar sarongs) and dried fish and buy goods sold by seafarers and traders. The region prospered and a city that took the name of the harbour, Majene, developed over time. In less than two decades, Majene's population increased more than 100% from 15,000 (de Graaff and Stibbe 1918, 638) to 30,778 (Volkstelling 1936, 131), the busy harbour and its inhabitants complementing each other's growth (Lapian 2008, 102).

Majene's development attracted the attention of both the government and the guerrillas in the 1950s and 1960s. Each element made "arrangements" to control the activities of residents in cities and ports. In 1954, the Maritime Regional Command (KDM) of Makassar stipulated that the waters of the Makassar Strait and its ports were closed for sail (Toraja Archives, No. 734). The sailing permit for boats, arranged by the Wirabuana Territory VII (TT VII) Army, was issued at Majene. This permit was granted only to seafarers who possessed travel permission from the village head and it was only valid for one journey for the maximum duration of one month. The local government also simultaneously created a special permit for seafarers with a validity of a maximum of three months (Toraja Archives, No. 871) and a maximum sailing distance of about three nautical miles from the shore (Toraja Archives, No. 1299). According to port regulations, any boat carrying copra would have to comply with the government regulation of not carrying any cargo when exiting the port where its licence was issued and, subsequently, loading copra in a closed area with a fixed route determined by the *syahbandar* (harbourmaster). The departure of the boat would be reported to KDM Makassar (PPS Archives, No. 359).

The material needs of the population were to be transported only on government ships and on boats so licensed by the government. The civil service in Makassar issued all shipping licences, including the clearance of goods in closed areas. The government determined the allocation of the population's essential products, especially rice, milk, wheat and kerosene. In addition, the government determined the place for loading and unloading these need-based goods. Merchants who did not have a shipping dispensation might be used to transport goods to remote areas as "supplements" (no more than 50% of the allocations) and they could only visit government-controlled ports. A number of harbours along the Mandar coast, from Pambauwang to Mamuju, did not have customs offices. Hence, the area was often used to smuggle copra to Tawau (formerly known as Tawau), Malaysia and the Philippines (PPS Archives, No. 359). The profits received from these smuggling operations were used to buy weapons for guerrillas in Mandar.

The shipping and trading arrangements described above were aimed at restricting the supply lines of the guerrillas. According to Harvey (1989, 209–210), the security disruptions increased in 1956, coinciding with the peaking of destructive guerrilla activities. In 1957, to build its power base, the rebel militia terrorised the citizenry. In 1956 until 1957, all areas in Mandar except for the city were in turmoil and a massive population shift occurred from the inland areas to the city and to the outskirts of Majene.

In response to the increasing domestic disturbances, the government declared in October 1957 that all Indonesian waters were in danger (LNRI [Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia] 1957). Each boat would have to carry a letter of permission from the *syahbandar* (harbourmaster) or the *pamongpraja* (civil service police) to allow the navy and the customs water police to supervise the shipping and trade activities (Bone Archives, No. 1551). Two months later, the government made the Djuanda Declaration on 13th December 1957 to establish the unity of the Indonesian nation and territory (Djalal 1979, 62–63). This declaration affirms that Indonesia's territorial sea limits are 12 nautical miles from the outer limits of each island of the country's territory. All ships sailing or crossing the Indonesian territorial sea must obtain permission from the government. Thus, the government can control shipping traffic in Indonesia's maritime area.

In terms of the regulatory and territorial tactics applied by the guerrillas, three classifications were used by the rebel militia to demarcate and control a target area: (1) enemy-occupied territory, (2) the area within which the enemy's patrol troops were located and (3) territories not belonging to the above two categories. The first two areas were referred to as bases for assault (*aanval basis*). Residents and property and especially the community leaders of these regions, were immediately

transferred to guerrilla-held strongholds (*terugval basis*). As they disrupted this line, the militia also ensured that their enemies did not settle in these locations. Residents in the third territorial classification were provided with enough training to prepare for any eventualities (PS Archives, No. 323).

