

SEPARATING THE TREES FROM THE FOREST: THE MATERIAL BASIS OF THE DAYAK STRUGGLE IN SARAWAK, MALAYSIA

Teresa M. Chala¹
University of Melbourne

Sarawak has become a focus of the international drive against the destruction of the tropical rainforests. Its indigenous people have formed human barricades in the jungles of Borneo to prevent the destruction of the forests, and have been used as symbols of resistance to deforestation. But this resistance is not a conflict over deforestation. It is an expression of a long-standing struggle by the Dayaks² to protect their customary land and is only one facet of resistance to an historical process that has made increasing demands on their land and material life.

That the conflict is often depicted as a distinctive forest issue is only partly because the rainforests are on the international environment agenda; it is also because the Dayaks have sought allies in the international rainforest movement for political reasons. There has been a major shift in the Dayak balance of power since Brooke times, whereby they have moved from a tacit 'alliance' with the Brooke government, to being on the periphery of power since the early days of independence. The changing alliances and the consequent political disempowerment of the Dayaks have been crucial in determining the new alliance with the international rainforest movement.

This argument is outlined in four sections. The first describes at a general level the historical, political and material contexts of disputes. The next section examines the evidence of non-compliance by the Dayaks generally, and the Iban open conflict with Chinese settlement in particular, during the Brooke administration (1839-1946), and argues that both show an early Dayak focus on protection of land rights. The Dayak response to new claims to land for development during the colonial (1946-1963) and early independence periods, and their opposition to new land recommendations tabled in parliament in 1965, are examined in the third section. This period is important not simply because it demonstrates Dayak concern for lands; it also established the political context of the 1980s (Chinese-Malay political alliance and the marginalisation of the Dayaks) in which disputes were increasingly played out. The last section focuses on more recent disputes and new Dayak international alliances, seeing these as a continuation of the long standing dispute over land.

DISPUTES IN CONTEXT

'Disputes do not happen in a vacuum but are often part of a longer social and historical process' (McKeown, 1983:13). Nor is all resistance spontaneous or organised instances of overt opposition to unpopular events or laws. It has been convincingly argued by Scott (1986) that dramatic revolutions are comparatively rare and that the more common peasant forms of resistance are expressed in countless subtle forms of behaviour such as non-compliance, avoidance or pilfering. This is an important facet of resistance in societies based on small, isolated communities such as the Dayaks in Sarawak, and is critical in establishing a historical background to the present conflict between the logging industry, the State and the Dayaks. Although the Dayaks have a history of fierce overt resistance to the imposition of outside authority,³ there is also evidence of more subtle but persistent action to avoid unacceptable restrictions, most importantly those tied to land acquisition, that has continued from Brooke times to the present day.

Dayak Political Context

Resistance has two political dimensions: an awareness of the power relations between those resisting and being resisted, and the politics within the resisting group that affect the nature of resistance. On both counts Dayak groups vary even though they generally have a history of being politically aware. The Penan political system is very simple requiring only voluntary participation (Rousseau, 1984:89); Kajang, Kenyah and Kayan societies are highly stratified with aristocrats dominating their political life (Nicolaisen, 1986: 77-83). The political experience of such groups was probably limited but they were not totally politically naive: the Kayan for example were known to default on debts to Chinese traders '...not because they were unable to pay ... but because the Kayan were knowledgeable about trade practices and were aware that the Brooke legal structure worked to their advantage' (Chew, 1990: 117).

Of all the groups, the Iban, numerically the largest Dayak tribe,⁴ appear to have been particularly politically assertive. Studies show a high level of participation in decision-making which is reflected in institutions such as the longhouse meeting, the *aum*, the non-inherited nature of the headman's position and individual control of dispute settlement.⁵ The Iban operated as a community but within it remained very individualistic and at a personal level were likely to be politically astute and assertive.

Nor were the Dayaks in Sarawak, particularly the Iban, cut off from exposure to western style political structures and court systems. Sarawak Iban were subjected to more interference and exploitation by the Brookes⁶ than were the Iban under the Dutch (McKeown, 1983:31,129). The Brooke government forced the Iban to bring major offences before the Resident's Court, the success of which can be gauged by their subsequent reputation for being litigious (Pringel, 1970:191). But Iban use of courts as a dispute arena predates Brooke influence⁷ and can also be understood in terms of the Iban character and group survival. While the Iban individual demands immediate redress for perceived violations (McKeown, 1983:515), *adat* ideology emphasises the importance of individual co-operation within the group and hence encourages conciliation in a dispute arena.

Although it is difficult to make conclusions about the political experience of all Dayaks, it can be said that the Iban were likely to be more politically aware and assertive than groups such as the Kenyah-Kayan-Kajang group or the Penan. Iban group, individual ideology and their higher level of interaction with the European rulers and institutions ensured a political history likely to encourage opposition or non-compliance when faced with unacceptable laws or events.

Dayak Material Context

When James Brooke arrived in Sarawak the Dayaks practised a system of shifting cultivation which formed the basis of their tenure to land. The means of tenure acquisition was through the clearing and cultivating of forest and this generally involved migrations seeking new land to farm. The finer details of customary tenure varied between groups but land was generally acquired by an individual family and owned and administered communally by the longhouse (Cramb 1986:28). These rights were not transferable to another community. Unlike the cultivation rights tree ownership rights were not tied to the longhouse but to individuals spread across longhouses.

According to customary law two types of land were claimed. Firstly *temuda* which is cultivated and fallow land; secondly the surrounding area of primary forest used by the community to harvest forest produce. The two together constitute *menoa*, which is the entire area of customary land, forest and water surrounding the longhouse, to which members have exclusive rights of usage (S.A.M., 1990:15). The forest is an important part of customary land, but this does not imply that Dayak groups claimed vast, unlimited areas of forest. Historically Dayaks were known to migrate frequently but this was largely to maintain production in the shifting cultivation system⁸ and claims to

abandoned areas were relinquished. When settled, Dayak groups, including the Penan, worked within defined areas (Lian, 1988: 119).

Dayaks have been historically seen as under-utilizing their land and forest resources, but their interest in the commercial application of these resources is evident in Brooke times. Third Division Iban accumulated considerable sums of money from the sale of forest produce⁹ and Second Division Iban were early participants in rubber cultivation: by 1934 the government estimated that 'pagan tribes' owned over half the rubber small holdings (Pringle, 1970: 294-5, 334). Even in relation to the timber industry a constant Dayak complaint since the colonial period has been the limited opportunities for Dayak participation (Roff, 1973: 229).

