

ISLAM AND THE END OF HISTORY*

Ali A. Mazrui

The author takes issue with Fukuyama's thesis on the "end of history" as the triumph of the liberal, democratic capitalist system. This thesis fails to appreciate that other civilizations which are non-Western may provide alternative paradigms for history's evolution. Such could be the role of Islam, for example. Muslims have considered themselves to be participants in the making of history. It is also true that they have been objects and shapers of history but more importantly, as makers of history, they could at this present phase contribute by democratising Islam as well as Islamizing democracy. The "end of history" has to be a marriage of more than one civilisation and more than one standard of values.

Pengarang mempersoalkan tesis Fukuyama tentang "Penyudahan Sejarah" sebagai kemenangan sistem kapitalis liberal dan demokratik. Tesis ini gagal menghargai kemungkinan tamadun bukan Barat menjelma sebagai satu paradigma alternatif kepada evolusi sejarah. Islam misalnya boleh memainkan peranan tersebut. Malah orang-orang Islam telah menganggap diri mereka sebagai peserta dalam pembentukan sejarah. Sememangnya mereka telah menjadi objek dan pembentuk sejarah tetapi lebih penting lagi, sebagai pencipta sejarah masa kini mereka boleh menyumbang dengan mendemokrasikan Islam dan pada masa yang sama mengIslamkan demokrasi "Penyudahan Sejarah" semestinya menggabungkan lebih daripada satu tamadun dan berbagai ukuran nilai.

INTRODUCTION

The debate about the end of history raises issues which touch upon the philosophy of history insofar as they relate not only to the significance of a particular century but to the entirety of the human species. Francis Fukuyama provoked this debate in his seminal article entitled, "The End of History?" in the journal, *The National Interest*.¹

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At the end of the 20th century, Fukuyama saw "an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism."² His central argument was that the whole world was moving toward a liberal democratic capitalist system which was destined to be the final socio-political paradigm of all human evolution. As Fukuyama put it:

What we may be witnessing is just not the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.³

For Fukuyama, at the time of writing the original article (in 1989), the momentous changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union – which were only just unraveling – were part of that historical evolution towards democratic capitalism which he argued all societies would experience sooner or later. Fukuyama has expanded his thoughts into a whole book.⁴

FUKUYAMA'S THESIS AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

For our purposes, we may ask, how does this thesis relate to the Muslim world? Is our Muslim society also evolving towards a system of liberal capitalist democracy? Or will Islam provide an alternative concluding paradigm to human history? Muslims in fact believe not so much in the end of history as in the end of religious history.

Islam considers itself to be both the inheritor and the continuation of the Abrahamic tradition in history. It is stated in the Qur'an:

He has made plain to you of the religion that He enjoined upon Nuh and that which We have revealed unto you, and that which We enjoined upon Ibrahim and Musa and Isa, that keep to obedience and be not divided therein...(42: 13)⁵

Muslims see the Prophet Muhammad as the last of the prophets. Muslims claim that both the Jews and the early Christians had prophesied the coming of Muhammad and his Qur'an. With regards to the Jews, the Qur'an asserts:

Say: Have you considered if it is from Allah, and you disbelieve in it, and a witness from among the children of Israel has borne witness of one like it, so he believed, while you are big with pride; surely Allah does not guide the unjust people. (46: 10)

With respect to the Christians, Muslims believe that Jesus had already informed his followers about the coming of the last prophet. The Qur'an asserts:

And Remember, Jesus, the son of Mary, said: O children of Israel! Surely I am the apostle of Allah to you, verifying that which is before me of the Taurat and giving the good news of an Apostle who will come after me, his name being Ahmad; but when he came to them with clear arguments they said: This is clear magic. (61:6)

One may ask: to what extent, has history vindicated these Muslim beliefs?

History has so far proven Muhammad to be the last of the grand founders of grand religions. Islam is the youngest of the grand global sacred faiths. And it is arguable that since Islam was born more than fourteen centuries ago, no religion has become numerous enough to be the national religion of even a single country in the twentieth century. Is Islam then the concluding chapter of religious history in the world? The Qur'an explicitly states that Muhammad is the Last of the Prophets.

Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but he is the Apostle of Allah and the Last of the prophets (Qur'an 33:40).

Does the expression "the Last of the Prophets," mean that He is in fact declaring the end of religious history since this is the final conclusion of that particular phase of human experience? Are Muslim societies therefore vindicated by fourteen centuries in which no other prophet has repeated the grand religious construction?

But with regard to the secular side of the end of history, are Muslim societies nevertheless moving towards liberal democratic capitalism? In the last years of the twentieth century, the world of Islam is larger in population - and growing faster - than the world of liberal democracy. As John Weeks has pointed out in a demographic study of Islamic Nations:

At current rates of growth, the 1988 estimated population of some 980 million Moslems could nearly double to 1.9 billion before the year 2020, accounting then for 23 percent of the world's total.⁶

While Islamic countries have a crude birth rate of 42.1 per 1000 population, developed countries have a crude birth rate of 13.1; while Islamic countries have an average rate of natural increase of 2.8 percent, that of developed

countries is only 0.3 percent; and the average Total Fertility Rate of Islamic nations is 6 percent, while that of developed countries is only 1.3 percent.⁷

On the other hand, the world of capitalism encompasses both liberal democracies and most Muslim societies. It is also worth remembering that while the Arab world is indeed the vanguard of Islamic civilization, it is not necessarily the vanguard of Islamic democracy. On the gender question, for example, Pakistan and Bangladesh have taken the lead in empowering Muslim women to the highest political offices in the land.⁸

Let us not forget the Arabia of Muhammad's time and what in fact the Prophet himself felt about women and women's' rights. Who was Muhammad's first wife? What was the relationship between them? To what extent was he "liberated" in contemporary terms? Let us remind ourselves of the fact that Muhammad's first wife was not only "a working woman" but she was also her husband's employer. Muhammad happily worked for a woman, sought her advice, and she was the first person to whom he brought his doubts about the Calling he had in the cave. Contemporary Saudi Arabia, under the Wahhabi tradition is very different from Muhammad's vision.