The announcement made by the Commander of TII Territorium IV, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, declared that the entire region was deemed to be in a state of war from 10th August 1953. All citizens, especially the Muslims, should participate actively in the defence of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) under the conceptual framework of “total people’s defence”, or *pertahanan rakyat total* (Hamid 2009, 35–36). Subsequently, in 1955, the de facto guerrilla territory extended closer than five kilometres from the city (PS Archives, No. 327). Residents who lived approximately three kilometres away on the outskirts of the city had to choose whether to enter the guerrilla territory or to return to the city as the enemies of the militia (Mattalioe 1994, 223). To execute their disruptive tactics, the guerrillas damaged land transportation networks such as the bridges and placed barriers in the middle of highways. They destroyed communication by damaging poles and telephone wires and committed random acts of crime and violence such as theft and murder around the city in the name of deterrence (PPS Archives, No. 233).

Since the de facto determination, the population of the region was divided into two factions. The first group comprised those from the inland and coastal belts who volunteered or were forced to join the guerrillas. To facilitate the control of this population, village heads and community leaders were also moved into the interior areas. This group was often known as the “insider”. The second section consisted of people who did not support the guerrillas. They generally lived in cities, or near army posts and thus they were often called the “city people” (Hamid 2016, 2–4). The insiders control forest products, agriculture and plantation products in remote areas, while the urban population had widespread access to fishery products and essential goods that were needed by rural residents.

The guerrillas managed trade in a limited way, using tactics such as enforcing the use of the Japanese currency as Darul Islam (DI) money in regions under their de facto control (PS Archives, No. 233). Merchants who wanted to buy goods from the interiors had to trade in DI currency, necessitating the exchange of the rupiah (Indonesian currency) for the ad hoc DI currency. Conversely, insider merchants or those persons designated by the DI to trade within the city had to use the rupiah currency. The village head of a de facto militia stronghold near the city was placed in charge of facilitating the exchange of rupiah money for DI traders (Mattalioe 1994, 202). After the de facto decree of 1955, the guerrillas forbade trade by inland residents with the city. Urban dwellers were also prohibited from taking their

agricultural and plantation products to the hinterland. In this manner, the guerrillas limited the movement of the population and restricted the economic development of the city of Majene.

Developing New Shipping and Trade Networks

“If not doing *simukel*, then what do we eat?”, said Mandar seafarers when asked about their way of life in the 1950s and 1960s. *Simukel* (from the Dutch *smokkel*) means smuggling and for Mandar sailors, a culprit smuggler was a *pasimukel*. *Simukel* became a survival strategy against the shipping and trading controls imposed by both the army and the guerrillas. This action was conducted outside the supervision of Majene customs officers. Pambauwang Harbour was one of the exit ports of the smugglers. Copra was brought by the inhabitants of Majene’s hinterlands, from places such as Tande and Tandasura, in horse loads to the harbour where it was bought by local merchants. After an adequate boatload was achieved, the ship left for Surabaya (PPS Archives, No. 359; Abdul Rahim Gazali, *pers. comm.*, 8th March 2018).

Among the actors of these covert business activities were Hamarong (85 years old), the skipper of *Bintang Baraka Agama* (*baqgo* [a type of boat for Mandar sailors] 18 tonnes) and seven of his crew (Yamang, Siding, Mustafa, Anas, Mahmud, Salengka and Pipi). The boat departed from Pambauwang to Surabaya for seven days, spending two days at Tanjung Seloka and Pulau Laut. The copra was bought by Haji Huduri, a trader from Bababulo, Pambauwang. The proceeds of the sale were used to buy sugar and wheat, which were later sold to the inhabitants of Majene. Three times a year, during the east season (June to August), the boat came to Surabaya. Around the end of 1956, three months before Pambauwang was burned down in January 1957, Hamarong and his crew moved to Tolitoli. There, they transported copra owned by two Bugis traders, Ambo Sanuddin and Abdul Wahid, in Ogotua using lease system. Within a year, they sailed five times to Tawau during the east monsoon season. A boatload comprised 15 tonnes of copra owned by tenants and three tonnes of boat crew. The route from Ogotua directly to Tawau took five days and the copra was bought by a Chinese trader, Yon Kin. Besides Mandar boats, there were also Buton boats that sailed from North Sulawesi to Tawau carrying copra. These boats were easily recognised from the *lambo* model (a type of boat for Buton sailors). “For 30 times I went *simukel* to Tawau and never get arrested”, said Hamarong. After unloading and waiting for copra prices for about a week, with provisions during the “waiting period” provided by *tauke* (referring to the Chinese traders), the boat returned without any load to Donggala in four days and then continued to Ogotua for two days. This

activity occurred between 1957 and 1964. After this period, they carried black wood and rattan wood on the same boat from Sampaga to Parepare, Makassar and Bali (Hamarong, *pers. comm.*, 29th May 2018).