BROOKE LAND LAWS, CHINESE EXPANSION AND DAYAK RESPONSE

During Brooke times there is little identifiable open conflict over the specific question of land control, except between the Iban and the Chinese in the Lower Rejang early this century. This does not mean that more subtle forms of opposing changes to land access and accumulation did not occur. It is recognised that the very nature of such resistance means that great caution is needed in interpreting the episodes, as information is scarce, of poor quality and often difficult to interpret. Nevertheless there is some evidence of covert action by the Dayaks to avoid restrictions to migrations and land clearing during the Brooke and colonial periods, and stronger evidence that it is continuing to the present day.

Land Tenure and the Brookes

The Brooke era saw little real change to Dayak practices of land acquisition and tenure rights, and as such it can be argued that land legislation posed no real threat to Dayak land tenure. To some extent the Brooke rulers protected Dayak rights to land. Customary tenure was consciously preserved (Hong, 1987: 39-40); non-native groups such as the Chinese were confined to specific areas of land and strictly forbidden to reside or setup shop in Dayak longhouses (Chew, 1990: 124), and foreign mining and planting interests were not encouraged in Sarawak (Reece, 1978:16).

Nevertheless the Brooke concept of government was fundamentally different from that of the former Brunei rulers when it came to land. For the latter,

government, even though generally exercised in a defined area, meant control of people; for the Brookes, government was based on control of territory (Pringle, 1970:71). The state accordingly enacted a set of European land laws claiming territory and even though customary tenure was recognised its practice was soon confined within a certain domain. The state gradually diminished this domain by expanding its own claim to land from 'all unoccupied and waste lands' in 1863; to 'all lands for which no document of title has been issued' in 1931¹⁰ (Hong, 1987:39,42).

In an era where acquisition of tenure to land depended on the availability of primary forest, and migrations to new areas were common, the imposition of such regulations would have restricted traditional Dayak migration practices. But the reality was that Dayak migration and associated forest clearing and land expansion continued, particularly with increased distance from centres of administration. Dayaks either ignored the laws or moved to areas outside Brooke control (Chin, December 1985:68; Cramb & Wills, 1990: 349).

Such actions by the Dayaks do not necessarily constitute resistance. The existing government resources were very limited and the government was unable to enforce its laws any further than a few miles from Kuching¹¹. Hence it can be argued that there were no real restrictions placed on Dayak land use practices and as such there can be no resistance. But according to Scott (1985:33) the resistance that emerges is very influenced by the existing nature of the controls and how they are enforced. The poor government control over the interior provided considerable scope for those who wished to deliberately ignore the laws.

Although government efforts to stop migrations met with limited success, they did make a considerable effort and employed a variety of tactics that were within their means¹². Many Dayak responses clearly show a deliberate intention to avoid, deceive or persist when it came to migrations and land acquisition. Dayaks were known to wear down official resistance to migration by endless pleading and sheer persistence, use evasive tactics such as visits to relatives or ignore the laws trekking secretly over watersheds into known forbidden areas that were outside Brooke control¹³ (Pringle, 1970: 257, 281-282).

It can be argued that people in remote areas were unaware of migration restrictions. But Brooke forts and associated trading centres began to penetrate the interior in the 1850s (Pringle, 1970:321). Communication and trading between bazaars and remote longhouses along the Rejang and Baram, was well developed by the 1890s (Chew, 1990:96-97). Many Dayaks themselves were

highly mobile. The Iban tradition of *bejalai* encouraged young men to journey around or beyond Borneo in search of adventure and profit. These men carried news and ideas back to the longhouses (Kedit, 1988: 135,146). Dayak longhouses, with long communal verandahs and everyone under one roof, would have facilitated communication, particularly as the verandahs were often used as pathways for moving around (Gomes, 1911:43). It is highly likely that information commonly known around government posts would have spread well beyond such points.

Although some evidence for non-compliance is tenuous, the Iban in particular had social structures and closer contact with the Brooke administration, which would have equipped them with a level of political awareness, and knowledge of government legislation and its implications, especially concerning their most important asset, land. As seen below the Iban readily used litigation to defend their land rights when threatened, but there is also evidence of another more persistent level of resistance: the deliberate ignoring or circumventing of unacceptable government restrictions on land acquisition activities wherever possible.

Chinese Land Expansion

Although some Chinese lived in Sarawak in the eighteenth century, it was the arrival of Foochow Chinese immigrants in 1901 that threatened Dayak land control. Charles Brooke had recruited Chinese agriculturists to open up the Lower Rejang (Third Division) to settled farming¹⁴ and by 1919 there were over 5500 Foochow in the area (Chew, 1990: 142, 153-154). Despite exclusive land allocations and the liberal issue of titles, the Foochow cleared land well beyond the concession limits and only later applied for surveying procedures (ibid: 60-66). By 1916 the Land Office admitted that up to three quarters of the Foochow farms were unsurveyed and unregistered (ibid: 153, 164-166).

The Iban of the Lower Rejang already had a history of resistance to Brooke rule (Leigh 1974:36) and strongly resisted Chinese land incursions. By 1903 the Land Office was concerned by Iban complaints and the 1909 Foochow land concession was partly to prevent further conflict (Chew, 1990:148,153). By 1916 the courts were fully occupied with land and boundary disputes with '... Dayaks ... contesting almost every new clearing' made by the Foochow (Cartwright in Chew, 1990:162-164). The 1924 Foochow land concession in Binatang sparked further conflict. Even though customary tenure was recognized the Land Office had no real understanding of the areas affected; the Binatang concession area was claimed by the Iban as customary land (Chew

1990:166). At first the courts were overburdened with land litigation cases but when this was seen as ineffective, open conflict occurred with Foochow property being attacked and looted (ibid:168).

Such open challenges to Chinese land expansion were localised incidents, defending an immediate threat to land. The Iban pattern of response to such threats is consistent with their cultural profile. They have a highly developed sense of justice and when the traditional means of settling a dispute has proven unsuccessful the response is very individual and direct (McKeown, 1983:518). But it also reflects a difference in the nature of the threat; uncontrolled land clearing requires more immediate action than poorly enforced laws limiting land expansion.