Saudi Arabia, as the custodian of Mecca and Medina, does not even permit women to be licensed to drive a car. A storm of controversy broke out when some Saudi women attempted to protest this rule during the build-up of American and allied forces during the Gulf War.⁹

Southeast Asian Islam may take the lead in accommodating cultural pluralism in the modern world. Despite tensions and occasional clashes between the Chinese, Indians and indigenous peoples in these states, or between Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and Christians, most people in Southeast Asia seem to be more interested in economic progress than cultural hegemony. As Wang puts it:

ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] has thus far been successful in projecting an image of growth, security and confidence. Its existence provides a comparative perspective on ethnic and other rights. Its experience with its members' social, cultural, and political issues has heightened its sensitivity as a group to wider common issues.¹⁰

It is conceivable that Southeast Asia will follow South Asian Islam on the gender question; politicizing women faster than Middle Eastern Islam and sharing power with women sooner than Middle Eastern Islam has been doing. At least, in these countries, there is more of a tendency to accept the

participation of women in various political activities than in Middle Eastern countries.¹¹

On the whole Arab Islam is by definition less multi-cultural than non-Arab Islam. After all, the Arab world fuses the Arabic language with the Islamic religion in day-to-day life. At one level this is a rich religious experience. But at another level, this is a less rich cultural experience than that of Muslims who pray in Arabic and recite poetry in another language, like Muslims in South-East Asia, whose varied cultural streams flow into the river of South-East Asian Islam. Of course, this is just part of the "long historical tradition in Southeast Asia of accommodating - and by degrees integrating - Islamic belief with local customs."¹² Muslims who are not Arabs are at the very least bi-cultural.

Islam in the 20th century has posed the greatest cultural resistance to western imperialism but not necessarily to Western liberal democracy. Islam in this century has posed resistance to western secularism but not necessarily to western capitalism. Do these tensions amount to a distinct role that Islam plays in relation to precisely this idea of the liberal democratic system as the concluding chapter in human history?

A large number of recent Muslim theologians have asked for liberalization and reformation in Islam. We should not forget that Islam's communitarianism and political agenda are concomitant with the fact that rather than having a static theology, it contains many mechanisms for reform, innovation and adaptation. Modern theological movements reflect this aspect of Islam. These include confrontation of Islam with Western colonial might; modern eschatology; and basic challenges to the core of the religious law expressed in changes in family structure, dress codes, and anti-monotheistic literature and movements.

A sample of modern thinkers, who were active in the 19th and 20 centuries would include: Jamal al-Din As'adabadi [known as Al-Afghani in the West]; Muhammad Abdu; and Muhammad Iqbal. These theorists were Muslims with European education, who had intimate knowledge of the Western world with its science, technology, as well as its social problems. Their attitudes outline a politico-theological challenge to the West on the basis of Islamic rationalism.¹³

As'adabadi's theology is intertwined with his political response to the forceful power of European Christian civilization. He recommends on theological grounds a pan-Islamic movement which revives the Caliphates and establishes Islamic force as a world power. As a political realist, this grand vision is transferred to a call for an Islamic nationalism which stands free of Western

economic domination. To support this plan, he appeals for: first, immediate political and economic independence; second, a recognition that the ultimate superiority of Islam over other religions, as Mu'tazila asserts, lies in its rationality; third, the practical result of a religious life includes not only the spiritual dimension of man and the special status of religious community, but also special inner qualities necessary for achieving peaceful bliss. The latter include modesty, honesty and truthfulness which frees man from the consequences of hedonism and materialism. As'adabadi like many modern reformers was a major organizer of a group of reform movements such as Egypt's Salafiyya and the Muslim Brotherhood. One of his protégés was Muhammad Abdu, a philosopher, a Professor at Al-Azhar University, a journalist, and a Mufti (Chief Judge) who proposed large-scale social programs for long-term social reform. He taught theology and wrote a number of works, including legal opinions, for example, permitting eating of animals slaughtered by Jews and Christians and legalizing loan on interest, as well as on reforms for women's rights. His theology focused on a close connection between reason and revelation. The latter, according to him, was intuitive knowledge given by God to the prophet for the education of the common man/woman and not necessarily to be reserved for exegesis by a few. Like the Mu'tazila, Abdu felt that the Qur'an was created in time, and theology is a rational science. Also, like As'adabadi, he invited Muslims to hold fast to the fundamentals of their religion while focusing on reform, and the innovation of practices open to reasoned reinterpretation and modernization.

Muhammad Iqbal (1878-1938) considers Islam as an intellectual, and moral phenomenon which places man as an innovative instrument of God to realize the infinite possibilities of the world. Iqbal held that the Islamic intellectual tradition transforms Greek models of abstract knowledge into empirical investigation of concrete facts, as illustrated by the Qur'an's attention to actual matters. Faith involved empirical knowledge of reality coupled with the vision of theory. Thus, the knowledge of how God reveals himself in the world is compatible with the idea of a transcendent God. Islam has always had a keen sense of historical consciousness and thus Muslims traditionally consider themselves to be participants in making of history.

WESTERN AND ISLAMIC HISTORY

In Western history, the intellectual and scientific changes paralleled the religious and economic changes. The changes exemplified by the former were, the Renaissance - creating individualism in the arts and its blossoming into a major movement in Europe; the Enlightenment - producing rationalism

European style, the cultivated skepticism and doubts; the Scientific-Technological Revolution – the first great scientists, the beginnings of sustained secularism, and then the scientific revolution beginning to take off. As one scholar said:

The vivid imagination of the Renaissance mind had revived the logic and induction and a biblical appreciation of humankind as observer and manipulator of creation while Reformed thought renewed hope in history and tamed nature for investigation. This was the combination that made modern science possible.¹⁴

Paralleling these developments, the Protestant Reformation in the religious domain in the 16th century began. It was inevitable with the opening of the mind and the world through the Renaissance and the Age of Discovery that there would be a questioning of Church authority and dogma.¹⁵

The economy was not immune to these changes in society. There were higher phases of economic behavior which started before the Protestant Reformation but entered more developed phases, resulting in a capitalist revolution. In examining this period, one issue has been much-debated; did the change in the religious domains result in major changes in economic behavior? A major sociological writer in the West who initiated the debate on the link between the Protestant reformation and the rise of capitalism was Max Weber in his famous book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.¹⁶ The argument was that Christianity before the Protestant Reformation distrusted making money, particularly through loans and interest.¹⁷ Making money was not morally respectable because of the strong biblical injunctions against riches and usury. For example in Mark 10: 25, Jesus said, "It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven."¹⁸ Poverty was prized by the faithful Christians.

Therefore, the tendency was to let Jews monopolize money-making. Since Jews were despised because of their perceived role in Jesus Christ's crucifixion, anti-Semitic Europe assigned the necessary evil of money-lending and other banking functions to the Jews.¹⁹ So the specializations that were taking place in Europe was because Christianity in pre-Reformation days distrusted certain forms of economic behavior and regarded them as religiously and morally less than respectable.