If Hamarong opened the route to Tawau, Jaarung Pua Anwar, a sailor from Tanjung Rangas, carried copra on his boats *Usaha Bersama* (*sandeq* type [a type of boat for Mandar sailors], two tonnes) to Parepare, which was under the control of the army. “I used to be a *simukel*, I hide and load, I hide and off”, said Pua Anwar. The boat departed at night from Rangas beach at the south-western bow then passed the bay of Mandar and circled back again. For fear of robbers, the boat would not venture near the beach between Pambusuang and Pinrang; after that stretch it would set a course to Parepare. Copra was purchased by Majene traders Pua Abu, Pua Jamalia and I Tager. New copra could be picked up at night. If they encountered robbers who were often members of the TBOs, the sailors said that their load of copra belonged to a high-ranked army officer in Majene or Polewali. They easily brought copra to Parepare in this manner. However, the tactic did not always work. On one occasion, Pua Anwar was hijacked by six TBO members using a *sandeq* boat in the waters of Langnga Pinrang. When asked if he had any money, he said no. The robbers checked and found the money in the hull of the boat. One of them hit Pua Anwar’s head with a gun. Apparently, they had spies who had observed the sailor’s activities in Parepare (Jaarung Pua Anwar, *pers. comm.*, June 2, 2018).

The two accounts related bear similarities. The smugglers looked for another port to load and unload their goods. In terms of volume, the northward line was smaller (Pua Anwar carried two tonnes) than the southward line was (Hamarong took 18 tonnes). If the northern route was controlled by the guerrillas, the southern route was controlled by the army, especially the Battalion 710. In fact, the northward line was also alternative. Previously, a boat from Mandar headed to Pulau Laut and to Surabaya. In 1957, this line changed northward (to Tawau) after the government stated that all Indonesian waters were in a state of danger (LNRI 1957).

The Copra Foundation’s (Jajasan Kopra – JK, old spelling) monopoly caused the smuggling of copra to Tawau. From 1950, the JK was the only licensee that could purchase copra from the government. However, this licence was not supported by sufficient funds; thus, the JK often did not pay the price of the copra to the producers. Unlike the JK, the smugglers paid the local population promptly and did not question its quality. In addition, the price of copra in Tawau was higher at USD24 per picol (equals to 61 kg); therefore, the sailors who carried copra there returned with luxury goods such as sewing machines, foreign cigarettes, watches, etc., for sale. From the early 1950s, northern Mandar was controlled by insurgents.

There was no customs office and, hence, there was significant smuggling of copra into Tawau (PPS Archives, No. 359; *Marhaen* 1959a; 1960).

Two successful entrepreneurs emerged from this chaotic situation: Muhammad Saleh Pua Abu and Haji Sikir. The first operated in the port area, especially in Kampung Pangaliali, while the latter was located in Kampung Tande, six kilometres from the Majene Port. Pua Abu came from Tanjung Batu and moved to Pangaliali in 1935. According to his grandson, Wildan (58 years old) (*pers. comm.*, 2nd June 2018), he first owned a *sandeq* boat, *Loloangga*, which was used for copra trade to Tawau. The profits were used to buy gold. Three years later, he built a *baggo* *Pasar Siang* 25 tonnes (1938–1970s). From the profits he made off the second boat, he built four *baggo* boats: the *Gunung Mandar* 100 tonnes (1960–1972), the *Kota Mandar* 50 tonnes (1962–1970), the *Hotel Mandar* 50 tonnes (1960s–1973) and the *Pos Mandar* 120 tonnes (1970–1980s). On 29th April 1964, a meeting of the Majene Level Regional Legislative Assembly of Majene was held and a boat organisation named Persatuan Pelayaran (the Sailing Union) was formed. The chairman Sjamsuddin Noor, the vice chairman Anwar Saleh, the secretary Haeruddin and the treasurer Muhammad Saleh Pua Abu were the officials of this body. The membership of this organisation comprised 138 boat owners registered in Majene (Sulselra [Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara] Archives, No. 91; Abdul Rachman Tamma Archives, No. 482).