The clashes are clearly land-based rather than ethnic. With the Chinese trader the Iban had a close relationship (Pringle, 1970:316), but Chinese farmers needed land and this made the relationship with Dayak groups more difficult. But the different attitudes to land use do have a cultural base. The spiritual and cultural associations of land as well as economic value was important for the Iban. The Foochow saw the land as an economic asset to exploit as fully as possible, clearing land so rapidly that '... jungle fell as though a tornado passed through' (Chew, 1990:167). These different approaches to resource use and development were to persist, surfacing in localised land clashes in the Second Division (Pringle, 1970:319) and continuing friction along the Rejang into early independence (Leigh, 1971:146) and more recently can be seen in the clashes between the Dayaks and largely Chinese-controlled timber industry.

Changing Alliances and the Land Factor

White (1986:50-51) notes that power relationships between peasants and the power structures are crucial in determining the success or failure of resistance. The Brooke government and the Dayaks had developed a mutually-beneficent power relationship¹⁵ which served Dayak interests but disadvantaged the Chinese, particularly with regard to land. As long as it was in the government interests to maintain an alliance with the Dayaks, native resistance to land control challenges were effective. But with the colonial government (1946-1963) came a new attitude towards land and forest resources which brought major legislative changes that would significantly alter the existing balance of control of these resources, and consequently the pattern of alliances between the Dayaks, Chinese and the state.

In the 1953 Forest Ordinance the state claimed 99 per cent of the forests leaving the Dayaks with the remaining 1 per cent as Communal Forests. Logging activities were allowed in all categories except the Communal Forests. The 1958 Land Code continued the Brooke system of land zones and ethnic separation: 22 per cent remained as customary land, 7.9 per cent open for Chinese settlement and most of the rest claimed by the government.¹⁶ The creation of new customary land was prohibited and customary land owners were classified as 'Licensees of the Crown' until title was proven¹⁷ (Foo, 1986:19; Hong, 1987:45). Hence while customary tenure continued to be recognised, its expansion was officially contained and it was left in an unproven limbo with the burden of proof of ownership shifted to the occupiers of the land.

The state now clearly favoured a commercial future for lands and forests, and this in Sarawak meant closer links with the Chinese. With the forests moved from Dayak control and the way opened for logging, Third Division Foochow began acquiring logging permits in the 1950s (Chin, 1981:105). But access to suitable land for commercial exploitation remained a problem. Although the expansion of customary land had been officially contained, the colonial government realised that the maintenance of separate Dayak areas under traditional ownership encouraged the continuation of subsistence-based land use.

In 1962 a special colonial Land Committee drafted recommendations that land be dezoned, differentiating only between titled or untitled status, hence opening the way for individual titles (Hong, 1987:53-54). This would have enabled the Chinese to expand into native land areas and the expansion of intensive land use. The legislation to enact this was left to the newly independent government, but when tabled in 1965 it provoked such intense Dayak opposition that it was clear that land issues were high on the political agenda of Dayaks. The bill was not only deferred but the mould of political alignments, which have lasted to this day, were cast.

With independence in 1963 the state changed from a body of foreigners to a composition of local political parties. In Sarawak no one group was numerically dominant and divisions existed within the ethnic groups, forcing factions to seek allies outside their group to gain political power (Leigh, 1974:161). The initial governing alliance was between the Dayak Sarawak National Party (SNAP) and the Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA) dominated by Chinese businessmen. But the intense Dayak opposition to the land bill triggered a split in this alliance and the formation of a new cabinet in

1966, numerically dominated by PESAKA¹⁸ Dayaks but with strong Muslim Malay BARJASA influence (ibid: 102-112).

The importance of the land issue for the Dayaks is evident in this new governing alignment. PESAKA was built up from Rejang River Dayaks where the basic Iban conflict was with the Chinese settlers over land (Leigh 1974:83). The strong feeling of PESAKA Dayaks against the Chinese is seen in their exclusion of Chinese membership in the party even when opened to other groups in 1965. That the reason for this was land-based is reflected in the word PESAKA itself, which was 'translated as "rights" and the most important of those inherited rights was land' (ibid:83). Significantly PESAKA Ministers took the two portfolios controlling land and forests (ibid:116).

The effects of the land question in the longer term was to marginalise Dayaks from the government. In 1970 the election results were evenly balanced between the major parties and a variety of coalitions for government was possible. The eventual outcome was that the Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP), a multi-racial party but with a large Chinese constituency and a predominantly Chinese leadership, formed a coalition not with the Dayak-based SNAP and PESAKA parties but with a newly united Muslim Malay party BUMIPUTRA.

The agreement reached with BUMIPUTRA was made by the Chinese leaders with no active Dayak participation, and negotiations were not approved by the SUPP's Central Working committee (Leigh 1974:144). Part of the reason for the Chinese choice of alliance can be seen in the SUPP leaders' claim that the agreement with BUMIPUTRA was '... more favourable than ... they could have obtained from the Iban...(who) would find difficulty conceding land...' (ibid: 145). Making farming land available for the landless¹⁹ had been one of SUPP's election promises, and at both federal and state levels promises to review the Land Code are believed to have been traded for Chinese political support (Leigh, 1971:250; Roff, 1973:247). This Muslim Malay/Melanau-Chinese alliance formed in the early years of independence still governs today.

The Land Bill of 1965 had exposed the Achilles heel of potential Dayak-Chinese cooperation. The Chinese choice of political alignment was at least partly based on perceived Dayak intransigence on the land issue. It was realised by both the Malay and Chinese that a strong Dayak influence in the government would hinder the potential to develop land and forest resources. The move by the colonial government to replace the racially-based land zones with non-specific land titles, set in motion new alliances which would isolate

the Dayaks and eventually force them to seek new allies in their struggle to maintain control over their land.

DEVELOPMENT, DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES

The recent highly publicised Dayak disputes were precipitated by the expansion of the timber industry, but logging is not the only activity causing dispute. Dayaks have resisted dam construction, agricultural schemes, mining leases and national park creation, all of which are related to a government development policies that demand access to land. Alongside increasing overt disputes, there is continued evidence of covert resistance through illegal clearing and logging. With the change of political alliances and Dayak marginalisation from power, Dayak resistance has had little success in halting the state and commercial demands on land and forest, forcing the Dayaks to seek new alliances through international linkages.