Then came the Protestant Reformation. It was pioneering in certain ways. First of all, it distrusted the Church and its authorities. This was a blow not against Christianity, but against the Church. And at that time the dominant church was the Roman Catholic Church. Second, it distrusted priestly

intercession, the representation of God by priests. People went to confess to a priest in order to be forgiven by God. Or they went to buy indulgences. One paid some money to the Church so that the church could allow one to drink more wine. So the church had reached a stage where it was doing all sorts of things on behalf of God, sometimes in exchange for bribes! Outraged by this, Martin Luther and John Calvin became the major movers of change, with Martin Luther hammering and nailing his 95 theses on a church door in Wittenburg in 1517, denouncing the abuses of Christianity and starting a movement which soon spread across northern Europe and subsequently penetrated much of the rest of the world through Protestant proselytization. Thus priestly intercession began to be challenged in the Protestant Reformation. An outraged Martin Luther, for example, said:

Popes and bishops are flinging about graces and indulgences. Here come religious men and flaunt their indulgence at every street corner, only to get money for food and clothes. Oh, those begging friars!²⁰

Third, this also began individualism in the new Western culture. It was felt that one could talk to God directly and that the Almighty could talk to you directly, and therefore, there was no need for priestly intermediaries. Since one did not need a priest to talk to God, there was religious individualism. And then from religious individualism, there was a transition to economic individualism. Fourthly, there are different forms of prayer. Work itself was considered a form of prayer. Work and prosperity can be signs that God is on your side.²¹ Prosperity is not disreputable. It can be a sign that God approves of one's actions. So it isn't the making of money that is sinful, it is how you spend it. And the Protestant Reformation veered towards a situation here that proclaimed, "make money but don't spend it - make lots of money, but spend very little." The result: accumulation on one side, reinvestment on the other, and the beginnings of massive accumulation of wealth because people who previously would not have entered the market place were now entering and they were interpreting it as a form of prayer. People who were God-fearing were at the same time eager to become rich and yet they were not spending their wealth in luxury. They were saving it, sometimes for reinvestment. Capitalism was about to take off. And capitalism took off.

The marriage of these two, the scientific revolution and the capitalist revolution, gave the West the Industrial Revolution. From the late 18th century onwards to the early part of the 19th century, the revolution burst upon the hitherto-placid world, with England leading the way for much of the period. Most spheres of life were transformed by the revolution.

And the argument was: look who is leading in the industrial revolution and the capitalist changes – it was the Protestant powers. On the other hand, the ones who were stagnating behind are the most Catholic of the Christian countries. So Portugal, Spain, and Ireland were stagnating behind the Protestant powers who were taking off in a big way. There was one big exception among Catholic countries that became a major actor in the game of capitalism and industry without being Protestant.²² This was France.

However, although France did not have a Protestant reformation, it had a functional alternative. It had the French Revolution.²³ In some ways, the Revolution was at least as anti-clerical as the Reformation and proceeded to change the nature of economic behavior in France as well as religious behavior there.²⁴ The industrial revolution and the capitalist revolution were responsible for the later revolutions; on the one side, there were liberal revolutions and on the other side you later had socialist revolutions. The most influential of the liberal revolutions were the one in the United States from 1776 onwards and the one in France from 1789 – the American and French Revolutions. The most spectacular of the socialist revolutions were of course the one in Russia of 1917 and the one in China of 1949. This view of Western history is not Fukuyama's, it is Mazrui's.

What Fukuyama was telling us is that socialist revolutions were doomed; this was the march of history. Ideologies attempted to achieve utopia for its followers, and socialism, which had exerted a powerful hold on the minds of millions for decades, was the last utopia. The last utopia is now crumbling. In the words of Fukuyama:

The passing of Marxism–Leninism first from China and then from the Soviet Union will mean its death as a living ideology of world historical significance....the fact that there is not a single large state in which it is a going concern undermines completely its pretensions to being in the vanguard of human history.²⁵

IS MARXISM DEAD?

Now, in our own lifetime, with the collapse of the socialist revolution – at least in Europe – I've raised the issue of whether the fate of Marxism is in fact still open.²⁶ What has collapsed seems to be Lenin's contribution to the package. Lenin was a Russian, and Marx a German. Lenin was primarily a 20th century figure. Marx was exclusively a 19th century figure. Lenin was a kind of Martin Luther, interpreting the Marxist gospel.²⁷ Just as there are different routes to Christianity; one doesn't have to be Lutheran to be

Christian, so there are different routes to Marxism; you don't have to be Leninist to be Marxist. The strange package of the 20th century is that Leninism became Marxism's false start. Because Russia was the first that took off and Lenin the Russian leader, almost everybody else who went Marxist, went Marxist-Leninist. This combination of Marxism-Leninism was regarded as indissoluble. The Leninist part of the package included, for instance, democratic centralism, the vanguard party, and the monopolistic communist party.²⁸ These concepts owed more to Lenin than to Marx.

There were three roles of Marxism in our history: first, as an ethic of distribution (how to distribute the wealth of the society and therefore reduce the inequalities of society) Second, as a methodology of analysis (a Marxist way of studying society, of interpreting society, of looking at society and drawing conclusions) and as an ideology of development, as an engine to increase productivity.

An evaluation of the first role of Marxism, as an ethic of distribution and the concern about economic disparities or inequalities, reveals that it has not been invalidated by the crisis that has taken place. The idea that we ought to minimize differences in the sharing of resources in society has not been invalidated one way or the other.²⁹ To treat the second role Marxism as a methodology of analysis, we may point out that though you and I may not be Marxist scholars, the history of the last three years has not invalidated class analysis or the study of imperialism. We may prefer to study societies differently - that is the privilege of each scholar - but Marxist methodology has not been rendered unintelligible or unintelligent.³⁰ Lastly, Marxism as an ideology of development has been discredited. It has not delivered the goods because Lenin constructed a particular form or strategy for development which failed to deliver in the countries in which it was attempted.³¹ And so it has more or less collapsed in many countries. The Marxist baby is being thrown out with the Leninist bath water.