Five Pua Abu trade boats served as freight carriers on two main lines using a rental system. First, loads of rattan wood from Majene to Mamuju were brought to Makassar, from where *sembako* (basic food supplies) was brought to Mamuju. Second, loads of copra were taken from Majene to Donggala to Gresik and Kali Mas Surabaya. From here to Balikpapan, mixed goods were loaded. Then, the boats continued to Donggala, or went from Surabaya to Donggala. In the western season (December to March), the boats boarded the dock at the Pangaliali shipyard. Toward the end of the season, the boats were re-prepared. At that time, Chinese traders usually came from Mamuju offering cargo at Mamuju and Donggala. The prospective tenant would stay at Pua Abu's house and after reaching an agreement with the owner of the boat and the skipper, would return via the land route to Mamuju. The boat sailed during the east season (July to September).

The *Pos Mandar* and the *Gunung Mandar* were the largest boats in Pangaliali. According to the skipper of the *Gunung Mandar* (1969–1972), Muhammad Gaus (*pers. comm.*, 27th May 2018; 2nd June 2018), the length of the *Pos Mandar* was 24 metres and its width was seven metres to eight metres. The body length measured three metres to 3.5 metres and the boat had a full height of four metres to five metres. Its mast was about 14 metres high. There are 14 people operated the

boat: Abdul Hae (skipper), Inene (helmsman), Muhammad Gaus (scribe), Pua Ati (deputy helmsman) and crew members Buhari (son of Pua Abu), Abu, Ali, Suardi, Raman, Pua Mira, Hapil, Pua Gani, Papa Bosi, Rifai and Baco. The boat departed from Majene to Sampaga with a load of about 90 tonnes of black wood to Bali's Gilimanuk Port. Upon arrival at Majene, the boat continued to Mamuju where it loaded around 70 tonnes of copra from Hubungan Baru company, owned by Ance Layo, a *tauke* from Mamuju. The copra load was taken to Surabaya's Kali Mas Port. The boat went to Banjarmasin empty and brought *meranti* (shorea) wood and *sonokeling* (palisander) (about 100 cubic tonnes) to the port of Sunda Kelapa in Jakarta, returning empty to Surabaya, from where the boat went back to Mamuju to again load copra for Surabaya.

From the mid-1970s, the boats of *Gunung Mandar* and *Pos Mandar* were based in Sunda Kelapa, transporting timber for a Chinese merchant. The route, Sunda Kelapa to Palembang took only one day of travel time. The boat goes back and forth five times per year. To transport wood, the boat entered Musi River tilted by a speed boat to the Oki area, Komering Ilir. Each route carried 120 cubic. After loading for three days, the boat was tilted again out to the mouth of the Musi River and continued across the Sunda Strait to Sunda Kelapa. The *Gunung Mandar* made its final voyage in 1972, when it encountered an accident in the Strait of Bangka and sank. However, the crew survived. After the incident, the *Pos Mandar* returned to Majene in 1973 with the crew of the *Gunung Mandar*.

Pua Abu sought to build his business with the *Kota Mandar* boat. In 1979, the boat was equipped with an engine. However, his efforts encountered difficulties and in late 1987, the boat was sold to Chinese merchants in Makassar. Pua Abu died two years later in 1989. According to his grandson, Wildan (*pers. comm.*, 21st February 2016), the local people were not very motivated to become sailors. The end of Pua Abu's journey also marked the decline of Majene's sailing boats in the 1980s.