Development and Customary Land: A Common Focus

By the 1980s Dayak resistance to government development policies had spread across a broad spectrum of activities and showed a variety of expressions. A common form of Dayak reaction to forest loss and logging, from 1968 until the early 1980s, was to apply for Communal Forest areas.²⁰ Before the 1980s such applications were not specifically directed at logging but at circumventing restrictions of the Forest Ordinance. When logging spread into the hill forests in the late 1970s and Communal Forest areas were slashed in 1980²¹, most subsequent applications²² were officially seen as a deliberate strategy against logging and therefore not considered (Insan, 1990:14).

The government's push for large-scale plantations, which began in the early 1970s, has not been well received by the Dayaks. Reactions have ranged from general non-compliance to frequent threats and assaults against Lands and Survey officers by Dayak landowners (Borneo Post, 14/10/1986; Hong, 1987:70). The editorial of the Sarawak Gazette (December, 1987) summed up Dayak response: 'when... any person or agency...try [sic] to initiate planning for development of the so-called idle land, we get so much opposition...that what initially was a welcome proposal turns sour'. Research into government land schemes shows a strong Dayak perception of threat to customary land, particularly if they involve relinquishing land titles (King, 1986:94; Cramb and Wills, 1990:357). This fear is backed up by evidence gathered by Hong (1987), S.A.M. (1990) and Insan (1990) in the Belaga, Baram and Limbang

areas, and highlights the overriding importance of maintaining control of customary land behind poor Dayak participation.

Mining, dam building and national park creation have also created discord across Sarawak amongst different Dayak groups. Mining on Bidayuh land in the Bau area (Division One), dams claiming Iban land along the Batang-Ai (Division Two), national parks on Berawan land in the Tinjar River (Division Four) have all sparked resistance (Hong, 1987:70, 172; Borneo Post, 25/3/1987). The most organised Dayak resistance was against the Bakun Dam proposal which threatened to displace over 4000 Dayaks. Local opposition, with the aid of S.A.M.²³, began in 1983, and by 1986 had spread to a national level²⁴ (Hong, 1987:182,189; Borneo Post, 1985-1986).

Many of these disputes may be said to express more concern for financial gain than protecting customary land. Colchester (1989:40) notes that '... the main aim for many native communities has not been so much to prevent logging as to try to secure for themselves a larger share of the profits'. Certainly the desire to share in the resource is a commonly expressed sentiment. Even in the Ningkan days a persistent Iban complaint was against participation in the industry (Roff, 1973:229). Since then there have been many demands for compensation, sharing of timber profits and efforts to secure the lucrative timber concessions and licenses.

Although Dayak concerns have always included the notion of compensation for damage, it is not as a replacement for their customary rights. For many it is based on the premise of ownership of the resource (Lian, 1988) and financial gain can be seen as essentially the same as compensation for loss or damage to property. Given that ownership of land and forest represents the only wealth of most Dayak people an important part of the protection of this wealth is the right to ask for and negotiate compensation if it is damaged. This is recognised under both state and customary law²⁵ and can be seen as an integral part of protecting their most important asset.

The common characteristic that runs through all of the Dayak actions described above is the perceived loss of or threat to customary land. Changes in the status of land from whatever source represents the same threat or loss to indigenous groups and has generated resistance and conflict over areas scattered throughout Sarawak.

Illegal Logging and Clearing

McKeown (1983:61) has noted that the Iban process of dispute resolution does not necessarily always follow the same path. Judgements are made on the nature of the dispute and the procedures chosen accordingly. In more recent years Dayak behaviour indicating covert resistance has been increasingly evident in opposition to land schemes and illegal clearing and felling, where a degree of choice or poor enforcement potential made such responses more appropriate to the nature of the threat. The persistence of such resistance can be seen as a continuation of the Dayak effort to protect their land and forest resources since Brooke rule.

Reports in newspapers show that forest and land laws are still widely ignored by the Dayaks, with widespread illegal logging and land clearing (Borneo Post, 2/3/1986, 14/4/1989, 13/5/1992; Brookfield, 1988:219). S.C. Chin (1985:73) found that most of the swiddens cleared by the Kenyah²⁶ between 1977-1980 created new customary land; Lian (1988:122) found that the Kenyah '... who are aware of the provisions of the land laws ... deliberately clear large areas of land, with the intention of making it Native Customary Rights land. This is encouraged by the absence of any foolproof methods to disprove native land claims'.

Although such covert activities are difficult to quantify, it is probable that their level has significantly accelerated. Certain changes have increased the opportunities for illegal clearing and felling. Logging has opened up inaccessible area which are poorly controlled by the government (Ooi, 1990:117) and the advent of the chainsaw has changed the balance of power between the people and the forest. It has been estimated by Pierce-Colfer²⁷ (1983:74) that one man with a chainsaw was equal to ten men with axes and knives. In Sarawak, chainsaw ownership is no doubt high as seen with the Kajang households of the Belaga District, which had a 44 per cent ownership (Nicolaisen, 1986).

Illegal logging by the Dayaks can be seen as opportunistic behaviour motivated by profit. But, as noted earlier, it can also be seen as a response to the lack of success in officially gaining access to the lucrative returns of logging, and a covert way of levelling out the rewards in situations where land and forest rights are seen to be lost. Certainly amongst the Kenyah dissatisfaction with the land laws has fostered a lack of concern for protection of land or forest resources over which they had lost rights (Lian, 1988:122). Both illegal logging and clearing are rational choices and represent a covert form of

resistance designed to equalise distribution, and are seen as a continuation of Dayak efforts to protect their rights of ownership and usage.

Dayak Powerbase and a New Alliance

As a group the Dayaks are poorly represented politically, both by traditional and state power structures. The Brooke government made changes to the traditional power structure which weakened Dayak control of their leaders but while the state was inclined to support and protect Dayak interests the effect was minimised. Since independence the state-Dayak relationship has altered and Dayak access to power through traditional channels has deteriorated. In the 1970s and 1980s, when Dayaks most needed strong representation, they were increasingly disempowered at traditional level and have not been able to unify effectively to take advantage of their numbers at state level.