It is conceivable that in the continent of Asia, Marxism stands a better chance, at least in the Peoples' Republic of China. It has not as yet been abandoned there. Despite Tiananmen, the PRC - particularly in the economic sphere - is becoming less and less Leninist. Democratic centralism is losing its centralism, and we may surely see the trend of increasing the "democratic" part of "democratic centralism."³²

If it happens that Marxism survives better in Asia than in Europe, the situation would be comparable to the fate of Christianity, a religion which failed in its original constituency. It failed among the Jews to whom it was first revealed and it failed in the Middle East as a geographical region. It prospered spectacularly in Europe - in exile. Europe then became the leading

Christian continent in the world. Christianity was spread by Europe to other lands.³³ Even under European hegemony it still did not prosper where it was born. And even when Europeans created Israel that was in part at the expense not only of Muslims but also of Christians. This is because the Europeans brought in Jews, while Christian Palestinians as well as Muslim Palestinians fled the area. An estimated 55,000 Christian refugees fled that part of Palestine which fell to the Zionists during the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49.³⁴ So the creation of Israel reduced the Christian presence in the Middle East even further because it displaced one particular sub-section of the residual Christian population of the Middle East. There was a steep decline in the numbers of Palestinian Christians in various areas of Palestine between 1931 and 1961. In New Jerusalem, the number of Christians fell from 11, 526 in 1931 to 1, 403 in 1961.³⁵

The question is, is Marxism moving in a similar direction? Is it a situation where it will prosper in exile and be marginal in Europe where it was born? In its cradle, in Europe, it may become peripheral but in the largest and most populous of all continents, Asia, it may find pockets of strength. At the moment the biggest pocket of all is the People's Republic of China. It is a question mark. Is the end of history really at hand or is it just the end of Leninism which is at hand? It is a question which only history will reveal more fully in the future.

ISLAM IN WORLD HISTORY

Is there an Islamic equivalent to this kind of history described above? What form does it take? Let us raise at the outset the most controversial aspect. Is it possible to argue that the Prophet Muhammad saw (some seven centuries or so before Martin Luther and John Calvin) that Christianity of his day needed a reformation?

The Qur'an asserts that the people of the book have altered their original text:

O you who believe! believe in Allah and His Apostle and the Book which He has revealed to His Apostle and the Book which He revealed before; and whoever disbelieves in Allah and His Angels and His Apostles and the last day, he indeed strays off into a remote error. (4:136).

This is true even though the Christians are nearest in friendship to Muslims. As the Quran puts it:

And you will certainly find the nearest in friendship to those who believe (to be) those who say: We are Christians; this is

because there are priests and monks among them and because they do not behave proudly. (5:82).

One of the major mistakes of Christians was their conviction that because Jesus was born of a virgin, he was therefore a son of God.

And The Jews say: 'Uzair is the son of Allah; and the Christians say: The Messiah is the Son of Allah; these are the words of their mouths; they imitate the saying of those who disbelieved before; may Allah destroy them; how they are turned away..... (Qur'an 9:30)

Thus Muhammad asserts that the Christians had distorted the real message of God. In the same manner, John Calvin and Martin Luther seven centuries later, said the message of Jesus had been distorted by some of its followers. For the Muslims, God is absolute and does not have a family. Specifically the celebrated passage of the Sura of "Purity" (112:1-4) asserts:

Say: He, Allah is One. Allah is He on Whom all depend. He begets not, nor is He begotten. And none is like Him.

But John Calvin and Martin Luther would not have accepted that, but they did restrict the sharing of divinity. They agreed Mary was special but not so special that you pray to God through the mother of Jesus. The Protestants place less emphasis on the significance of Mary than do the Roman Catholics. For instance, Martin Luther warned against giving Mary divine status or venerating her more than Jesus Christ.³⁶ Similarly, Martin Luther and John Calvin said that one does not have to pray to God through priests; one can have direct communications with the Almighty. They were saying these things in the 16th century AD; several centuries earlier it had been said by the Prophet Mohammad. Here is a situation where Islam said the body of Christianity, or what others call Christianity, is properly the religion of God and that the priests have taken over as pretenders to Godly authority.

Was Islam the first Protestant Revolution? That is the question. It had accepted the message of what others call Christianity, asserted it had been distorted and proceeded to attempt to purify it without necessarily undermining Jesus as a major figure in spiritual worth. And then, is there an effect that leads on to a form of mercantilism in trade after Muslims expanded? This is really nascent capitalist revolution trying to take form. That is one stage.

Is there a similar stage of an Islamic renaissance in the arts and sciences? If this is what we mean by major changes which took place in periods of Islamic history, extending approximately the then nascent scientific revolution

depends on one's perspective. If one is too Arabocentric in interpretation of the Islamic enlightenment, you will reduce the period of Islamic enlightenment to a brief period. If one extends the period well into the Ottoman empire, one can carry the period right into the 17th century. The Islamic enlargement borrowed from other civilizations, and then improved upon it. If we say, "1,2,3" we know the English language calls them Arabic numerals and that is part of the Islamic response from the stimulus of other civilizations, it passes on that stimulus, after improvement to future centuries and civilizations. In this case the stimulus was from India, and the Muslims passed it on to other civilizations after improving upon it.³⁷

The wisdom of the Greeks was originally transmitted to western Europe through such Muslim scholars as the Muslim Iranian philosopher Ibn Sina (a.k. a. Avicenna) and the Muslim Spanish thinker, Ibn Rushd.³⁸ Ibn Sina's philosophical system was embedded in Christian Catholicism in many ways. For example, St. Thomas Aquinas, perhaps the greatest scholarly theologian, quotes ibn Sina's work over 500 times and formulates his own key doctrines, such as the difference between "essence" and "existence" based on the analysis of the Muslim philosopher. In the same manner, ibn Rushd's commentaries on Aristotle were handbooks of philosophers for the greatest Christian thinkers such as Albert the Great and his celebrated student St. Aquinas. These commentaries have been translated into Latin and English and are still useful in deciphering the works of the Greek philosopher.³⁹

The wisdom of the Greeks later became part of the Western self-conception and the origins and cradle of its own rationalism.⁴⁰ The English word "alphabet" may not have come directly from the Greek word "alphabita" but from the Arabic "alif bete." Although western European languages have shown other influences from Arabic, Spanish has been particularly affected by Arabic, partly through the impact of Muslims in Spain for about 8 centuries.⁴¹ And the architectural wonders of Muslim civilization extends from the Alhambra in Spain and to the Taj Mahal in India. As I indicated, nor must we forget, the West's own Renaissance may be due to the Islamic renaissance in the first place. Here I quote one Western scholar, Eugene A. Myers.

...from the late ninth century until the twelfth, Islamic influence on Western science and culture was very great.⁴²

And again, in conclusion, he states:

The cultural importance of the work of Islamic scholars and translators for the development of science and humanities can hardly be overestimated...Thus, the roots of Western

thought are a mixture of Greco-Arabic and Hebrew thought.⁴³

It is a paradoxical development that the doors of Hellenism which later inspired the western European renaissance came largely by way of the Islamic world particularly through Spain. So on the whole, therefore, all this has some equivalent in Muslim history, but in a nascent stage.

What happened afterwards? The figure begins to change with a decline. So the Dark Ages for the West came before the Renaissance while for Muslims it came after the Renaissance. And then Muslims became objects of history. Not subjects of history, not actors, but the acted-upon. Depending on whether one is too Arabocentric or not, one can choose the period – past the Moghuls, past the Ottoman empire – as to when the decline really became sufficiently decisive.