In the 1960s, the second entrepreneur, Haji Sikir, traded copra between Majene and Parepare via land using an army vehicle cum copra-collecting vehicle in Tolitoli Central Sulawesi along with his colleague, Siddang. He transported his own copra to Surabaya, averaging about eight tonnes to 10 tonnes on every journey. The proceeds of the sale were used to purchase goods such as clothes, salt, sugar, cement and notebooks amounting to six crates to 10 crates and an average of 20 tonnes of rice for the people of Mandar and Tolitoli. The results of the copra trade in Tolitoli, he was able to buy two rice mills (12 PK and 19 PK each) in the Wonomulyo market for his business.

In the 1980s, Sikir moved the business to Makassar and established PT Fajar Mas. The company had several subsidiaries: PT Binamitra Fajar Mas (contractor and supplier), CV Fajar Mas Niaga (land transportation expedition), PT Fajar Mas Karyatama (general trading) and UD Fajar Mas (trading of agricultural products). Some of the profits were used to build the central market in Wonomulyo (Polmas), Griya Fajar Mas housing in Makassar City (1993), shopping malls and transport terminals in Bantaeng District (1996–2002), Mall Bone Trade Centre in Bone District (2005) and shopping centres in West Sulawesi. In addition to the economic sector, he also built educational institutions such as Al-Ikhlas Islamic Boarding School in Polman and Bina Bangsa High School and forayed into the health field in Majene District (Rais 2008, 297–301).

The contexts that facilitated the success of the two entrepreneurs described those evidenced initial similarities but were dissimilar in their ultimate development. Both entrepreneurs began in a chaotic business environment. Both started as copra traders. Pua Abu opened the path to Tawau, while Sikir pioneered trade to Parepare and Surabaya. Pua Abu returned to Majene carrying some gold and built four new trading boats; Haji Sikir went home to buy goods for the people in Mandar and Tolitoli. Pua Abu's business subsequently collapsed because of three factors: (1) the motorisation of sailboats, (2) the 1972 *Gunung Mandar* boat crash and (3) the low interest of locals in taking on sailing as a profession. As Pua Abu's business decreased, Haji Sikir's enterprise increased its successes because of two breakthroughs: (1) the transfer of the business headquarters from Majene to Makassar city and (2) the diversification of business sectors. The disparities in the outcomes of the two business enterprises may be credited to their capabilities (or lack of ability) of transformation and to their actor factor. In terms of the actor element, Pua Abu died in 1989, while Haji Sikir is still alive to organise and develop his business.

Monopoly and Violence of Battalion 710

The efforts of the local people to search for ports outside of Majene suggests that shipping and trading arrangements did not benefit the indigenous population of the area. On the contrary, the arrangement was beneficial to the army and especially to Battalion 710 which was led by Andi Selle Mattola. For 10 years (1954–1964), Andi Selle was in power throughout Mandar as well as Pinrang. The last area under de jure rule was known as the Andi Sose region, but it was, in fact, controlled by Andi Selle (Gonggong 1992, 34; 173). Pinrang is the rice producer for Majene, while Mandar is the main producer of copra on the west coast of Sulawesi. Rice is also produced in Polewali. Battalion 710 controlled the trade of rice and copra (PS Archives, No. 474).

The protection of the territory was placed in charge of the official troops of Battalion 710; however, the unofficial troops known as the TBO also simultaneously undertook security operations. The TBO troops numbered more than the soldiers of Battalion 710. They comprised more than 10,000 people who were financed by the copra trade with Tawau, were equipped and were fully armed (Gonggong 1992, 180; Soetanto 2009, 138). The people of Mandar regarded both the army battalion and the TBO to be the same and were called “Troop 710” or “710”. They were scattered in the region of Mandar and Pinrang.

The 710 monopolised the copra trade. Copra was purchased from farmers in two ways:

1. The copra was purchased at the production site. This type of copra was bought at prices that were 50% lower than the market price, taking into consideration that the other 50% comprised the cost of transportation.
2. The copra was purchased from the traditional market. IDR5 per picol were deduced from the general price (PS Archives, No. 474; Asba 2007, 226–227).