Fundamental changes were made to longhouse power structures under Brooke rule. Traditionally longhouses operated as independent 'states' (Cramb & Wills, 1990:357). They were ruled by powerful headmen *Tuai Rumah* but the ultimate control lay with the longhouse people, as the headman's tenure was subject to common approval (Colchester, 1989:20). When the Brooke regime pacified the native communities a government-appointed structure of native representation was superimposed on longhouses to implement government policy²⁸. However after independence, when the Dayak-led Ningkan government was deposed, the future role of native chiefs was strictly relegated to the implementation of government policy (Leigh 1971:202).²⁹

The government *Tuai Rumah* is an important position, particularly in largely illiterate communities strongly bound by traditional structures of authority. It represents their negotiations with important external bodies such as the government and timber companies. And yet since early independence there is evidence that government *Tuai Rumah* were compromised, both by the state and timber companies. State political patronage of influential headmen to ensure longhouse votes³⁰ (Roff, 1973:138), logging companies' practices of paying monthly salaries to headmen and the granting of timber licences to some headmen, have compromised the independence of *Tuai Rumah* (Insan, 1990:18; Hong, 1987:100). The lack of representation by the traditional power structure has become an increasing problem at a time when effective community leadership is essential.

The other avenue of Dayak power, state and federal elections, has not been effectively tapped. For the last twenty five years elected political power has

been in the hands of the Malay/Melanau-Chinese alliance. The Dayaks are an estimated 40-50 per cent of the population, but they are scattered and isolated groups and have not been able to unify to exploit this power politically (Roff 1973:6). The Iban alone make up 30 per cent of Sarawak's population and could be a potent political force but historical and cultural factors have made such unity difficult.³¹

At present Dayak political loyalties are scattered across a number of political parties. Even in the 1987 election when many Dayaks supported one party,³² winning fifteen of the forty eight seats, they stayed in opposition. Elected Dayak politicians such as Jabu and Ujang who claim to represent them, are not considered spokesmen for the Dayaks as they have to follow the party line (Sarawak Tribune, 4/5/1987; Insan, 1990:xi). Hence a large proportion of the Dayak population have no effective voice in government.

This political isolation has led the Dayaks to seek new allies in their struggle to protect their land. This has come largely through the activities of S.A.M. which launched a national campaign in 1986 against logging in Malaysia by organising resistance as well as mass education and awareness³³ (Suara S.A.M., 1986:14). Nicolaisen (1986) notes that in largely illiterate societies the leader's position is greatly enhanced by control over information. S.A.M.'s activities would have profoundly influenced information dissemination and hence the power of the headman. The role of S.A.M. as a middleman between the people and the government (Borneo Post, 1/8/1987) is similar to that of the *Tuai Rumah*, and is significant when considering the compromised position of many headmen as representatives of their people. For many longhouses S.A.M. can be seen as replacing the *Tuai Rumah* as a link to the outside world in articulating their needs.

S.A.M. maintains active links with its international counterpart Friends of the Earth (Suara S.A.M., 1986) and national public interest groups such as Aliran³⁴ and the Malaysian Bar Council (Means, 1991:198). Such links have enabled Dayaks to broaden and alter their powerbase, moving from an isolated position in the early years of independence to gaining significant national and international support. This has opened up powerful new alliances: at the national level the involvement of the powerful legal sector in Kuala Lumpur and Miri (Borneo Post, 20/6/1987) as reflected in new legal strategies; at an international level trade pressures are being applied to the federal government by powerful bodies such as the European Economic Community, World Bank and United States government (Sarawak Tribune, 15/7/1987, 20/4/1988; Borneo Post, 23/10/1988, 21/7/1989).

Whilst the agendas of the international bodies may not be identical to those of the Dayaks, the linking of Dayak land claims to international issues serves the Dayak purpose. The events of the early 1980s showed the futility of the Dayak struggle against powerful state and business interests. Through S.A.M. the Dayaks' struggle to protect their customary land has become part of global deforestation and human rights struggles, creating a broad new base of alliances and support. With the new alliances the nature of the Dayaks resistance has changed, moving away from non-confrontational reactions to politically-oriented and legal strategies which have challenged both the government and the law.³⁵

Forest Exploitation and Customary Land

The extent of the area involved in logging is enormous: 76 per cent of Sarawak was under forest in the late 1970s (Collins, et. al., 1991: 202) and all but 10 per cent of this is under logging concessions (Reuter Newswire Far East, 16/11/1990). One third of this concession area is said to have been logged (IWGIA Yearbook 1989). Since the expansion of logging there have been three main threats to customary land, apart from environmental degradation. The first is of the vagueness of boundaries separating customary land and state forest; the second is that under the Land Code Penan customary land is not recognised and the third is the unresolved definition of what actually constitutes customary land. The focus of complaints against logging have centred on total invasion of customary land for the Penan, and transgressions on the forested parts of customary land for other Dayaks, rather than opposition to all logging.

Few boundaries between state-claimed forest and Dayak-claimed customary land have been officially drawn. The potential mileage of such boundaries is enormous as customary land generally lies in thin ribbons along waterways in the midst of vast areas of forest, or Interior Area Land. There was an official attempt to delineate longhouse territories in the late 1930s, but it was poorly followed up in colonial and post-colonial periods. Current government efforts have concentrated on adjudicating more accessible and commercially valuable land (Cramb & Wills, 1990: 353). But this has been slow: by 1984 only 2.17 per cent of Native Customary Land and Interior Area Land (nearly 70 per cent of the state) had been surveyed, adjudicated and titled (Zaidie, 1985:16-17). Hence, although the location of customary land is generally known, most is not legally separated from state-claimed forests by clearly surveyed boundaries, creating scope for transgressions by the logging industry.

Amongst the Dayak tribes it is the Penan who have focused the issues of the logging conflict on land rights. Their position is unique amongst Sarawak Dayaks: they are more vulnerable to the effects of logging because they lack the legal claim of other Dayak groups to traditional land. The Land Code only recognises customary ownership of land that has been cleared and cultivated before 1958: the Penan do not farm and hence cannot claim customary ownership of land³⁶. While only about 300 of a maximum estimate of 10,000 Penan are still completely nomadic, even the settled and semi-settled groups cannot claim land as most were settled in the 1960s after the Land Code froze the creation of customary land (Suara S.A.M. 1990/B:14).

Penan-claimed areas are classified as Interior Area Land, and are part of the vast area of forest claimed by the state. These areas are given out as timber concessions, and logging takes place throughout. Hence the Penan's concern that nobody apart from themselves seem to be aware that they own the land being logged (Borneo Post, 18/6/1987). Implicit in their claim to land is a call for a halt to logging in their areas, but the emphasis is less on the nature of the logging practices than the fact that some of it is on their customary land.