In this century I would say the first half of this century was still part of the decline. This was part of the period of Muslims as objects of history. Much of the Muslim world was colonized. The Ottoman empire disintegrated after World War I. The different pieces were occupied by European powers; they became colonies or protectorates.⁴⁴ Those parts of the Muslim world which were not colonized were neo-colonized. Countries like Iran (or Persia) and Afghanistan did not have much independence in this period.

In the second half of the 20th century, Muslims emerged as shapers of history. In this phase, Muslims affected world history, not by design, but by attempting to change more localized history and then generating consequences abroad. So the unintended consequences became globally transformative. One major example was the war of independence in Algeria from 1954–1962.⁴⁵

One might think of the war in Algeria in Eurocentric terms. France regarded it as part of France, but the Algerians insisted. This is a colony.” They fought for their independence. Then a good Frenchman called General Charles DeGaulle came to power, recognized realities and gave independence to Algeria in 1962. That is the wrong way of interpreting Algerian history. The correct way of interpreting Algerian history is to say Algerians are North Africans who took up arms to fight for their freedom. Their aim was to only fight for their liberty and human rights.⁴⁶ They didn’t know they were changing the history of the world.

How did they change the history of the world in only four years (1954–58)? They imposed so much stress on the constitutional order of France – more stress than the Vietnam war later imposed on the constitutional order of the United States. The French hovered over a civil war.⁴⁷ I was in England as a

student at that time. I remember very distinctly, we were watching it across the Channel, wondering what was going to happen. The *Manchester Guardian*, for the first time in its history, carried an editorial in French, appealing to the people of France to desist from this reckless plunge towards armed civil convulsion. If the French soldiers, frustrated and demoralized in Algeria had flown to Paris to take over government, the Left in France would have poured into the streets with arms to fight them.⁴⁸

It was a close shave. There was only one person who could save France; that was General Charles DeGaulle. The old constitutional order collapsed because General DeGaulle would not rule France under it. He insisted on the Fifth Republic; a whole new constitution had to be written.⁴⁹ When it came into force, it made France politically more stable. It enabled France to pull out of the military side of NATO and less submissive to the United States for quite a while. It pushed France's nuclear program and accelerated France's decolonization policy in the rest of the world; especially in the rest of Africa.⁵⁰ And by 1962, Algeria itself became independent.

The history of France was changed because Muslims were fighting for their independence in Algeria, in North Africa. The history of Europe was changed because the history of France was changed. The history of the world was changed because the history of Europe was changed. So this is a situation of shapers of history; shaping of history when you are trying to change local history.

In relation to Fukuyama's thesis – the “end of history” as the collapse of Communism – almost no Western analysts talk about Afghanistan. Nobody discusses the end of Communism in relation to the collapse of the imperial will of the Soviet Union when defeated in Afghanistan. Almost nobody does it in the West. Here was a country, the Soviet Union, which was hegemonic and powerful. Any time it had trouble in its empire it sent the tanks in response and crushed the trouble. It did this in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. It could not do it in Afghanistan from 1979 onwards because, unlike the architects of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, unlike the Hungarians in 1956, the Mujahiddin would not let the invaders lie in peace. They fought and fought and fought. Even now that the invaders have left, they are still fighting. Of course, sooner or later we have to remind them the invader is gone. But at least in the heroic phase of the struggle, they took on the Superpower aided by the fervor of Islam, just as earlier Islam had proved to be a potent force in fighting the imperialist powers.⁵¹ And the Soviet imperial will undergoes a fatal damage. Nobody discusses this in the West; that after Afghanistan, the Soviet Union could no longer send tanks into another Hungary, into another Poland, into another

Czechoslovakia. After being defeated by Muslims it could no longer play that old game again.

Nobody regards this as relevant, because they do not think of the Muslim world as a causal factor in history. They still think of us as objects of history, objects being manipulated by historical forces. And yet Afghanistan is a tremendous case of a movement of Muslims pursuing local goals and yet, in the process, transforming global history. Many of the Mujahidin know very little about *perestroika* and East/West relations. They just knew: we are Muslims, we love our freedom, we love our religion and this invader is not going to sleep in peace in my land; I am going to throw him out. So that was Muslims creating change by destroying the old Eastern bloc. Afghanistan's role was reinforced by Iran's role in creating conditions in which the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in the first place, since it was scared of another Islamic revolution.⁵² All these are causal factors with major Muslim actors which were inadequately attended to in the explanation of shapers of modern history at work.

Coming to the role of Muslims in South/South and North/South relations - they have played a major role in challenging Western control over Muslim resources. We also know about the role played by Nassar in challenging western control over Muslim resources. There is an impact of Muslims on South/South relations - aid to each other and employment, as for example in the case of the oil-rich Muslim countries.⁵³ There is an impact of Muslims on North/South relations, as for example in the case of negotiations with the North on key international and economic issues.⁵⁴ Muslims have strengthened Southern power to some extent. And Muslims have succeeded in destroying Eastern power. What is not clear is, what we are going to do with the West which unfortunately is still too strong for the Muslims. Is there a way out?

This brings us to Muslims as makers of history. As shapers of history in my sense, Muslims shape global history but unintentionally, with unintended consequences. Makers of history on the other hand do it intentionally, for that exact purpose. I think it is important that we confront the issue of Fukuyama's democracy and capitalism and where it is leading Muslims. On the whole I am much more enthusiastic about democracy than about capitalism. Unfortunately, capitalism may be the necessary manure for democracy. Historically, there has been no pluralistic democracy in the world that has succeeded without a minimum of capitalism. It doesn't exist. The question is, is this accidental or is it causal? Is it impossible to have competitive, pluralistic, open society without at the same time having some degree of capitalism? Is capitalism the necessary cow dung for the plant of

democracy? Do we have to put up with it? There is considerable debate among scholars on the subject.⁵⁵ It is conceivable that we do have to accept the combination of capitalism with democracy. Can we then do two things, (1) democratize Islam or redemocratize it and (2) Islamize democracy?

On democratizing Islam, do we make it more a part of the forces at work in our lives which combine accountability to God with accountability to the people? That's one question we have to ask ourselves in making future Islamic history – how to combine in our governments accountability to God with accountability to the people? Secondly, how to localize the concept of the Ummah and make it an electoral constituency rather than a diffuse one billion people in different states of the world. There are one billion Muslims around the world.⁵⁶ If you think of the Ummah as the 1 billion people round the world as a single constituency that is very often unrealistic. Can there be smaller constituencies?