Traders were prohibited from buying copra from farmers, except with the permission of Battalion 710. Farmers could also not sell their products to parties other than the traders licensed by 710 (Limbugau 2000, 329–330). The people who climbed trees and processed coconuts without permission from 710 were subjected to harsh punishments (Sewang 2017, 37). Local inhabitants were prohibited from making coconut oil and those who were found guilty of violating this rule were punished and their equipment was destroyed. They were also subjected to a certain tax for entering and leaving the city (Soetanto 2009, 137–138; Saharang, *pers. comm.*, 27th May 2018).

To manage the copra trade, Andi Selle formed a company called PT Pembangunan, which was managed by his own family. The company actively collected and traded copra and its stores for copra in each area of cultivation were never empty. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was easy for the company to earn large profits through the barter system. The business of 710 continued to increase to receive copra from the population and also to manage the former Dutch-owned plantations in the area. Since Andi Selle was the head of security in the Mandar area, the trading and smuggling of copra to Singapore and Tawau did not face any obstacles (Limbugau 2000, 335–336).

As a result of its economic enterprise, the 710 developed into the strongest and wealthiest battalion within Kodam XIV Hasanuddin (Gonggong 1992, 172). After being instituted as the Commander of Korem IV Mappesonae at Lappa Polewali Square on 29th July 1959, Andi Selle commemorated eight years of the creation of Battalion 710 with celebrations over the period of a week (1st to 7th August). The festivities were enlivened by a soccer competition, a volleyball tournament, badminton games and a table tennis tourney. The daily newspaper *Duta Pantjasila* (1959) covered the event with the headline “Tjoretan Hari Ulang Tahun Bn. 710”. During his vacations, Andi Selle invited Kodam officers and provincial officials to play tennis and offered interesting prizes. If Andi Selle’s team won, the losing team would receive a bigger award than the winner (Limbugau 2000, 330). The people of Mandar called the 710 the *batalyon dollar* (dollar battalion) (Asba 2007, 228) and the TBOs were mocked as *tentara banyak ongkos*, or the “soldiers of fortune” (Sewang 2017, 37).

Behind the veils of the 710’s power and wealth, Mandar’s population suffered heavily because of the business monopoly and the violence perpetrated by the TBO members. According to Jaarung Pua Anwar (*pers. comm.*, 2nd June 2018), “The problem was not the 710, but his men (TBO). During ‘actions’, they were known to use the expression: ‘your stuff, my stuff; my stuff is not yours’”. “Unable to bear the activities of the TBO”, a Mandar fisherman, Muhammad Saleh (*pers. comm.*, 2nd June 2018) “left their village (Luaor-Pambauwang) for Ujung Lero (Parepare) and then moved to Masalima”. The luxurious houses were dismantled and the timber from them was taken to Pinrang. The people used Bugis language, to be considered as Bugis, hoping to evade the TBO’s violence. There were also many cases where Mandar women were forced to marry TBO men (Hasisah, *pers. comm.*, 23rd July 2017).

Set against the suffering of the population, some Mandar figures, including M. Riri Amin Daud, Andi Depu, Baharuddin Lopa, S. Mengga, Amir and Andi Mappatunru formed the Front Pembebasan Rakyat Tertindas Mandar or Mandar Persecuted Free People Liberation Front, based in Makassar. The local inhabitants received support primarily from Mahmud Saal, artillery leaders in Makassar and Battalion S. Mengga in Parepare. Two guerrilla leaders, Muhammad Tahir Rachmat and Muhammad Saleh Bakti, also joined this movement. To expel the troops of Battalion 710 and the guerrillas, the activities of the members of this front entailed sabotage and murder (Rahman 1988, 329–330).

From 5th April 1964, Andi Selle and his troops were officially labelled as rebels and the government crushed them through military force. On 10th and 11th April, the national army occupied the two centres of activities of the 710, Polewali and

Majene. In September, Andi Selle was found dead from heart disease in Bunging Pinrang Village (Gonggong 1992, 173; Soetanto 2009, 134–148). The security conditions at Mandar gradually became better. Andi Selle's men were disabled and, one by one, they surrendered to the government.