But even for the majority of Dayaks who have recognised claims to land the definition of customary land is in dispute. The government claims that it means the cleared *temuda* areas only, while the natives say it means *menoa* and therefore includes surrounding primary forest. This differentiation is critical for all Dayaks with recognised claims to customary land, as it is not the legitimacy of customary land itself which is disputed, but the area it covers. The Kayan of Uma Bawang have launched a legal case challenging the government definition. This case has implication for all Dayak land claims and could make many of the government-issued timber concessions illegal.³⁷ It has been realised that until the nature of customary land is clearly defined under state law there is no base for fighting transgressions and contradictions in relation to customary land³⁸.

The context in which the logging industry operates varies. The forests are divided: one third is controlled by the Forestry Department; two thirds are designated for eventual agricultural and other uses with no Forestry Department management or restrictions on permissible yield (Davis & Henley, 1990:108). According to Colchester (1989:37) 60 per cent of concessions are in the unprotected two thirds of the forest, and even in the controlled one third it is evident that control is poor and compromised. An independent report commissioned by the Malaysian Government in 1990 for an ITTO³⁹ meeting, noted that the Forestry Department was understaffed, were under-reporting

logging and known to accept payoffs from timber magnates to avoid quotas, levies and rules (Australian Financial Review, 28/8/1990).

The effect of this has been to create scope for transgressions over a widespread area, by an industry where the returns are lucrative, the boundaries vague and the controls poor. Even though one of the conditions attached to a timber licence itself prohibits the encroachment of logging activities on customary land, many Dayak complaints against the timber companies are based on such transgressions (World Rainforest Movement & S.A.M., 1989:19,46,71). The state has consistently ignored Dayak claim to *menoa*, and allowed logging in customary forest areas, taking advantage of undefined boundaries and the unresolved definition of customary land. This can be seen in the State Secretary's comment that those involved in the blockades have no legitimate claims unless they can prove that the land and forests within the licenced areas legally or customarily belong to them (Borneo Post, 16/10/1987).

CONCLUSION

Dayak opposition to logging is an extension of a longstanding struggle over land that can be traced back to the Brooke period, where open conflict and avoidance of official restrictions on land expansion flagged the beginning of land-based resistance. Over this time fundamental changes in alliances have been precipitated by the Dayak struggle to maintain control of customary land and forest. As the government attitude to the development of land and forest resources changed in the colonial period, significant realignments of power occurred, which left the Dayaks on the periphery of political power. Fundamental to this alignment was the issue of non-Dayak access to customary land and forest.

The present conflict in Sarawak is not over logging, but over logging on customary land and is only one facet of a land-based conflict. Challenges to land control have come from a variety of government development policies which demand access to land. But the development of the timber industry has played a major part in the conflict over land in Sarawak. For the Dayaks it has exposed the weaknesses of their tenure to land and been the catalyst which moved them to seek outside alliances, extending their powerbase to the international arena and attaching their struggle to deforestation, environmental degradation and human rights agendas. The internationalisation of the dispute has thrown the Dayaks into the political arena and significantly changed the nature of their resistance tactics and the scope of their demands, but land control is still fundamental to the struggle.

NOTES:

- ¹ I would like to acknowledge and give thanks to Geoff Missen, Shamsul A.B. and Susan White for their assistance and encouragement in the writing of this article.
- ² The term Dayak is used in different ways in Sarawak. Constitutionally, it refers to two native groups, the Iban or Sea Dayaks and the Bidayuh or Land Dayaks; but by 1987 it included other native groups such as the Kayan, Kenyah, Kelabit, Kajang and Penan (Jayum, 1990: 148). Although the term Dayak is used throughout this article it is a practical measure and does not assume a single group with unified goals.
- ³ Most Dayaks share a history of political independence based on the longhouse unit, and this was often fiercely defended during Brooke rule, with many rebellions and insurrections (Pringle, 1970).
- ⁴ Dayaks, in the nineteenth century, made up most of Sarawak's population, and of these the Iban formed the great majority (Pringle, 1970). By 1985 Dayaks made up 43.3 per cent of the population, of which nearly 70 per cent were Iban (Annual Statistical Bulletin 1985 in Colchester, 1989:12).
- ⁵ All families (including both sexes) participated in decision-making on community issues through the *aum* (Freeman in Cramb, October 1989:181). Headmen earned their position through being '... clever, wise, knowledgeable and above all successful' (McKeown, 1983:518) and were not automatically in charge of dispute settlement. The disputants could invite their adjudication, but essentially controlled the negotiations themselves which often involved extended bargaining and compromise (ibid: 59).
- ⁶ This can be seen in schooling, health, roads and the widespread use of labour as warriors.
- ⁷ Court procedures operated through the *aum* well before European rule in areas such as the Saribas and continue to resolve local conflicts to the present day (Sather in Cramb, 1989:181).
- ⁸ Dayak addiction to head-taking was also a factor in frequent migrations.

- ⁹ Some Iban lent their money on interest to Chinese merchants and by 1900 owned some of the bazaar shops run by the Chinese (Pringle, 1970:294).
- ¹⁰ Given that very little customary land had registered titles, the 1931 Land Order effectively laid state claim to most native land until title could be proven and secured.
- ¹¹ There was little surveying or mapping of land, only a vague definition of customary land and inadequate manpower to enforce regulations (Hong, 1977:61).
- ¹² Tactics used ranged from requesting deposition of valuable property such as brassware and old jars as security against migration, to building forts in strategic areas, to establishing markers on rivers signifying the limits of settlement (Pringle, 1970:279).
- ¹³ In the 1880s the Balleh River was cleared of Ibans and declared closed to settlement. By 1895 it became apparent that Ibans had been secretly moving up a minor tributary and crossing watersheds into the Balleh (Pringle, 1970: 257).
- ¹⁴ Charles Brooke was the second Rajah in Sarawak, ruling from 1868 to 1917. He aimed at this time to establish wet rice farming but the rubber boom encouraged widespread planting of rubber.
- ¹⁵ Dayak military support and administrative structures can be seen as an important exchange for the protective attitude of the Brookes.
- ¹⁶ State claimed land was zoned as Interior Area Land and native-claimed land as Native Customary Land: together they made up nearly 70 per cent of Sarawak. But it was unclear how much of this land would remain state land as most of the customary land was unsurveyed and unadjudicated (Zaidie, 1985:16).
- ¹⁷ Attempt to deal with both of these issues had already occurred in 1952 legislation.
- ¹⁸ Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak

- 19 More than half of the Sarawak Chinese Community are rural smallholders.
- 20 Under the 1953 Forest Ordinance there were provisions that empowered the Forestry Minister to grant Communal Forest for Dayak use (Insan, 1990:12).
- 21 Communal Forest areas decreased from 306 to 54 square kilometres.
- 22 Applications were made by most longhouses in the Belaga area and many in the Baram and Limbang (Hong, 1987:78, 99-100, 116, 253-255).
- 23 Sahabat Alam Malaysia is the Malaysian branch of Friends of the Earth.
- 24 The affected Dayaks formed longhouse action committees, organised petitions, sent protest letters and made recommendations concerning suitable development to the state government (Suara S.A.M., May 1986; Insan, 1990:93; Borneo Post, 5/2/1986).
- 25 There is a strong historical base for compensation both under traditional and state law. Customary payment is part of the traditional dispute process, and amongst the Iban dates back to the sixteenth century (Kedit, 1989:6-7; McKeown, 1983:77). The Brooke courts reinforced the notion of compensation by imposing fines (Sather in McKeown, 1983:44) and today compensation for damage to customary land by logging operations is recognised in the Land Code (Insan, 1990:15).
- 26 The study was on the Kenyah at Long Selatong on the Baram.
- 27 Pierce-Colfer's research was based on the Kenyah in Kalimantan.
- 28 Each longhouse had a government-appointed headman with a three tiered hierarchy of appointed native chiefs above the longhouse.
- 29 Government enforcement of such expectations can be seen in the dismissal of a Kelabit headman because of his opposition to logging (World Rainforest Movement & S.A.M., 1989:551).
- 30 Many *Tuai Rumah* still have enormous influence over the voting patterns of a longhouse (Nicolaisen, 1986).

- ³¹ Iban unity has been restricted by the importance of 'individualism, the absence of a hierarchy of leadership and the Brooke exploitation of historical animosities where some Iban were used to "pacify" other Iban' (Kedit, 1989:5,12).
- ³² PBDS, Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak.
- ³³ Initially S.A.M.'s activities in Sarawak involved data collection and information dissemination (Suara S.A.M., 1990/A).
- ³⁴ Aliran is a public interest society formed in 1977 and is involved in social reform.
- ³⁵ Resistance tactics used since 1987 began with widespread blockading of logging sites, supported by national and international publicity, political delegations, public meetings, workshops, the formation of longhouse associations and major legal challenges. These have already been well documented by S.A.M., Insan and other authors.
- ³⁶ The Penan do have oral histories and occupation habits testifying to traditional ownership of specific areas (Brosius, 1986:175; Lian, 1988:119).
- ³⁷ The argument has not yet been tested. The case was judged statute-barred by the Kuching High Court because a complaint was not lodged within thirty six months of the disputed changes in 1951 (Malayan Law Journal, 1990:428). The case has been taken to the Supreme Court and in June 1993 was still not heard.
- ³⁸ An interesting anomaly is that the state does not recognise the customary forest areas of *menoa*, while at the same time legally recognising customary tree ownership rights within the forest that is part of *menoa*.
- ³⁹ International Tropical Timber Organisation.

REFERENCES:

- Brookfield, Harold, 1988, "The New Great Age of Clearance and Beyond", in J.S. Denslow and C. Padoch (eds.), *People of the Tropical Rainforest*, Berkeley: University of California.
- Brosius, Peter, J., 1986, "River, Forest and Mountain: The Penan Gang Landscape," *The Sarawak Museum Journal*, Vol. xxxvi, number 57, New Series, December.
- Chew, Daniel, 1990, *Chinese Pioneers on the Sarawak Frontier 1841-1941*, Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Chin, John M., 1981, *The Sarawak Chinese*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Chin, S.C., 1985, "Land Tenure", *The Sarawak Museum Journal*, Vol. xxxv, Number 56 (New Series), December, pp. 68-76.
- Colchester, Marcus, 1989, *Pirates, Squatters and Poachers. The Political Ecology of Dispossession of the Native Peoples of Sarawak*, Survival International, Insan.
- Collins, Mark, N., Sayer, Jeffrey, A, and Whitmore, Timothy. C., 1991, *The Conservation Atlas of Tropical Forests, Asia and the Pacific*, London: MacMillan.
- Cramb, R.A., 1986, "The Evolution of Iban Land Tenure", Monash University Department of Economics, Australia, Centre for South East Asian Studies Working Paper Number 39.
- _____, 1989, "Explaining Variations in Bornean Land Tenure: The Iban Case". *Ethnology*, Vol. xxviii, Number 4, October, pp. 277-300.
- _____, and Wills, I.R., 1990, "The Role of Traditional Institutions in Rural Development: Community-based Land Tenure and Government Policy in Sarawak, Malaysia", *World Development*, Vol. 18, Number 3, pp. 347-360.
- Davis, Wade and Henley, Thom., 1990, *Penan, Voice for the Borneo Rainforest*, Western Canada Wilderness Committee.

Foo, Nyuk Kian, 1986, "Land Classification and Land Tenure in Sarawak in Relation to land Development", *Sarawak Gazette*, Second Quarter Issue, July, pp. 17-21.

Gomes, Edwin. H, 1911, *Seventeen Years Among the Sea Dayaks of Borneo*, London : Seeley and Co. Ltd.

Hong, Evelyne, 1977, "Trade, Crops and Land: The Impact of Colonialism and Modernisation on Sarawak", *The Sarawak Museum Journal*, Vol. xxv, Number 46, July-December, New Series.

_____, 1987, *Natives of Sarawak: Survival in Borneo's Vanishing Forests*, Malaysia : Institute Masyarakat.

Insan, 1990, *Logging Against the Natives of Sarawak*, Selangor, Malaysia, Institute of Social Analysis.

International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (I.W.G.I.A.), 1989 *Yearbook*, April, Copenhagen.

Jayum A. Jawan, 1990. "The Dayak in Sarawak: Politics and Participation in National Development", in V.T. King and M.J.G. Parnwell (eds.), *Margins and Minorities. The Peripheral Areas and Peoples in Malaysia*, University of Hull: J.G. Hull University Press, pp. 147-163.