Also, relating to the question of gender, how do we make Muslim women full participants? Gender could be the interrupted revolution in the original history of Islam. Islam was revealed among a people, the Arabs, who were still steeped in female infanticide. Therefore it was sexism at its worst. Allah (God) chose to reveal the religion first of all among people with that defect. Do I have enough or too many daughters? In that case let's have a pillow ready for the next one. Now that is obviously horrendous in historical terms and yet within a single generation this society began to have property-owning female citizens.⁵⁷ The society was on its way towards change. The question is, did Allah intend the changes to be incremental. You are dealing with raw human material. In the first generation you may not be able to transform all you want. Were there seeds of change like for example in polygamy? When we were told, a man may marry more than one woman provided he treats them equally, was that a seed of change – provided you treat them equally? You realize you can't do that because it is impossible to treat two human beings equally. You will find one more amusing than another, one more irritating, more restful or more attractive. One may galvanize you more, depress you more, titillate you more. Obviously it is impossible to treat two human beings equally.

My father had more than one wife. One of the widows of my father is in fact still alive today and of whatever little earnings I receive, I give a small contribution to one of my father's widows. She wasn't my biological mother. My father died in 1947. Yet since that year one of his widows is still part of my family obligations. This shows how long these loyalties last.

On one occasion I saw my father – my father was a Chief Kadhi of Kenya - in Nairobi, the capital city. I saw him buying a dress as a gift for my second

mother, the one who is still alive. I then said to my father "I didn't see you buying anything for my mother." My father, alarmed by this observation, said:

look, your mother is a more traditional woman and she wears particular sorts of things which you don't get in Nairobi. They are better in our home town.

This was perfectly true. The sort of thing my mother wore had a bigger variety in Mombasa than in Nairobi. On the other hand, I wanted to make trouble, so one day, when I was angry with my father, I told my mother about my father's gift, but my mother slapped me and asked me to mind my own business.

On the whole, the essential issue to grasp is, although my father was a very learned Islamic jurist, and still accepted the permission that you could marry more than one wife, it is possible to take that position provided you treat them equally. This was a *de facto* prohibition in the seed of Islam since it is psychologically and physically impossible for this to happen. In the fullness of time, if there were a judicial review in Islam the way there is for example in the US system, we may find that polygamy may be declared unlawful, just like slavery. The US system passes judgment on the issue of abortion in the American Constitution; the founding fathers, 200 years ago, would not have dreamt of discussing those issues in constitution making. And yet here are judges and juries discussing whether or not there are implications on issues of privacy which affect the issue of abortion.⁵⁸ The Islamic notion that the man can marry more than one woman, provided he can treat them equally, is much more explicit than anything about abortion in the American Constitution. So it is possible to take the stand that was the *de facto* prohibition.

The gender question should be reexamined afresh. The gender revolution was intended in Islam, but it never took off. It was aborted arguably for two reasons. One, because mainstream Islam turned royalist from the Ummayyads onwards, and the harem developed and became more secluded as a result of the development of a more aristocratic version of Islam. Secondly, the doors of Ijtihad closed and the gender revolution was aborted.

On equalizing democracy, as distinct from democratizing Islam, I mean by that we even attempt to make Islamic values more available to societies that are not Muslim. I was quite intrigued in my own country of Kenya that there is an Islamic party which the government refuses to register. It is a very unusual Islamic party. It explicitly says you do not have to be a Muslim to be a member, to be a supporter, to be an office-holder. One just has to subscribe to particular Muslim values which the party has regarded as

fundamental to its program. So it is not a party for a Muslim fraternity. It is a party of Muslim values. So confessionally, a member can belong to some other religion provided her/his values converge with those of Islam.

So in Islam you can have situations for example where you minimize drug addiction and drunkenness. These are two of the main threats to Western democracy since it could lead to chaos, willful disobedience and disorder. Due to the strong strain of individualism in Western society and consequent freedom for the individual, it is very difficult for the state to infringe on the rights of individuals, even if they pose a danger to themselves or others around them.⁵⁹ Can Islam provide avenues of sobriety that could help the West reduce the danger?

In reference to globalizing democracy, Islam was the first religion to ritualize globalism. Praying five times a day, facing a particular direction worldwide wherever the devout Muslim happens to be; that is the ritualization of globalism. The concept of the Ummah – the billion people worldwide community of believers – is part of Islamic globalism. The pilgrimage to Mecca is one particular place, still very sacred, where every Muslim is required to attempt to go at least once in his/her lifetime if s/he can afford it is part of the globalization. Will this help in the globalization of democracy?

Does Islam have a lot to teach about equality and fighting racism?. It is not enough to go capitalist or liberal. There must also be levels of egalitarianism including racial equality which Islam started from the first integrated mosque with Seyyidna Bilal. Christianity, on the other hand, has had major problems with racism. For instance Jimmy Carter, when he was President, confessed his church still kept Blacks out. It was still an all-white church in Carter's presidency! The Dutch Reform Church was one of the architects of the apartheid system in the Republic of South Africa. So there are areas of Islamic egalitarianism that the West should be invited to scrutinize, not in order to convert Westerners to the Islamic faith but that they may learn from Islamic values.

CONCLUSION

The future may be "post-Western"; it may be "anti-Western." It cannot be "non-Western."

--- Peter F. Drucker.⁶⁰

Should, and can, Muslims respond to this challenge? Much of the discussion of the "end of history" focuses on the strengths of the West and therefore assumes the weaknesses of the rest of the world. But if Islam in the 20th century has not always been the most fertile ground for democracy, it has also been less fertile for some of the greatest evils of this century – Nazism, fascism, Communism, genocide. These have emerged in societies that were Christian or Buddhist or Confucian. Muslims are often criticized for not producing the best but they are not congratulated for having standards of human behavior which avert the worst. There are no Muslim equivalents of Nazi concentration camps, or American racial lynching, or apartheid under the Dutch Reform Church, or Japanese racism before or during World War II, or genocide under Stalin and Pol Pot. What is it in Islam which insists on minimum standards of humanity and humanness?

If the triumph of liberal democracy required the collapse of Communism, let us also remember a point we raised earlier; the collapse of communism required the resistance of Islam. Communism autonomously triumphed in previously Christian countries, such as Russia and Czechoslovakia; Communism autonomously triumphed in previously Buddhist countries such as Vietnam and Korea and to some extent China; Communism triumphed in a previously Confucian country such as China; but apart from the dubious case of Albania, communism has never triumphed in a previously Muslim country. We have seen fascism in Christian Germany and Italy. We have seen fascism in Buddhist and Shintoist Japan. We have never seen fascism in the Muslim world. We have seen no concentration camps among the Ummah.