Port Town Dynamics

Three factors influence the dynamics of a port city: the transport network, the flow of commodities from the hinterland to the city and across (foreland) or vice versa and regional security and population. The first factor, the transport network, determines the ways in which commodities arrive in the city. During the rule of the Dutch East Indies, beside the sailboats, merchant ships (*KPM*) arrived each week in the harbour city, especially the west season, carrying necessities from across the ocean for residents. The inhabitants of the city and its interiors brought forest, agricultural and plantation products loaded on horses and horse-driven carts into town for sale or for barter against these items. However, between the 1950s and the 1960s, because of the conflicts between the soldiers and the guerrillas and the resulting poor security climate of the area, this network was disturbed. As has been mentioned before, government ships used the Majene Port, while sailboats for the benefit of guerrillas and local residents used the ports outside the city.

Due to the polarisation of territories and populations between the army-controlled city and the inland towns ruled by guerrillas, the flow of commodities from the hinterland to the city was hampered. The militants alienated the rural population from the city by forcing people to move inland and by forbidding the transport of agricultural produce for sale in cities, except to ports and markets controlled by the insurgents outside the cities of Pambauwang and Cenrana. Urban residents were prohibited from taking products to the interiors and if caught they would be punished by the guerrillas.

While the inhabitants of the city were dependent on goods from outside the city, the ship that transported the cargo did not arrive regularly every month. Sometimes, it would take two to three months for the ship to arrive at the Majene Port. Consequently, food items, especially rice, were often late and inadequate in quantity. The price was not fixed and tended to be expensive. In 1952, the price of rice averaged IDR1.70 per litre. The cost rose to span IDR2.75 to IDR3.00 in 1956 and ranged between IDR8.50 and IDR12.00 per litre in 1961. In 1962, the price rose to IDR20.00 to IDR22.00 per litre. In early 1964, the price of rice peaked at IDR180, then fell again in the second half of the year to IDR75.00 per litre. In addition to the expensive rates, the stocks of rice in the city were depleted. March to June 1963 rice rations for employees were received in July, while the November

allocation was received in January 1964. Even 710 soldiers did not get rice rations in the early part of that year (PPS Archives, No. 233; Sulselra Archives, No. 91).

The increase in the price of rice affected other basic commodities such as sugar, which went up from IDR180 per litre in January to IDR210 by the end of February 1964; the price of maize rose from IDR40 to IDR60 per litre during the same time. Kerosene registered an increase of one hundred percent in early March from the previous month's rate of IDR50 per litre because the city of Majene run out of stock. The allocation of 65 drums of kerosene per month from PT Shell Makassar was not enough for the city's growing needs since the fuel was used both for cooking (oil stove) and for the electric lights (Sulselra Archives, No. 91).

The third factor of a troubled security situation affected all aspects of life in the port city: the transport network, the flow of commodities and the lives of the population. Majene City became a centre for migrants from both the coastal and inland regions. These groups of citizens moved to the city because they did not want to join the guerrillas or because of the security operations carried out by the army. Two patterns of refugee migration and displacement were observed: some moved to the city but returned to their place of origin after the security situation returned to normal; others moved to the city and then found a way out of Majene City to survive. The inland population of farmers adopted the first pattern, while seafarers and traders in coastal areas adopted the second pattern.

Baharuddin Lolo's experience evidences the second pattern (*pers. comm.*, 6th May 2016). After his village, Bababulo, burned in early 1957, he and his family moved to Majene City and subsequently to Karasian Island in South Kalimantan. After the situation normalised, the family returned to Bababulo Village again in 1964. A small portion only of the people who migrated returned to Mandar. Therefore, to find the indigenous population of Bababulo Village, you have to go to Karasian Island, said Saadong (78 years old) (*pers. comm.*, 7th May 2016).

The displacement of the population caused the growth rate between the city and its environs to become unbalanced. Growth was concentrated in the city centre, especially in the districts of Banggae and Pangaliali. In the 1930 census, the total population of these districts were 10,384 and 6,357 people respectively. This number increased to 12,072 and 9,360 people in the 1961 population census. In contrast, there was a reduction in the population outside the city, especially in Pambauwang. The population of Bonde, the parent village of Bababulo and Luaor, reduced from 9,615 inhabitants counted in the 1930 census to 6,608 (census 1961). In three decades, Majene's population decreased from 68,015 to 43,996 (Volkstelling 1936, 131; Biro Pusat Statistik 1980, 96–97).