Kedit, Peter, M, 1988, "Iban Bejalai and Sarawak's Development" in R. Cramb and R.H.W. Reece (eds.), *Development in Sarawak*, Victoria: Monash Paper on South East Asia Number 17, Centre of South East Asian Studies, Monash University, Morphet Press.

_____, 1989, "Iban Cultural Heritage", *Sarawak Museum Journal*, Special Issue Number Four, Part IV, December, pp 1-14.

King, Victor, 1986, *Planning for Agrarian Change: Hydro-Electric Power, Resettlement and Iban Swidden Cultivators in Sarawak, East Malaysia*. University of Hull, Centre for South East Asian Studies Occasional paper Series number 11, Sub-series on South East Asian Development.

Leigh, Michael. B., 1971, *The Development of Political Organisation and Leadership in Sarawak, East Malaysia*. Ph.D. Thesis 1971, Cornell University.

_____, 1974. *The Rising Moon: Political Change in Sarawak*, Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Lian, Francis, 1988, "The Economics and Ecology of the Production of the Tropical Rainforest Resources by Tribal Groups of Sarawak, Borneo", in J. Dargavel, K. Dixon and N. Semple (eds.), *Changing Tropical Forests. Historical Perspectives on Today's Challenges in Asia, Australasia & Oceania*, Canberra, Workshop Meeting, 16-18 May 1988, Centre for Resource & Environmental Studies

Malayan Law Journal, 1990, "Jok Jau Evong and Ors V. Marabong Lumber Sdn. Bhd. & Ors." 1990/3, December 14, pp. 427-428.

McKeown, Francis. A., 1983, *The Meraki Iban: An Ethnographic Account with Special Reference to Dispute Settlement*. Ph.D. Thesis, Monash University, Victoria, Australia.

Means, Gordon. P. 1991. *Malaysian Politics. The Second Generation*, Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Nicolaisen, Ida, 1986, "Pride and Progress: The Kajang Response to Economic Change," *The Sarawak Museum Journal*, Vol. xxxvi, Number 57, December, New Series.

Ooi, Jin Bee, 1990, "Tropical Rain Forest: Trade Patterns". *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, Vol. 11, Number 2, December.

Pierce-Colfer, Carol, 1983, "Change and Indigenous Agro-forestry in East Kalimantan (continued)." *Borneo Research Bulletin*, Vol. 15, Number 2, September, pp. 70-87.

Pringle, Robert., 1970, *Rajahs and Rebels: The Iban of Sarawak Under Brooke Rule, 1841-1941*, London : Macmillan.

Reece, Robert. H.W., 1978, "The Cession of Sarawak to the British Crown in 1946." Summary of a Ph.D. Dissertation A.N.U., March 1977. *Borneo Research Bulletin*, Vol. 10, Number 1, April, pp. 110-121.

Roff, M.F., 1973, *Political Change in East Malaysia 1966-1972: Organisation, Mobilization and Incorporation*, Ph.D. Thesis, Colombia University.

Rousseau, Jerome, 1984, "Review Article: Four Theses on the Nomads of Central Borneo," *Borneo Research Bulletin*, Vol. 16, Number 1, April, p. 85-95.

S.A.M. (Sahabat Alam Malaysia), 1990, *Solving Sarawak's Forest and Native Problem*. Malaysia: S.A.M., Penang.

Sather, Clifford, 1990, "Trees and Tree Tenure in Paku Iban Society: The Management of Secondary Forest Resources in a Long-established Iban Community." *Borneo Review*, Vol. 1, Number 1, December, pp. 16-40.

Scott, James. C., 1985, *Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

_____, 1986, "Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance.", in J.C. Scott, T. Kerkvleit and Benedict. J. (eds.), *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in South East Asia* Great Britain: Frank Cass.

White, Christine Pelzer, 1986, "Everyday Resistance, Socialist Revolution and Rural Development: The Vietnamese Case," in J.C. Scott, T. Kerkvleit and Benedict. J. (eds.), *Everyday Forms of Peasant resistance in South East Asia*, Great Britain : Frank Cass.

World Rainforest Movement and Sahabat Alam Malaysia, 1989, *The Battle for Sarawak's Forests*, Penang: World Rainforest Movement and Sahabat Alam Malaysia.

Zaidie, Khaldin, Zainie, 1985, "Land Tenure in Sarawak." *Sarawak Gazette*, 2nd Quarter Issue, July, pp. 14-17.

NEWSPAPERS AND NEWSLETTERS

Australian Financial Review

August 28 1990. "Environmentalists Seek Ban on Sarawak's Rich Timber Exports". (Peter Osborne)

Borneo Post

February 5, 1986, "Affected Folk up in Arms over Bakun Power Project

March 2, 1986, "Trees Felled Illegally".

October 14, 1986, "Trouble Makers in Land Schemes Warned."

March 25, 1987, "Berawan People Oppose National Park".

June 18, 1987, "What Do the Natives Really Want".

June 20, 1987, "Penan Issue: MAA Forms Sub-committee."

August 1, 1987, "SAM Refutes Jinggut's Claim."

October 16, 1987, "Stop Blockades in Logging Areas or Face Prosecution, Warning."

October 23, 1988, "London Group Demonstrates Over Two Sarawak Issues".

April 14, 1989, "Illegal Logging: Department Identifies Culprits".

July 21, 1989, "MTO: Ample Supply of Low Grade Logs for Core Stock Production".

May 13, 1992, "100,000 Ha. Illegally Cleared by Shifting Cultivation".

Reuter Newswire-Far East

November 16, 1990, "Malaysian Forest Tribesmen Baffled by Tokyo's Concrete Jungle".

Sarawak Gazette

December 1987, "In Our Opinion. Large Scale Land Development & N.C.R." 4th Quarter Issue, p. 3.

Sarawak Tribune

May 4, 1987, "Taib Mahmud: On the Back of a Tiger".

July 15, 1987, "Japanese Support for the Penan."

April 20, 1988, "Boycott of Malaysian Timber May Have Backlash".

SUARA S.A.M

1986, "FOE Groups Plan TRF Campaign". Vol. 3, Number 2.

May 1986, "Donning the Mantle of David in Opposing Bakun." Vol. 3, Number 3

1990/A, "SAM's Response to Comments in the Star." Vol. 5, Number 4

1990/B, "Land and Forest Rights of Natives". Vol. 5, Number 5.