Fukuyama assumed that the "end of history" arrives when we have discovered the best. He forgot that we also need to understand how to protect ourselves from the worst. We know that Western liberal democracy has enabled us to find openness, governmental accountability, popular participation and high economic productivity. But we also know that western pluralism has been a breeding ground for racism, fascism, Nazism, exploitation and purposeful, cynical genocide. If history is to come to an end as a quest for the ultimate political order, it can never be satisfied with the message of the West on how to maximize the best in human nature. History must consult Islam about how to check the worst in human nature. From alcoholism to racism, from materialism to Nazism, from drug addiction to Leninism – of all the systems of values in the world, Islam has been the most resistant to the ultimate destructive forces of the 20th century – perhaps for the time being, including the dreaded Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Indeed, it's worth asking, are those societies that are closer to the Shariah also more distant from being HIV positive? If so, we should take a closer look as to why that is so.

The "end of history" has to be a marriage of more than one civilization and more than one standard. Muslims must continue to leave behind that middle phase decline as objects of history. I would hope their role as shapers of history will continue. Muslims should continue sometime to pursue local goals and still change extra-local dimensions. But Muslims' resumption of their role as makers of history is perhaps the most important imperative of them all, hopefully awaiting dramatic expansion in the post-Leninist age. We should proceed not only to take charge of our own destiny but help to transform the rest of our species.

For much of this century, we were very often no more than passengers on a ship called S.S. Earth. We were just passengers, sometimes passengers in chains. In the course of the second half of the 20th Century, we began to be members of the crew – at least some of us. We began to be participants in the movements of that ship and in helping to direct its ultimate destination. The question which now arises is, are we in a position once again to take charge of the ship, if not, this decade, if not the next decade, not long after that? Are we in a position to take our turn as the collective captain of S.S. Earth?

NOTES

1. The Dushkin Publishing Group, 1991. Frances Fukuyama, who previously worked for the State Department of the United States and was at the time of writing this article working for the Rand Corporation, published "The End of History?" in the Spring 1990 edition of *The National Interest*. Reprinted in *Taking Sides*, 3rd Edition. John T. Rourke, Ed. Guilford, Connecticut:
2. Fukuyama, in Rourke, 1991, p. 340
3. Fukuyama, in Rourke, 1991, p. 341.
4. See Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and The Last Man*. New York and Toronto: Free Press & Maxwell MacMillan Canada, 1992.
5. All quotations in this paper are taken from *The Qur'an*, trans. M.H. Shakir, 6th ed. Elmhurst, NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an, Inc. 1990.
6. John Weeks. "The Demography of Islamic Nations, " *Population Bulletin* (1988) 43, 4:5,. Some have argued that the low birth rates in the Western world, vis-a-vis the high birth rate in the developing world (most of which is not democratic), could pose a danger to "Western values" *The Birth Dearth*, New York, NY: Pharos Books, 1991.
7. Weeks, p. 13

8. Benazir Bhutto became Prime Minister of Pakistan in December 1988 and is currently leader of the opposition. Begum Khaleda Zia became Prime Minister of Bangladesh in December 1991. The leader of the opposition is also a woman, Sheik Hasina Wajed.
9. For reports on the "car-driving" question in Saudi Arabia, see *The New York Times* of November 7, 1990, p. 18; November 8, 1990, p. 15; November 13, 1990, p. 14; November 15, 1990, p. 19; November 18, 1990, p. 16; and December 8, 1990, p. 16.
10. See Gungwu Wang, "Ethnicity and Religion in Social Development," in *The ASEAN Success Story*: 43. Ed. Linda G. Martin. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center, 1987. For a detailed description of the economic performance of ASEAN countries, see Seija Naya, "Economic Performance and Growth Factors of the ASEAN Countries," : 47-87 in *ibid*.
11. For a critical look at women and politics in two Southeast Asian countries - Malaysia and Indonesia - see Lenore Manderson, "Gender and Politics in Malaysia," : 43-60; and Norma Sullivan, "Gender and Politics in Indonesia," : 61-86, in *Why Gender Matters in Southeast Asian Politics*. Ed. Maila Stivens, Clayton, Australia: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991.
12. Roy F. Ellen, "Social Theory, Ethnography and the Understanding of Practical Islam in Southeast Asia," : 58 in *Islam in Southeast Asia*: 50-91. Ed. M. B. Hooker. Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1983.
13. See, Muhammad Abdu, *The Theology of Unity* Kenneth Gragg and Ishq Muhammad trans. New York: Humanities Press, 1966; Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam* Lahore: Pakistan: Sh. Muhammad Shraf, 1951; *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, ed. John Donohue, and John L. Esposito.
14. Harold P. Nebelsick, *The Renaissance, Reformation and the Rise of Science*: xix. Edinburgh, Scotland: T & T Clark, 1992.
15. For historical accounts of the links between the Renaissance and Reformation, see, for example, William R. Estep, *Renaissance and Reformation*. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1986; and Albert Hyma, *Renaissance To Reformation*. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1951.
16. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958. Also see M. J. Kitch, *Capitalism and the Reformation*, New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968; Jelle C.

- Riemersma. *Religious Factors in Early Dutch Capitalism 1550-1650*. The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 1968; Wolfgang Schluchter, *Rationalism, Religion and Domination: A Weberian Perspective*, Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press, 1989; and, for an early overview of the controversy, see *Protestantism, Capitalism and Social Science; The Weber Thesis Controversy*, 2nd ed. Lexington, Mass: Heath, 1973.
17. Canon law threatened expulsion from the Church for those who continued in the practice of usury, even after warning from the Church. See Hyma, 1951, p. 66.
18. *The Holy Bible*. Ed. Rev. C.I. Scofield. New York: Oxford University Press, 1909. Other verses against usury often cited include Psalm 15:5 and Ezekiel 18:8, 13 and 17.
19. See, for example, H.A. Oberman, *The Roots of Anti-Semitism in the Age of Renaissance and Reformation*, Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1984; and William Nicholls, *Christian Antisemitism: A History of Hate*, Northvale, NJ: J. Aronson, 1993.
20. Quoted in Hyma, 1951, p. 273.
21. Hyma, 1951, pp. 490-491.
22. For a comparative look at France and Britain's industrial-technological progress, see, for example, J.R. Harris, *Essays in Industry and Technology in the Eighteenth Century: England and France*, Hampshire, GB & Brookfield, VT: Variorum and Ashgate, 1992.
23. For instance, see Jean-Pierre Hirsch "Revolutionary France, Cradle of Free Enterprise," *American Historical Review* (December 1989), 94: 5: 1281-89.
24. For analyses of the economic nature and impact of the French Revolution, see, for example, Florin Aftalion, *The French Revolution, and Economic Interpretation*, Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Jean Laurent Rosenthal, "The Development of Agriculture in Provence 1700-1860: The French Revolution and Economic Growth," *Journal of Economic History* (September 1990), 50: 3: 615-638; and Peter McPhee, "The French Revolution, Peasants and Capitalism," *American Historical Review* (December 1989), 94: 5: 1265-1280. For origins and consequences in other areas of society, see, for example, Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991; *Reshaping France: Town, Country and Region during the French Revolution*, Eds. Alan Forrest and Peter Jones, Manchester, UK and New York: Manchester University Press and St.