Security disorders and displacement exerted a further impact on four aspects of life: consumption patterns, monetary liquidity, health and wellbeing and social activities. Consumption materials, especially essentials such as rice, sugar and wheat were often not available in markets and shops. Stocks of these commodities were imported by ship from Makassar port. The problem would be temporarily overcome when there was a sailboat coming in with essential supplies from Surabaya. Boat routes from and to Makassar, especially the waters between Majene and Parepare, were troubled by armed pirates who used boats and *sandeq* (PPS Archives, No. 233; Jaarung Pua Anwar, *pers. comm.*, 2nd June 2018) to loot supplies meant for the city.

In terms of health, there were smallpox cases in Tanjung Batu, Tjilallang and Saleppa in 1956 and two smallpox patients died in August. To thwart the transmission of the disease, the government implemented the system of issuing road passes only to residents who were immunised against smallpox. Many residents came voluntarily to health workers before they became infected. However, medical supplies from Makassar were often delayed because of the arrival of non-routine ships to the Majene Port (PPS Archives, No. 233). The pale faces and thin bodies of refugees suffering from diseases such as dysentery, malaria and beriberi told a heartrending story of the state of health in the port city of Majene (*Marhaen* 1959b; 1959c).

Regarding monetary liquidity, the monthly report of the Head of the Mandar Region, Mattotorang Daeng Masikki, records that from mid-1953 to 1957 the stock of small currency of less than IDR10 was depleted in the city. The paucity of small change made it difficult for people to buy their daily necessities. Until March 1957, only IDR50 to IDR100 of currency sent from Makassar was circulating in the city. Investigations demonstrate that most currency notes of less than IDR10 were paid to sellers from the interiors in return for bananas, coconut oil, firewood, etc. Once the farmers stopped (or were stopped from) coming to the city to sell their produce, the small currency was stuck in the interior (guerrilla) areas, leading to the severe deficiency in the city.

The final impact concerns social issues. At the end of 1956, the number of refugees from Mandar regency reached 40,000 people. Refugees targeted Majene City, the Mandar regency capital and Polewali Town. Because of the limited amounts of aid and the fact that ships carrying the aid were often late in arriving at Majene harbour, the Social Services were unable to provide adequate social protection to the refugees. The peaks of migration were reached in early 1957, when coastal villages were burned by guerrillas. Out-of-towners were forced to move to cities or were pushed inland. Refugees who found it difficult to survive in the city due to the

population density or health and monetary problems then migrated outside Mandar to Parepare, Makassar, the islands of the Makassar Strait and South Kalimantan.

Conclusion

The magnitude of the economic potential of Majene harbour and its surrounding areas drove both the army and the guerrilla forces to compete for its control. Among other ways, the effort to control Majene was channelled on shipping and on the management of trade in the area. In turn, the regulations made and imposed by the army and the guerrilla forces provided opportunities for seafarers and traders to run profitable businesses in those times of turmoil (1950–1960s). Mandar sailors and traders developed new sailing and trade networks northward to the main port of Tawau, Malaysia, and conducted smuggling operations as a survival strategy. Two special entrepreneurs, Pua Abu and Haji Sikir, emerged during this time and later became agents of local prosperity. In addition to the activities of the indigenous population, the army and the rebel militia in this area were also involved in monopolising trade. The guerrillas who ruled the interiors imposed an economy blockade on the port city of Majene, which was controlled by the army. On the other hand, the army, especially Battalion 710, the unit responsible for maintaining the security of the territory, violated the people's trust to benefit from the lucrative copra trade. This condition creates difficulties for Majene people to obtain various basic needs as the government ships no longer come to the Majene Port every month. In the midst of the chaotic and structural constraints, history demonstrated the emergence of human agents who were able to master their circumstances and to rejuvenate the local economy. These human agents later become successful entrepreneurs in the area. It is hoped that this study of the local history of a port city caught in an era of disruption will help students and scholars understand the path Indonesia must take to attain political and economic ascendance as a nation-state. This study also shows that port dynamics are influenced by both land (*tanah*) and sea (*air*) conditions. This study confirms the importance of the *Tanah-Air* concept in the study of maritime history.

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