Martin's Press, 1991; and *The French Revolution in Culture and Society*, Eds. David G. Troyansky et al, New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.

25. Fukuyama in Rourke, 1991, p. 355.
26. See A.A. Mazrui, "The Resurgence of Islam and the Decline of Communism: What is the Connection," *Futures* (Buttersworth, England) 1991, pp. 273-88.
27. See, for example, Paul LeBlanc, *Lenin and the Revolutionary Party*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1990.
28. See, for example, *The Fundamentals of Marxist-Lennist Philosophy*, trans. Robert Daglish, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974.
29. Even formerly hard-headed economists are now turning their eyes toward the "fuzzy" topics of "equality." One example from that group is Amartya Sen. See, for example, his *Inequality Reexamined*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. Equality continues to occupy the minds of political theorists. See, for instance, David G. Gil, *Unraveling Social Policy: Theory, Analysis and Political Action toward Social Equality*, 4th ed. Rochester, VT: Schenkman Books, 1990; Charles R. Beitz, *Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
30. A recent library search yielded some 1510 books and 1356 articles on the political economy sub-field, which borrows heavily from Marxian analysis.
31. For a recent overview of the political and economic transformations in Eastern Europe, see *Crisis and Reform in Eastern Europe*, Eds. Ferenc Feher and Andrew Arato, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1991.
32. Recent reports in newspapers and the release of political prisoners seem to indicate an easing of the tight political controls; see, for example, *The New York Times*, June 1, 1993: A1. China's economy is definitely booming at a tremendous rate, although problems remain; see, for example, C.A. Tisdell, *Economic Development in the Context of China: Policy Issues and Analysis*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
33. For a non-critical account of the western role in expanding Christianity to the non-western world, see *Christianity in the Non-Western World*, Ed. Charles W. Forman, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967: 35-58.
34. See R.B. Betts, *Christians in the Arab East*, Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1978, p. 67.

35. See *ibid*, p. 69.
36. Bernhard Lohse, *A Short History of Christian Doctrine*, trans. F. Ernest Stoeffler, Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1978, p. 207.
37. See Duncan Towson, *Muslim Spain*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1973: 41.
38. See *ibid*, p. 42: Also see Hichem Djait, *Europe and Islam*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985; and W. Montgomery Watt, *The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe*, Edinburgh: University Press, 1972.
39. See De Lacy O'Leary, *Arabic Thought and Its Place in History*. London, 1922; Majid Fakhry, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*. NY: Columbia U. Press, 1970.
40. See, for example, G.E. Von Grunebaum, *Islam and Medieval Hellenism: Social and Cultural Perspectives*, London: Variorum Reprints, 1976.
41. See Duncan Townson, *op cit*, for a general description of the impact of Islam on Spain.
42. See Eugene A. Myers, *Arabic Thought and the Western World in the Golden Age of Islam*, New York: Frederick Ungar, 1964:10.
43. See *ibid*: 133-134.
44. For an overview of the colonial empire, see David K. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century*, 2nd ed. London: Macmillan, 1982.
45. For an account of the war, see, for example, John E. Talbott, *The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962*, New York: Knopf, 1980.
46. The French attached immense importance ot Algeria. See, for instance, Tony Smith, *The French Stake in Algeria, 1945-1962*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978.
47. Consult, for example, W.G. Andrews, *French Politics and Algeria: The Process of Policy Formation, 1954-1962*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962, for an account of the French policy towards Algeria; and, for a more journalistic account of De Gaulle's grappling with the Algerian problem see C. L. Sulzberger's. *The Test: De Gaulle and Algeria*, London: R. Hart-Davis, 1962.
48. One of the most pressing problems in decolonizing Algeria were the large amount of French ex-military personnel who had settled in Algeria. They

- were understandably enraged about any moves toward decolonization. There was also considerable sympathy within the French military for their view, leading to fears of a military coup in France itself. See, for example, G. A. Kelly, *Lost Soldiers; The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965.
49. See, for example, P.M. Williams and Martin Harrison, *De Gaulle's Republic*, London: Longman, 1960.
 50. The impetus toward French peace movements and decolonization, as a result of the Algerian struggle, is well documented by David L. Schalk in his *War and the Ivory Tower: Algeria and Vietnam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
 51. See, for instance, Rudolph Peters, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History*. The Hague: Mouton, 1979; and Oliver Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, 2nd ed. Cambridge, England & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
 52. Consult, for example, Lawrence Ziring, *Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan: A Political Chronology*, New York: Praeger, 1981; and *The USSR and the Third World: Issues in Domestic and Foreign Policy*, Ed. Yaacov Ro'i, London & Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984.
 53. Consult Shireen T. Hunter, *OPEC and the Third World: Politics of Aid*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984; *OPEC Aid and The Challenge of Development*, Eds. Abdelkader Benamara and Sam Ifeagwu, London & New York: Croom Helm, 1987.
 54. See James Piscatori, *International Relations of the Asian Muslim States*, Lanham, MD and New York: University Press of America and the Asia Society, 1986; and D. Abdullah, *The Biting Falsehood (A Study of Islam and Western Thought)*, London: Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd. 1984.
 55. Two recent works include Dietrich Rueschmeyer *et al*, *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992; and Gyorgy Lukacs, *The Process of Democratization*, trans. S. Bernhardt and Norman Levine, Albany: SUNY Press, 1991.
 56. See Weeks, 1988.
 57. See John Thomas Cummings *et al*, *Islam and Development*, Ed. John Esposito, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1984: 35-36.
 58. See, for example, *Abortion and the Constitution: Reversing Roe v. Wade through the Courts*, Eds. Dennis J. Horan *et al*, Washington DC:

Georgetown University Press, 1987; and Alida Brill, *Nobody's Business: Pradoxes of Privacy*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1990.

59. A French conservative philosopher predicts ominous consequences for Western democracies because of the inherent challenges posed by individualist freedom. See Jean-Francois Revel, *How Democracies Perish*, trans. William Byron. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.
60. Peter Drucker, *Post-Capitalist Society*, New York: Harper Business, 1993: 214.